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ABSTRACT

Semantic Network Activation Contributes to the Relationship Between Mood and Inhibition
by
James Stephen Maniscalco

Advisor: Justin Storbeck, Ph.D.

Prior research has identified several relationships between mood and executive functions.
Very broadly, these findings generally suggest that positive moods are associated with enhanced
cognitive performance, particularly in working memory and learning. However, recent studies
note that there are some instances in which negative moods may benefit select executive skills,
such as those involved in divided attention and inhibition. In sum, these findings indicate that
positive moods favor top-down, heuristic, or relational processing, whereas negative trait moods
favor bottom-up, detail-oriented processing. However, a clear mechanism by which these effects
occur has yet to be identified.
The most compelling theories that may explain these findings include Bower’s Network
Theory of Affect and Schwarz and Clore’s Cognitive Tuning Model. While neither model
accounts fully for these research findings, they share a common basis, which states that cognitive
processes are informed by the expedient access of conceptual knowledge. The present research
study uses conceptual access (via measures of semantic network activity) as a basis to evaluate
the contribution of this activity to the relationships between trait mood and executive functions.
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One hundred and twenty research participants were administered self-report mood
surveys and standardized neuropsychological tests of executive and other cognitive functions.
The entire study dataset was organized into 3 different models to evaluate the contribution of 1)
positive trait mood alone, 2) negative trait mood alone, and 3) positive and negative trait moods
together, to examine whether the effect of trait mood on various executive functions is mediated
by semantic network activity. Means comparisons in each model reliably found that more
positive and less negative trait moods were associated with increased semantic network
activation (via verbal fluency measures) and poorer inhibition performance, whereas less positive
and more negative trait moods were reliably associated with reduced semantic network activation
and enhanced inhibition performance. No between-groups differences in semantic network
access (i.e., naming), verbal learning and memory, verbal and non-verbal attention and working
memory, psychomotor and visuolexical speed, or intellectual functioning were found. Structural
equation modeling in each model failed and was unable to identify a clear relationship between
trait mood and executive functions via semantic network activity. Correlation and canonical
correlation analyses indicated that an indirect relationship between semantic network activation
and inhibition performance exists across modalities and is most clearly identified when both
positive and negative trait moods are considered together. Specifically, increased semantic
network activation was reliably associated with poorer inhibition performance, and reduced
semantic network activation was reliably associated with enhanced inhibition performance in
each study model. The study model that considered both positive and negative trait moods
together also provided some evidence of a weak, partial mediational relationship between
inhibition and semantic network activation that neither the positive trait mood model nor the
negative trait mood model was able to identify.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Study Basis and Overview
Mood has been shown to influence quality of life, health outcomes, and general
wellbeing. Although this effect has been well known for quite some time, cognitive scientists
have turned greater attention to the effect of mood on cognitive function only within the last
three to four decades. The mood-cognition interaction has proven complex; some researchers
previously suggested that these domains function independently (Zajonc, 1980, 1984), despite
the current opinion that they are not only related, but inseparably intertwined, both in terms of
phenomenology (Duncan & Barrett, 2007; ; Erickson & Schulkin, 2003; Lazarus 1981; Lazarus,
1984; Schacter & Singer, 1962; Storbeck & Clore, 2007) and neuroanatomy (Allen, Kaut, and
Lord, 2008; Dolan, 2002; Ghashghaei & Barbas, 2002; Oschner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli,
2002).
In examining the interaction between mood and cognition, a broad body of
neuropsychological evidence suggests that these systems are interactive and can at times be fully
integrated (see Gray, 2004; Pessoa, 2008), suggesting that the whole (e.g., concerted activity of
positive affect and verbal working memory systems together) is psychologically more efficient
than the sum of its constituents (e.g., the non-concerted activity of positive affect and verbal
working memory systems acting alone). Schwarz (2002) provided a classic example of the mood
and cognition interaction, specifically that cognitive insight into extrinsic factors influencing
negative moods may abate their persistence and sequelae. Conversely, intrinsic mood has been
widely shown to influence cognitive performance on a range of tasks (Chamberlain & Sahakian,
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2006; Landro, Stiles, & Sletvold, 2001; McAllister-Williams, Ferrier, & Young, 1998).
Depression and subclinical depressive states that naturally occur have been associated with
various cognitive effects on formal clinical testing, including reduced attention, working
memory, initiation, concentration, generativity, and learning and memory (Chepenik, Cornew, &
Farah, 2007). When negative moods are induced within a non-depressed population, induced
negative moods generally hinder cognitive performance (Seibert & Ellis, 1991; Mitchell &
Phillips, 2007; Park & Banaji, 2002; however, see Forgas, 2013 for a different perspective),
whereas induced positive moods typically improve cognitive performance (Mitchell & Phillips,
2007).
A number of theories seek to explain these effects, which posit that positive moods must
be associated with enhanced cognition, particularly, in alertness and insight, which are skills that
may benefit creativity and overall cognition (Ashby, Isen, and Turken, 1999; Lyubomirsky,
King, & Diener, 2005). However, select recent findings, run contrary to the notion that positive
moods generally and very broadly benefit cognition; rather, the nature of these effects may be
situation- or task-dependent. Positive moods may lead to increased reliance on heuristic
processing, which in some tasks can result in more frequent errors due to bias and distractibility
(Bless, Clore, Galisano, Rabe, & Wolk, 1996). For example, false memories are more likely to
occur in individuals who report more positive moods (Kopelman, 1999; Pezdek & Lam, 2007) or
who are induced into a positive mood (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). These findings suggest that
positive affect is not always beneficial to cognition and memory.
Few models have emerged to explain the mood-cognition interaction; however, these
models presume a direct relationship, relying on mood as the basis for the resultant cognitive
findings. Current models fare well in explaining the wealth of cognitive findings that have led to
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the assumption that positive moods enhance cognition, but they struggle to account for the select
unexpected findings in which negative moods appear to benefit some aspects of cognition
(Andrews & Thomson, 2009), such as better memory accuracy in induced sad moods (Storbeck
& Clore, 2005, 2011; Storbeck, 2013; Zhang, Gross, & Hayne, 2016). To rectify these disparate
results, it has been suggested that negative moods exert an inhibiting effect on individuals in
these states (for a review, see Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). This inhibiting effect presumably
results in being “closed to experience,” which may be beneficial in some cognitive contexts (e.g.,
reduced distractibility and heightened attention to important, albeit minor, details due to a
propensity for systematic, bottom-up processing). These models have been extended to describe
greater analytic versus heuristic processing styles in negative mood states and a preference for
heuristic over analytic processing in positive states, which offers a compelling explanation of the
majority of cognitive findings (Huntsinger & Clore, 2007; Storbeck & Clore, 2007). Although
these models can account for a variety of findings, they do not provide a clear mechanism
(beyond “processing style”) for the phenomena observed when people are in positive or negative
moods. This suggests that the relationship between mood and cognition is not only complex but
that it may be less direct than assumed and, perhaps, mediated by a phenomenon that remains
elusive.
It is possible, then, that the field lacks a single model that fully integrates the breadth of
findings in the mood-cognition literature because there may be an indirect relationship involving
this third, unknown intermediary variable between mood and cognition. Additionally, while
negative states may exert an “inhibiting effect” on individuals, exactly what the mechanism is
that drives the inhibition and what this inhibition process affects remain unclear. Specifically,
this unnamed variable may not only contribute to the mood-cognition interaction, but it may also
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unify the seemingly paradoxical effects of specific mood states benefitting and, at the same time,
hindering select aspects of cognition described in the literature.
Semantic networks refer to the organization of stored conceptual (i.e., semantic)
information, and their activity contributes greatly to linguistic functions, working memory (more
specifically, phonological loop activity), and learning and memory (Collins & Loftus, 1975).
Interestingly, differences in the organization and interconnectedness of stored conceptual
information (i.e., the structure of semantic networks) may exist between materials of dissimilar
emotional valence (Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996; Bower, 1981; Madigan & Bollenbach,
1982; Yeh & Hua, 2009), and, therefore, may represent the intermediary variable between mood
and cognition. Disparities in processing dissimilarly-valenced information have been
investigated as the basis for differences in processing styles across the mood spectrum, which
has yielded the expected conclusions already described: generally, happier moods are thought to
engage greater cognitive resources leading to a propensity for top-down, heuristic processes,
whereas depressed moods engage fewer resources allowing for bottom-up, detailed analytic
processing. The processing style-centered focus in examining the mood-cognition interaction is
complex and may neglect primary factors that could significantly contribute to these effects.
Semantic network activity may potentially be one such factor acting as the intermediate process
between mood and cognition, given its role in the various cognitive skills that appear to be
affected by mood (Emmorey, 2002). Further, depressive neuropsychological profiles involve
limited and ruminative thought content (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008;
Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000), reduced verbal output and generativity, and poorer
phonological loop activity in verbal encoding (Daneman & Merikle, 1996). Thus, the “inhibiting
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effect” could very well be centralized to inhibition of semantic network activity in such negative
states.
Prior research has failed to investigate the extent to which activity within semantic
networks contributes to the mood-cognition interaction. Executive functions are a set of
cognitive abilities that work to direct cognition, and, thus, represent an important starting point in
examining mood-cognition relationships and the effects that semantic activity plays in them.
Therefore, the goal of this study was to examine the role of semantic network activity in
executive functions across basic trait mood states (i.e., positive or negative) in the general
population. A range of executive abilities were assessed via standardized neuropsychological
tests in individuals reporting a range of mood symptoms, which categorized individuals into
mood groups. In addition, specialized analyses were applied to the results of an auditory naming
task and a category fluency task to examine semantic network activity. To date, similar analyses
have been used to describe populations with neuropsychiatric conditions that are non-remitting
and usually progressive and/or severe (see Chan et al., 1993; Chan et al., 1995; Paulsen et al.,
1996). The findings of these procedures were entered into a statistical model to understand the
extent to which semantic network activity drives the effect of mood on executive function in the
general population. It is hoped that the results of this work will improve understanding of the
mood-cognition interaction, and serve as the basis for future research of the utility of semantic
network activity measures in cognitive science and clinical practice in conditions in which
semantic network systems are affected.

The Role of Emotions
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Emotions have eluded definition since well before James (1884) attempted to describe
them. There remains recent discussion of the differences among emotion, affect, mood, and
feelings (Barrett, 2006; Russell, 1980; Russell & Barrett, 1999); despite this distinction, these
terms are generally used interchangeably throughout this document.
Emotions represent discrete affective states. According to the circumplex model (Russell,
1980), emotions are experienced along two dimensions: 1) valence (i.e., pleasantness), and 2)
arousal. Emotions are, thus, thought to represent evolutionary signals that alert us to the
attentional and behavioral demands of a situation. They give us important information used in
decision-making (Wyer & Carlston, 1979) and act as alarms for when situations require action or
when such situations resolve/no longer require action (Frijda, 1988). Emotions typically arise
from a clear, distinct object or situation (e.g., feeling sad due to the death of a friend) (Clore &
Ortony, 2000; Lazarus, 1980); however, emotions or their causes can be unconscious, making
such attributions unnecessary or superfluous (Winkielman & Berridge, 2004).
Moods, conversely, are traditionally defined as free-floating affective states that typically
lack a clear identifiable object or situation, but importantly, can still convey informative value
and influence cognitive processing styles (Clore et al., 2001). Specifically, moods, conscious or
otherwise, tell us about our environments, the things we find in them, and the situations in them
in which we find ourselves. In other words, we sometimes experience feelings or moods that
appear objectless (e.g., when one can state “I am feeling sad today.”). Schwarz and Clore (1983)
theorized in their “affect-as-information” hypothesis that the informative value contained in
affective (mood) states, that is, how we feel about things, serves to influence our decisions,
judgments, and future behaviors. The subjective “goodness” of things, experiences, and
situations can be gleaned from our affective states, which informs us about our internal appraisal
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processes of these things (Clore & Tamir, 2002). Given that moods may reflect these states and
serve as the basis for consciously or unconsciously judging value, emotions work as motivational
forces towards or away from action (Schwarz & Bohner, 1996).
As such, it is clear that emotions and moods are very likely to affect cognitive skills, and
vice versa. Indeed, both top-down and bottom-up processes have major roles in emotional
experiences, and specific experiences likely have unique signatures involving differing
proportions of top-down and bottom-up factors (Clore & Ortony, 2000). The effect of emotion
on specific cognitive skills is described in the so-entitled subsection below.
While emotions may represent universal signals for approach or avoidance, there may be
great variability between specific affective states experienced within and between individuals.
For example, the happiness experienced by winning a game of chess is likely to differ from that
experienced by the same person after winning the lottery. Similarly, the sadness felt grieving a
spouse is probably distinct between two different recently widowed individuals. This fact has
been well characterized by Gohm and Clore (2002), who reported that the individual differences
between emotional experiences are numerous and can be found between different aspects of
emotional experiences, including their clarity, intensity, and expression. In the same vein, there
must be similar variability within and between individuals regarding cognition and the
contribution of mood to cognitive functioning.
Despite the variability in emotional experience, people generally have good insight into
their affective states. Self-report has been shown to be effective in measuring emotional
experience (Clore, 1994). However, it is important to note that this is not always the case. Selfreport may result in (inadvertently) biased reporting, as generating responses may depend on the
accessibility of factors that are contributory to mood (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Similarly,
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experimental evidence suggests that the experience of emotion may be confined by linguistic
abilities and processes (Bann, 2012; Barrett, 2006; Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & Russell,
2006). These may be crucial aspects to understanding the interaction between emotion and
cognition: 1) the semantic processes involved in conceptualizing emotion and cognitive thought
(i.e., the factors that allow for appraisal of self, items, situations, and experiences), and 2) the
accessibility of these emotional and cognitive factors. These aspects, in particular, as they relate
to executive functions, served as main areas of study for this research.

Models of the Mood-Cognition Interaction
A number of models have been put forth to describe the effect of mood on cognition. The
two most comprehensive models emerged in the first half of the 1980s, however, they spawned
differing lines of research. The first model, described by Bower (1981), is a theory reliant on
semantic networks of stored conceptual knowledge, with much of the research focused on the
effects of mood on memory. The second model, as already described in the section above, was
put forth by Schwarz and Clore (1983), and it focuses on the informational value of moods and
the effects they exert on judgments and decision-making, and has served as the basis of various
derivatives of this kind of processing model that have been proposed, as well (see Bless, 2001;
Forgas, 2005; Martin, 2001). These models, respectively, the Network Theory of Affect and the
Cognitive Tuning model (which is heavily reliant on the affect-as-information hypothesis), are
described in greater detail below.
The Network Theory of Affect (Bower, 1981)
Using prior theoretical discussions of semantic network as a structure of conceptual
information, Bower (1981) attempted to describe the effect of mood on memory. Citing semantic
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network models of memory (Quillian, 1967) and semantic processing (Collins & Loftus, 1975)
that were derived by cognitive psychologists trying to understand how general information is
mentally organized, Bower’s model assumes that activation of internalized concepts spreads
throughout semantic networks from active concepts to associated, inactive concepts. His model
further posits that the linguistic labels used to describe affective states represent nodes within
semantic networks and that subjective affective experiences serve to activate these nodes and
spread to closely related, mood-congruent nodes (i.e., within the proximate semantic
neighborhood surrounding an emotion node). For instance, thinking about death may activate
related semantic concepts, emotional memories, autonomic patterns, and expressive behaviors
and may inhibit other emotional nodes (e.g., happiness). Bower, thus, expected two effects
according to his model: mood-dependent retrieval and mood-congruent memory.
Mood-dependent retrieval refers to increased effectiveness in recalling memories when
an individual’s affective state matches that originally experienced during encoding.
Results from studies of mood-dependent memory research in adult and child populations are
mixed (Blaney, 1986). For example, mood-dependent recall of positive and negative stimuli may
be necessary for children’s social learning and their ability to regulate mood (Nasby & Yando,
1982). There additionally exists some evidence that in adults, thoughts related to emotions are
activated by positive moods but less so for negative moods, which may be related to emotion
regulation (Mackie & Worth, 1989). However, it is assumed that mood regulation and social
learning are mastered by adulthood, calling into question the need for mood dependence in
adults. As demonstrated by Eich and colleagues (1989; 1994), mood-dependent memory may
rely on internal versus external cues. In their studies, Eich et al. argued that after mood induction,
external events and their outcomes are more likely to be remembered than internal events, such
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as an individual’s affective state or reasoning processes. However, these researchers found that it
was internal events that appeared to be more closely tied to mood and were possibly affected by
mood induction-related arousal. It is, therefore, unclear whether the mood dependence
phenomenon is due to mood rather than to arousal states (especially in less significant changes in
mood), or to the interaction between mood and arousal.
The second prediction according to Bower’s model, that is, mood-congruent memory,
which presumes that current moods determine the affective association of memories recalled, has
yielded stronger support. For example, mood congruent effects have been reported in the speed
of recall for unpleasant or pleasant events after a mood-congruent induction (Teasdale &
Fogarty, 1979). Thus, individuals induced into a positive affective state were faster to recall
events that were positive than negative (or neutral). Unfortunately, instead of a perfect crossover
interaction, in which positive moods would facilitate positive memories and negative moods
would facilitate negative memories, inconsistent effects were often found. Namely, positive
affect increased the recall of positive memories, but negative affect did not increase the recall of
negative memories. Thus, these effects might be explained by non-mood factors and may be
difficult to detect in everyday experiences, which is true in both clinical and healthy samples
(Mayer, McCormick, & Strong, 1995). Alternatively, it is possible that because Bower’s
Network model assumes that emotions function as nodes within the network that are at more
regularly active than non-emotional nodes (Matthews & Southall, 1991), this leads to activity
traces towards proximate, or more closely-related, nodes within the network as activity spreads
(McClelland & Rumelhardt, 1981), potentially causing the blending of emotional to nonemotional nodes (Ingram, 1984). These results also obscure Bower’s mood-congruent memory
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predictions; as Bower (1987), himself, concedes in his commentary, via multiple lines of
research, the Network Theory of Affect falls short.
While support for the Network Theory is weak, this may reflect biases in the tasks used
to assess this model. As pointed out by Lewis and Critchley (2003), semantic network models
may have a neural basis, and emotional memory nodes must connect to various nodes (including
the emotion itself, associated autonomic and overt behavioral responses, and other situations
related to the emotion). Though it would be quite difficult to demonstrate that emotional
memories interact with mood states or the directionality of the interaction as either positive or
negative, as these authors suggest, it is possible that the field has relied too heavily on outdated
predictions of this model. Specifically, the expectation of mood-congruent effects and mooddependent memory, and the assumption that emotions, themselves, represent active network
nodes during subjective affective experience may be inaccurate.
Cognitive Tuning Model
The most compelling model that seeks to explain the interaction between mood and
cognition involves a process known as cognitive tuning. Cognitive tuning refers to the belief that
distinct, everyday situations require different processing demands. As such, situational demands
influence our emotional responses to the situation and direct attentional/cognitive resources to
deal with these demands (Rusting, 1998; Schwarz, 2002). More succinctly, as Schwarz (2002)
explains, affective feelings alarm us to what situations require. Moreover, experienced feelings
may precede cognitions (McLemee, 2003) and need not be cognitively attributed to the stimuli
that elicit them (Schwarz & Clore, 2003).
An essential hypothesis of this model was described by Schwarz and Clore (1983) as
“affect-as-information.” This view differentiates between effects on judgments and those on
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cognitive processing. Judgment effects suggest that affective states serve as a basis for judging
the way one feels about something, therefore, representing information regarding what is
important/salient or not important/salient, liked or disliked, or valued positively or negatively
(Clore & Palmer, 2009; Clore & Schnall, 2005). Processing effects suggest that affective states
serve as information about how one is performing on a task, signaling whether the current
processing style is either sufficient or problematic. Therefore, affective feelings provide
feedback from appraisal processes that is contextually useful. This has been supported by studies
of individuals with different feedback-integrating capacities: those adept at applying affective
feedback demonstrate enhanced functioning (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004), and individuals
who are unable to integrate this feedback (e.g., due to brain damage) demonstrate impaired
judgment and decision-making (Damasio, 1994).
Multiple lines of behavioral research have lent support to this hypothesis, as well. There
is much evidence to suggest that affect regulates multiple cognitive domains. These include
global/local processing (Gasper & Clore, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2007), semantic priming
(Storbeck & Clore, 2005), heuristic “schema-based” memory (Bless, Clore, Galisano, Rabe, &
Wolk, 1996), stereotyping (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994), and false memories
(Storbeck & Clore, 2005). While these effects are readily seen in positive moods, nonpathological sad moods, on the other hand, may not induce such noteworthy responses and may
even reduce such common cognitive phenomena (e.g., reduce semantic priming; see Forgas,
2013; Storbeck & Clore, 2007; and for a discussion of the effects of pathological sad moods,
refer to the Depression subsection below). In sum, positive affect enhances dominant styles of
processing resulting in broadened cognition (Frederickson & Branigan, 2005), flexibility (Ashby
et al., 1999), and creativity (Erez & Isen, 2002; Fielder, 2001) and promotes heuristic or
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relational processing, whereas negative affect promotes analytic or referential processing (Clore
& Huntsinger, 2007; Gasper, 2000; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Storbeck & Clore, 2007).
While the Network and Cognitive Tuning models may appear disjointed in regard to their
focus, they ultimately share a key feature: they describe the access of knowledge as it is affected
by mood. Concept access appears to be influenced by mood, with positive moods increasing
access and negative moods decreasing access, and may be crucial to our understanding of the
interaction between mood and various cognitive skills.

The Effect of Mood on Concept Access
The effect of mood on cognition has been well documented. Bower (1983) put forth three
general conclusions that mood states 1) influence learning and memory systems, 2) direct
attentional resources, and 3) affect a wide range of cognitive skills. These claims, in a very
general sense, summarize and underscore findings from much of the mood-cognition literature
published well before and well after Bower’s work: in specific contexts, information processing
and a multitude of specific cognitive skills are influenced by mood (Friedman & Forster, 2010;
Schwarz & Clore, 2007).
Easterbrook (1959) hypothesized that arousal states, which are an important component
of emotional experiences, affect the scope of attentional focus. Various bodies of research have
indicated that this hypothesis accurately predicts constricted, or the narrowing of, perceptual
abilities across various modalities in high arousal/negative valence states (Burke, Heuer, &
Reisberg, 1992; Cacioppo, Berntson, & Crites, 1996; Tyler & Tucker, 1981). This narrowing of
attention is widely considered to be adaptive, as moderate levels of psychological stress may
intensify motivation, recruit complex problem-solving resources (Andrews & Thomson, 2009),
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and narrow focus to stimulus-based properties (i.e., identify and/or select dangerous entities in
the environment). It is intuitive that arousal and, to a lesser extent, negative valence may signal
potentially problematic situations (Schwarz, 1990), as they require narrowed focus at the expense
of extraneous details or broadened attention, which shields one from distraction. However, there
is recent debate and evidence for whether an emotion such as desire, which is marked by a
positive valence and high arousal/intensity, can also narrow attention, suggesting that narrowed
attention may not be specific to negative/high arousal states per se (see Harmon-Jones & Gable,
2010) and that similar cognitive and attentional effects should arise in negative, high arousing
states. Conversely, positive or low arousing affect may signal safety and exploration, which may
allow for the broadening of attention and one’s scope of focus, as well as for updating mental
representations (Friedman & Forster, 2010). An intriguing theory in support of this was put forth
by Dreisbach and Goshcke (2004; 2006), who suggested that positive affect increases
distractibility rather than attentional maintenance or perseveration.
Indeed, positive mood states have been shown to broaden the scope of attention by
focusing on the global rather than local features of a stimulus (Frederickson & Branigan, 2005;
Gasper & Clore, 2002), as indicated by reduced peripheral suppression of visual stimuli (Rowe,
Hirsch, & Anderson, 2007) and greater interference on a visual Flanker task in which
respondents are asked to ignore peripheral stimuli (Rowe et al., 2007). Isen and her colleagues
(1984, 1985, 1987) demonstrated that positive moods led to more inclusive categorization
decisions in auditory semantic tasks and increased creativity in remote association tasks, both of
which require greater accessibility of stored conceptual information (Dreisbach & Goshcke,
2004; Nadler, Rabi, & Minda, 1995, 2010; Rowe et al., 2007; Schooler & Melcher, 1995) and/or
facilitation of processing distant semantic relationships (Federmeier, Kirson, Moreno, & Kutas,
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2001). As one might expect, the inverse was also demonstrated via the work of Mikulincer,
Kedem, and Paz (1990), who showed that negative moods led to reduced category inclusion.
Taken together, these studies suggest that mood states flexibly affect perceptual and cognitive
performance and, perhaps, more importantly, conceptual activation (Huntsinger, 2013), while at
the same time lending support to the processing-style effects described above (i.e., positive
moods lead to relational processing while negative moods lead to referential processing).
Conceptual activation, as Schwarz (1998) points out in his review, involves content called to
mind and the ease at which this occurs, which functions as an important, albeit not completely
understood, factor affecting cognition. The potential role of mood in conceptual access (i.e.,
target content called to mind) and activation (i.e., the spread of access to semantically-related
content, including concepts that are proximal and those that are distal) serves as the basis of the
semantic network activity-related hypotheses described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, which is
an extension of previously described models (Bower, Montiero, & Gilligan, 1978; Isen, Shalker,
Clark, & Karp, 1978).

The Effect of Mood on Specific Cognitive Functions
Multiple lines of research and decades of clinical findings have demonstrated that mood
can significantly affect various cognitive functions. Among those most commonly described
include the effects of mood on perception, memory, information processing, and
frontal/executive functions; selected findings are discussed in the subsections below.
The Effect of Mood on Perception
Moods may affect sensory-perceptual processes. As Frederickson (2001) suggested,
moods influence the attentional scope, which can influence perception. For example, cognitive
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tasks, such as those described above, have shown that moods affect the global/local aspects of
visual processing. This is further supported by EEG and fMRI studies reporting that the sensory
encoding of visual stimuli may be facilitated by naturally occurring selective attention (Schupp,
Junghofer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003). Moreover, fear (or high arousal states) appears to increase
the perception of low spatial frequencies, which may benefit attention and navigation (Song &
Keil, 2013; Susskind et al., 2008). However, perceptual effects are not limited to laboratory
settings, as perception of the physical world appears to be susceptible to the effects of mood.
Explicit judgments of hill steepness have been shown to be increased by mood following a sad
mood induction (Reiner, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Clore, 2003), hardship (such as the weight of a
backpack; Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), and fear (as induced by potential risk; Stefanucci, Proffitt, &
Clore, 2005). Taken together, these findings suggest that affective reactions do indeed influence
the manner in which sensory information is taken in and interpreted.
The Effect of Mood on Memory
Mood has been shown to affect various forms of memory in both healthy individuals and
individuals with depression. This section will review select findings of the effects mood exerts
on explicit memory in healthy individuals.
First, it is important to note that explicit memory involves the recall of information that is
personal (i.e., autobiographical memory) and factual (i.e., semantic memory). Both systems
appear to be influenced by mood, as dysphoric mood has been shown to reduce autobiographical
and semantic memory, respectively, via autobiographical recall and lexical recognition memory
paradigms (Ramponi, Barnard & Nimmo-Smith, 2004).
Autobiographical memory involves knowledge relating to the self, experienced events,
and life episodes of varying duration. Various research paradigms have shown that this system is
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clearly affected by mood. The Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent,
1986) is a tool used to assess specificity in autobiographical memories and has been effective in
demonstrating reduced episodic memory in sadder individuals (Yueng, Dalgleish, Golden, &
Schartau, 2006). In addition, the content of autobiographical memories has been shown to be
influenced by mood, as well. In a study of hypnosis-induced mood states, Natale and Hantas
(1982) showed that negative moods led to increased negative and decreased positive
autobiographical recall, whereas hypnosis-induced positive moods led to increased positive and
decreased negative autobiographical recall. Though more recent findings suggest that induced
negative moods often reveal no benefit of recalling positive or negative events, induced positive
affect does lead to enhanced recall of positive, but not negative, events, thereby, revealing an
asymmetric effect of mood on memory (see Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1987). These findings might
suggest that the content of self-knowledge activated during recall and the clarity of that
knowledge are influenced by mood.
Semantic memory refers to learning and recall systems that deal with information that is
factual and non-personal. While memory recall accuracy and performance speed typically do not
reveal significant differences based on mood, there is some evidence of an effect of mood on
semantic memory. In a study of learning brand names, Lee and Sternthal (1999) showed that
individuals in positive moods demonstrated improved learning and clustering (i.e., relational
processing). These authors suggest that novel information rehearsal may be enhanced in positive
moods, which could be interpreted as improved phonological loop activity or a different effect
that is not dissimilar to experiential openness or broadening in positive moods described above
(or in Schwarz’s (2002) words, “playful exploration”). While this evidence may not be extremely
powerful to suggest semantic memory is affected by mood, it is important to consider that mood
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intensity and task demands are important in memory effects, and that low intensity moods, such
as those that induction procedures typically yield, may exert minimally demonstrable effects
(Ellis, 1985).
Although semantic memory deals with facts that are known truths, insight as to how
mood affects this system may be gleaned by examining errors. In particular, examining the
literature related to the loss of known material (i.e., forgetting) and the construction of erroneous
material (i.e., false memory) yield more evidence of such a relationship. Anderson, Bjork, and
Bjork (1994) described retrieval-induced forgetting in characterizing prior list-learning studies
that reported slower word recognition when participants were cued with semantically-related
primes. This effect has been theorized as being due to suppression of unrelated words (i.e.,
within the same semantic neighborhood) or interference of a prepotent response to access words
related to target semantic network nodes. Retrieval-induced forgetting has been shown to occur
more frequently in positive moods as opposed to neutral or negative moods (Bauml &
Kuhbandner, 2007), as has false memory construction (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Reasonable
arguments could be made that 1) the semantic memory system can be influenced by mood, and
2) semantic network activity may contribute to this system’s functioning. These points have been
supported by Storbeck and Clore (2005), who showed that music-induced negative moods led to
reduced false memories in a Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, compared to
individuals with induced positive or natural (i.e., non-manipulated) moods. These authors also
suggest that this effect is a function of semantic access at encoding rather than enhanced
monitoring during retrieval, which is a point further supported by event-related potential studies
(for an example, see Kiefer, Schuch, Schenck, & Fielder, 2007) and semantic priming studies
(Storbeck & Clore, 2008). While this does provide strong evidence that the semantic memory
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system may be susceptible to mood effects, the results of the studies noted above should be
approached cautiously. It is difficult to differentiate the influence of valence versus arousal, and
in fact, the latter has been previously suggested as the most important factor in generating false
memories in DRM paradigms, regardless of whether valence is positive or negative (Corson &
Verrier, 2007).
The Effect of Mood on Frontal/Executive Functions
Frontal/executive functions comprise various cognitive skills, including attentional
control, working memory, planning, decision-making, code switching, inhibition, errordetection, and cognitive control. These functions clearly are quite mixed, and, as could be
expected, research results pertaining to the effect of mood on these abilities are similarly mixed
(and, at times, contradictory). However, a wealth of evidence supports the general conclusion
that there is, indeed, an effect of mood on these skills (Chepenik, Cornew, & Farah, 2007;
Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, & Williams, 1996; Phillips, Smith, & Gilhooly, 2002). One issue
underlying inconsistent results is that investigations using clinical samples may be
overrepresented. The studies discussed in this subsection focus on non-clinical samples; those
involving clinical depression are discussed in the Depression subsection below.
Attention is generally considered a basic frontal lobe function. It involves sustained
awareness and orientation to stimuli deemed important to task demands. It, therefore, likely
contributes to a number of executive abilities, particularly those related to goal-oriented
behavior. In examining the effect of mood on attention, McConnell and Shore (2011) used a
musical mood-induction technique in addition to the Attention Network Test (Fan, McCandliss,
Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). Their findings suggest that both emotional arousal and
emotional valence affect attention systems, though arousal appeared more important in directing
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participants’ attention. This is intuitive if arousal is considered to be a signal of the urgency of a
stimulus; situations involving threat of immediate harm demand immediate attention for survival.
Because these situations are threatening, high arousal contexts are most probably associated with
negatively valenced emotions.
Working memory involves holding and manipulating or using information in short-term
storage. A variety of findings indicate an effect of mood on working memory. Gray (2001)
showed a double dissociation between spatial and verbal working memory using equivalent 2back tasks. Specifically, he found enhanced spatial and impaired verbal working memory after
induced negative states and impaired spatial and enhanced verbal working memory after induced
positive states, arguing that emotion prioritizes the active goals that are maintained in working
memory. Gray, Braver, and Raichle (2002) later presented imaging evidence supporting
prefrontal integration of mood and working memory in a similar cognitive task. Their findings
were interpreted to reveal the interconnectedness of emotional and cognitive task demands, such
that the integration of these factors reflects the psychological load necessary to maintain and
address these demands. Similarly, Storbeck and colleagues (2015) used mood induction and a 2back task to expand on the negative-spatial/positive-verbal effect. They showed that emotion and
task incompatibility (i.e., positive/spatial & negative/verbal) required greater cognitive effort and
increased behavioral control and that they may have led to increased negative affect. Thus, there
appears to be a clear link between emotion, working memory, and cognitive control processes
involved in addressing situational demands. Cognitive control refers to the processes that direct
information-processing flexibly (Posner & Snyder, 1975), which functions to regulate attention,
working memory, inhibition, and self-monitoring. One way in which control is assessed is via
tasks that require working memory abilities while preventing interference (Conway et al, 2005),
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such as the operation span task (OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 1989). Research involving these tasks
has shown that working memory capacity involves greater attentional control (in general, and
when necessary, to resist interference), as opposed to memory storage (Engle, 2002; Kane &
Engle, 2000; Unsworth & Engle, 2005). Generally, cognitive control is believed to be enhanced
in positive mood states (Yuan et al., 2011). For example, positive moods may enhance verbal
(Yang, Yang, & Isen, 2012) or spatial working memory span (Storbeck & Maswood, 2016).
These between-domain differences can be interpreted to demonstrate that the effects of mood
influence cognitive control rather than specific frontal abilities. This supports Gray’s (2001)
claim that cognitive resources that are typically dedicated to control functions may be allocated
differentially depending on present mood states. For example, Martin and Kerns (2011) reported
that while controlled working memory storage may be reduced in positive states, inhibitory
processes assessed using Stroop (Stroop, 1935) and Flanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) tasks may
not. Others, however, have found positive moods to lead to greater Stroop interference (Philips,
Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). This finding is similar to those cited in studies mentioned above,
in that positivity has been shown to induce relational processing, whereas negative moods appear
to favor item-specific processing (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Thus the affect-as-information
perspective may be useful in understanding the effects of mood on working memory and
cognitive control: broadened processing may benefit verbal tasks, and narrow, detail-oriented
processing may benefit spatial tasks, and congruity between affective states and task demands
may play an important role in effort, performance, and subsequent affect (i.e., that which is
reactive to task difficulty, performance, etc.).
The effects of negative emotional states on cognition are varied and generally taskand/or context-specific. As above, negative moods can impair cognitive skills, such as the type
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of flexible thinking involved in solving syllogisms (Radenhausen & Anker, 1988), the skills
involved in integrating environmental feedback and self-monitoring (Davis & Nolen, Hoeksema,
2000), and the skills involved in verbal generativity (Bartolic, Basso, Schefft, Glauser, &
Titanic-Schefft, 1999). However, although some of these abilities may play a role in executive
control, evidence exists to suggest that negative moods exert minimal effects on executive
control (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007), which may be on par with neutral moods in tasks requiring
proactive or reactive control (Dreisbach, 2006; Martin & Kerns, 2011). On the other hand,
negative moods have been shown to improve performance on tasks requiring reactive control
after errors are made (Kuhbander & Zehetleitner, 2011; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel,
2010), which would be consistent with the idea that negative affect works to signal that
something is wrong in the environment and that processing must be slowed (or inhibited) to
identify and further understand whatever problematic aspects of the environment exist. Thus, the
influence of negative affect should be considered nuanced, as these states may, at times, exert
little to no effect on executive functions, and at other times, enhance or impair select aspects of
these functions (Storbeck & Maswood, 2016).
Verbal generativity is of particular interest and has reliably been shown to be affected by
mood. Generally speaking, negative moods typically result in poorer performance on semantic
fluency tasks (Baker, Frith, & Dolan, 1997). However, these results should be examined closely
to appreciate the scope of what is meant by the term “fluency.” Prior work has shown that
individuals in negative moods may perform no differently than individuals in positive or neutral
moods on letter fluency tests (Carvalho, 2008; Clark, Iverson, & Goodwin, 2001) and better on
figural fluency tasks (Bartolic et al., 1999). It would, therefore, appear that negative moods are
not necessarily associated with retrieval difficulties, but rather with reduced access to the
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semantic concepts required in category fluency tasks. As previously suggested, semantic
processing plays an important role in cognitive functions, especially in the skills assessed via
lexical tasks (Ellis, Thomas, & Rodriguez, 1984). As Seibert and Ellis (1991) argued, positive
moods lead to greater activation of mood-salient, but task-irrelevant concepts. This would be
consistent with the proposed model stating that semantic network activity contributes to the
interaction between mood and executive function. Specifically, positive moods may lead to
broadened, relational processing via greater semantic concept activation, whereas negative
moods may lead to narrowed, analytic processing via restricted semantic activation, which has
major implications for executive abilities.

Greater Detail on the Importance of Executive Functions to Cognition
Executive functions refer to a set of specific cognitive abilities generally believed to be
related to goal-directed behaviors, which exert a supervisory role in overall cognition (Gilbert &
Burgess, 2008). These include planning and executing behaviors, judgment, abstract reasoning,
cognitive/task set-shifting, inhibition, problem-solving, and working memory (Brandt et al.,
2009; Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006; Miyake, Freidman, Emerson, Witzki, &
Howerter, 2000). Although these skills are unified in a global cognitive context, they are thought
to be diverse and potentially separable. Despite this potential separability, executive function is
greater than the sum of its discrete parts, especially in dealing with conceptual information, as
indicated by recent meta-analyses (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Carpenter, Just, & Reichle, 2000).
If these skills must act in concert, what exactly do they do? Despite varied theories of
executive function, there is good conceptual overlap as to their purpose. Many of these theories
posit that executive functions activate schemas in routine and non-routine mental processes. In
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other words, these abilities direct attentional resources to meet the demands of a situation (and
when necessary, do so above the demands of one’s inner mental or emotional state, or other
“local” considerations), to organize complex thought and prioritize goals (Bull, Phillips, &
Conway, 2007; Miller & Wallis, 2009). As Miller and Wallis (2009) stated, executive functions
“take charge” of cognition to coordinate lower-level (e.g., sensory and motor functions) and
higher-level cognitive functions (e.g., memory and planning) as an intermediary and arbitrator
between these processes. Specifically, executive functions should be considered paramount, out
of all the abilities that cognition comprises, to tuning and directing cognitive resources, thoughts,
and behaviors for successful adaptation to the environment.
Evolutionarily and developmentally, these notions are crucial. In studies of early
childhood, executive functions are reliably found to be necessary for intact social function and,
specifically, in perspective-taking and selection (Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010). Further,
this allows for learning and integrating information, both experientially and socially, to be
applied in future novel situations (Zelazo, Craik, & Booth, 2004). A Piagetian perspective shows
that these abilities develop to control action; “embodied cognition” (i.e., information learning in
the sensorimotor period) leads to procedural learning and affects semantic memory acquisition
(Best & Miller, 2010; Koziol, Budding, & Chidekel, 2012). Later stages of cognitive
development in childhood deal with the organization and integration of this knowledge and are
characterized by the emergence of skills related to working memory and inhibitory control
processes, which may continue to develop well into adulthood (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002;
Steinberg, 2007). Further, inhibitory control over thoughts and actions has been implicated in
studies using a “Less is More” reward-based decisional paradigm, in which individuals shown
two quantities are instructed to point to the smaller quantity in order to receive the larger quantity
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as a reward. In studies using this paradigm in preschool-aged children, results suggest that
performance may represent a function of the semantic processing of the symbolic distance of the
key points of the task instructions (i.e., choosing the smaller quantity to receive the larger
quantity requires processing the disparity between wanting the larger quantity but choosing the
smaller quantity, and inhibiting prepotent behavioral responses to indicate that the larger quantity
is desired). This processing is believed to be akin to verbal abilities related to internal-state
language used in inner reasoning skills, beyond what would be expected based on vocabulary
size alone (Carlson, Davis, & Leach, 2005; Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004). Thus, early
development may be characterized as a period in which the links between executive functions,
linguistic abilities, and other cognitive functions are established.
These links, however, may break down or disintegrate in late-life development. For
instance, fronto-striatal age-related changes may reduce executive abilities, yielding reduced
memory and cognitive reserve in late life (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Buckner, 2004; GunningDixon & Raz, 2000; Volkow et al., 1998). Indeed, executive functions have been found to be
more powerful predictors in elderly functional decline and mortality than overall cognition
(Johnson, Liu, & Yaffe 2007), and they appear to be the most greatly affected cognitive ability in
aging (Treitz, Heyder, & Daum, 2007). Specifically, executive decline may be used to
psychometrically predict various changes that occur in aging, such as: 1) gait dysfunction and
postural instability, 2) global cognition and memory decrement (to the level of differentiating
healthy, impaired, and demented individuals who are similarly aged), and 3) the conversion of
Mild Cognitive Impairment to frank dementia (Brandt et al., 2009; Ijmker & Lamoth, 2012;
Mugas, Reed, & Kramer, 2003; Yogev, Huasdorff, & Giladi, 2008).
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In sum, executive functions are important and critical to successful goal completion.
They are state-dependent, as shown in behavioral and neurochemical investigations (see Robbins
& Arnsten, 2009), and have major implications for individuals’ functioning. This is highlighted
throughout various fields of research: these skills are compromised in various clinical
syndromes, including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, substance abuse disorder, and
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and they may be the strongest predictors of independence
and health outcomes (Banich, 2009; Hanks, Rapport, Millis, & Deshpande, 1999; Snyder, 2013;
Watkins & Brown, 2002; Wells & Matthews, 1996).
Given these findings, their role in situationally-based cognitive tuning, and potential
linguistic aspects, executive functions were chosen as the focus for the current research. While
much of the following material in this chapter discusses the interaction between mood and
overall cognition, the reader’s attention should be oriented to the leading role played by
executive function.

The Relationship of Language to Mood and Cognition
As noted in the Overview above, it is believed that mood and cognition are inseparable.
Language and thought are viewed by many as inseparable as well (Carruthers, 2012; Chomsky,
1997; Perlovsky, 2009; Seleskovitch, 1978). A number of essential questions exist related to
language and cognition. Do we think in words? Are semantic labels representative of our
thoughts or reflective of communicative needs? Does semantic meaning change as cognition
matures? These enduring questions are beyond the scope of this work, but they reflect
philosophical questions posed even since ancient times.
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Language acts as a bridge between the self and the world and the self and others.
Information is taken in from the world, and in an effort to understand, or more simply, organize
this information, it becomes linguistically labelled. Semantic labels have personal meanings,
which may be idiosyncratic; however, on the whole, language is consensual (Rosch, 1973;
Tversky, 1977). Language allows for the understanding of inner needs, thoughts, beliefs, and
feelings, and it allows these things to be communicated to other individuals, who are able to
understand the communication because they have independently internalized corresponding
conceptual information and applied similar semantic labels to it.
Language, like emotion, is powerful and can affect cognition. It can affect visual
(Davidoff, 2001; Lucy, 1997; van Brakel, 1993) and spatial perception (Levinson, 1996;
Pederson, Danziger, Wilkins, & Senft, 1998), as well as cognitive concept formation and
organization (Steels & Belpaeme, 2005; Zhang & Nisbett, 2004). Language also can influence
the understanding of phenomenological experience, such as our affective states (Pons, Lawson,
Harris, & De Rosnay, 2003; Wellman, Harris, Banerjee, & Sinclair, 1995). Emotions are abstract
and their linguistic processing requires accessibility and/or imaginability. As such, a number of
research studies have examined emotional words and the ways in which they affect cognition.
Emotional words are processed differently than concrete words (Altarriba & Bauer, 2007)
and they can, therefore, lead to unique priming effects. Lexical decision tasks have been used to
show that controlled and automatic priming and encoding of emotional words are affected by
various factors, including mood (Matthews, Pitcaithly, & Mann, 1995). In a series of studies
using lexical decision tasks, it was found that semantic evaluation precedes affective evaluation,
and affective information may be a subset or subordinate category within the semantic network
(Storbeck & Clore, 2007; Storbeck & Robinson, 2004; Storbeck, Robinson, Ram, Meier, &
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Clore, 2004), suggesting that these processes share a similar mechanism (Kemp, Wheeler, &
Hill, 1992; Klauer & Musch, 2002). As suggested by Storbeck and Clore (2007), identification
should be necessary to retrieve evaluative information, as identification must tap into semantic
knowledge for accurate processing and emotional responding. Moreover, inductions of positive
states may facilitate both semantic and affective priming (i.e., accessibility to semantic/affective
concepts), whereas induced negative states may reduce such forms of priming (Storbeck &
Clore, 2008).
As evidence from prior research supports, linguistic processing is crucial to cognitive and
emotional experiences. Linguistic priming has been shown to affect cognitive processing of
others’ emotions (Lindquist, Feldman Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 2006). This is intuitive
from a basic priming standpoint; activated (i.e., primed) concepts should affect downstream
conceptual access as activation spreads to related concepts. Perrig and Perrig’s (1988) research
on encoding and retrieval of novel semantic information yielded similar findings. They
stimulated moods, using linguistic procedures rather than typical mood induction procedures,
and found mood-congruent memory effects as originally predicted by Bower (1981). Further,
mood-congruent effects have been found in emotional Stroop tasks after mood-induction
procedures as well (Gilboa-Schechtman, Revelle, & Gotlib, 2000). Thus, affective biases may
underlie differences in mood-congruity findings in the mood-cognition literature, especially on
tasks involving linguistic components. Additionally, these findings, together, suggest that
specific cognitive concepts may be associated with emotional states and that these states may be
essential to our understanding of abstract concepts. These ideas are further supported by fMRI
and TMS studies (for examples, see Devlin, Matthews, & Rushworth, 2003; Vigliocco et al.,
2013).
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Much of these findings, at least partially, support predictions of the Network Theory of
Affect, but were actually reported well after that model had largely fallen out of favor. Given
these findings and the apparent interconnectedness of emotion, cognition, and language, a
semantic network-based model of the emotion-cognition interaction is plausible. Bower’s
original theory, however, failed to appreciate the breadth of cognitive functions that are
linguistically based and affected by mood. Another fatal shortcoming of his model was the
assumption that emotional experiences represent semantic network nodes. Although one may
have internalized cognitive concepts surrounding emotions, the phenomenological experience of
emotion may not necessarily activate these concepts. For example, one might cognitively know
that sadness is associated with crying and anhedonia, but when feeling sad, these may not be
subjectively experienced nor conceptually accessed. This idea has been previously argued by
Wenzlaff, Wegner, and Klein (1991) in their study using musical mood induction in a cognitive
thought-suppression paradigm. Their findings revealed that thoughts and moods may become
bound to each other, both in experience and expression, further suggesting that emotions are a
phenomenological experience that can call up concepts, as opposed to acting as singular
conceptual nodes themselves as in Bower’s semantic network model.

Semantic Networks: Organization, Activity, and their Assessment
Semantic networks reflect theoretical systems that store factual information and
conceptual knowledge. Their structure is both hierarchical and associative, such that activated
nodes (i.e., concepts that are accessed) can direct switching and clustering of cognitive concepts
(Goni et al., 2011; Scott, 1962). Switching and clustering reflect increased levels of
sophistication in thought and language use throughout childhood, as individuals build and
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explore these internalized semantic networks (Sauzeon, Lestage, Raboutet, N’Koaua, &
Claverie, 2004).
Language is learned through assimilation and accommodation processes similar to
Piaget’s concept formation in the late sensorimotor stage (Piaget, 1954). Semantics refers to the
language-specific linguistic labels that are given to these concepts. They are believed to be
constructed into a network that is held together by associations between them that including
similarity (i.e., synonymy), dissimilarity (i.e., antonymy), and gradation (i.e., qualitative
similarity and dissimilarity). Specific concepts are likely to have unique neurological signatures,
like perceptions and actions, because the thoughts that access them involve specific activity
patterns across neural networks. Additionally, concepts can be activated combinatorially and,
perhaps, more importantly, associatively, because the emergence of thoughts involves
combinations of existing concepts (Marupaka, Iyer, & Minai, 2012).
The organization of semantic networks differs between individuals. For one, semantic
network organization is influenced by culture (Slobin, 1991). In an analysis of dissemination
style of important figures’ transcripts in addressing groups, Jang and Barnett (1994) were able to
differentiate American and Japanese speakers with complete accuracy. Similar results were
obtained in a study of native Danish second-language learners’ understanding and use of English
adjectives, as measured by categorization tasks (Haastrup & Henriksen, 2000). In addition, the
idiosyncratic organization of semantic networks differs between individuals, regardless of
culture. Using a divided visual-field task to examine laterality in emotion word-processing,
Atchley, Ilardi, and Enloe (2003) found that depressed and previously depressed individuals
were faster to correctly categorize negative words than were never-depressed participants.
According to these authors, this finding suggests that the organization of semantic networks
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differs between individuals varying in affective experience. Integrity of these structures is
necessary for controlled spread of semantic network activity, which is essential to cognitive
functioning, both in human and computer models (Chan, Salmon, & De La Pina, 2000; Cohen &
Kjeldsen, 1987).
The organization of semantic networks is important because it guides activity within
these networks. Because activity is associative and propagative, it should be characterized as
having at least two major mechanisms. The first of which is termed semantic network access
throughout this work, and it refers to the selection of specific, target conceptual nodes. If a
concept is necessary to a task, activity should spread selectively toward it from related active
concepts, so that the target node itself will become active. Conversely, the second mechanism,
termed semantic network activation throughout this work, refers to the non-selective spread of
activity away from activated (i.e., accessed) concepts to related, inactive concepts. Semantic
network activity, as characterized by measures of semantic network access and activation, is of
particular interest and served as the basis for exploratory analyses between mood and executive
functions in the current research.
Semantic Network Access
Access to specific concepts involves selection of symbolic, lexical representations (i.e.,
semantic network nodes) (Bock, 1982; Bock & Levelt, 1994; Caramazza, 1997). Within
semantic networks, lexical representations are encoded to produce a hierarchical structure, which
can be syntactically modified to resolve grammatical meaning (Garrett, 1992). Studies of
semantic versus syntactic distinction latencies indicate that syntax represents lexical, as opposed
to semantic, knowledge (Bowers, Vigliocco, Stadthagen-Gonzalez, & Vinson, 1999). This
suggests that conceptual knowledge has broad mental representations within linguistic semantics,
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in which this knowledge can be syntactically modified to alter its idiosyncratic meaning as
opposed to its global meaning. Therefore, the utility of semantic network nodes lies in their
symbolic, global meaning and associated conceptual aspects (e.g., physical form, functionality,
living versus non-living, etc.).
Semantic network access can occur through guided search of a target concept given
associated cues. fMRI studies of lexical retrieval tasks have shown that broad bilateral activity
occurs to identify targets (e.g., the spread of activation from disambiguating nodes from cues
such as “an animal with humps that lives in the desert” should lead to access of the target node,
“camel;” Assaf et al., 2009). This mechanism is important as it involves selection of specific
conceptual information, as opposed to random spread of activation. According to the affect-asinformation approach, affective responses provide evaluative appraisal information. As argued
by Storbeck and Clore (2007), affect is neither automatic nor primary, but rather it is probably an
inherent set of associations within the semantic network. It is, therefore, possible that the
appraisal processes underlying affective responses rely on, or at least take into account, accessed
conceptual knowledge.
Semantic Network Activation
Semantic network access likely occurs spontaneously and/or due to the targeted spread of
activity to specific concepts, whereas semantic network activation describes the non-targeted and
spontaneous spread of activity from one accessed concept to other conceptual nodes. As
described by Caramazza (1997), once a concept within a semantic network is accessed, activity
spreads of varying strengths to related concepts, which is based on models of declarative
memory and language processing put forth decades prior (Anderson & Pirolli, 1984; Collins &
Loftus, 1975; Quillian, 1967). Given that the spread of semantic network activation may underlie
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cognitive priming in categorization tasks, including those that are affective (De Houwer,
Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002), it is reasonable to assume that emotion may affect
semantic network activity (see Storbeck & Clore, 2008). For example, false memory effects
observed by Storbeck and Clore (2005) relied on spreading activation, such that presented words
(e.g., bed, pillow, wake, rest, etc.) resulted in greater reporting of related, non-presented “critical
lure” words (e.g., sleep); this effect was minimized following an induced negative state,
suggesting reduced activation of the non-presented critical lure.
Semantic network organization reflects hierarchical class, subclass, and subordinate
structures. Because of this organization, the spread of activation is essential in concept retrieval
and cognitive flexibility (for a review, see McClelland & Rogers, 2003). Researchers who have
modelled information retrieval systems using psycholinguistic theory have postulated that
activation is selective rather than random. Activation requires processing of individual features
of the initially accessed node and salient situational characteristics (Crestani & van Rijsbergen,
1993), and it eventually dissipates from one node to another as semantic distance increases (den
Heyer & Briand, 1986; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1981). These factors have been implicated in
declarative memory recall, as they may induce priming effects at encoding and may also use
available cognitive resources involved in search during retrieval (Nelson, Kitto, Galea, McEvoy,
& Bruza, 2013). This finding is interesting because it may be interpreted in two ways. The first
interpretation could suggest mood-congruent and/or mood-dependent effects as originally put
forth in Bower’s (1981) model, especially if mood state and/or affective content are salient in a
given situation. The second interpretation may characterize a semantic network-based model
explaining the interaction of mood and memory (which is similar to the theoretical basis of this
work, as applied to executive function as opposed to memory). Specifically, if positive moods
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are assumed to enhance semantic network activation (i.e., relational processing), priming and
categorization cues should benefit encoding, which has previously been supported (Lee &
Sternthal, 1999; Storbeck & Clore, 2008). Similarly, increased network activation in positive
moods may represent a mechanism for the false memory effects described above; automatic
semantic activation may lead to suprathreshold activation strengths to endorse lures that are
related to targets but were never presented (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Along similar lines, it has
previously been suggested that false memories may be arise via semantic network activation
(Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001) according to fuzzy trace theory, which dissociates reasoning
and memory accuracy. These systems involve understanding the 1) gist and 2) specifics of the
event recalled in parallel (and erroneously in false memories; see Brainerd & Reyna, 2002;
Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). These elements, however, are represented symbolically in semantic
networks; it thus stands to reason that activity between associated nodes may lead to false
memories.
Semantic networks and their activity likely have a neuroanatomic basis. A recent review
of 120 fMRI studies showed that the neuroanatomy of the semantic system appears to be leftlateralized and that it includes the cingulate gyrus as well as cortical prefrontal,
parahippocampal, and inferior temporoparietal areas (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009;
Vigneau et al., 2006). These areas are associated with explicit and implicit memory systems
involving conceptual knowledge (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; Wiggs, Weisberg, & Martin,
1999), and they intersect sensory, motor, and emotional processing centers (Binder & Desai,
2011). These findings provide anatomic evidence for relationships between the semantic system
and cognition, perception, and emotion. Functional imaging has also indicated anatomic
structures involved in semantic network activity. fMRI studies have demonstrated that unique
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semantic relationships are differentially processed, specifically in areas of the anterior temporal
lobe (ATL) and language-related frontal areas (Kotz, Cappa, von Cramon, & Friederici, 2002).
This suggests that semantic processing functionally spreads within semantic space to delineate
relationships between concepts, which may remain flexible and dependent on neural activity.
Fronto-temporal cortical activity may also reflect semantic priming, effortful processing, and
manipulation of meaning (Lau, Phillips, & Poeppel, 2008), and the ATL may act as a broad
semantic meaning hub where activity spreads conceptually and anatomically to fronto-temporoparietal association cortices (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). The ATL network has been
further implicated in PET studies assessing knowledge of associations between concepts
(Shaywitz et al., 1995; Vandenberghe, Price, Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996) and TMS
studies disrupting activity in critical areas of the ATL network (Whitney, Kirk, O’Sullivan,
Lambon Ralph, & Jefferies, 2010). Disruption of the ATL hub has also been implicated in
clinical disorders involving impaired semantic network activation, such as Alzheimer’s disease
and related dementing syndromes, stroke, and herpes simplex virus encephalitis (Patterson et al.,
2007).
Semantic Network Space can be Scaled
Semantic network space refers to the conceptual representation of linguistically labelled
knowledge. It has been studied for decades in cognitive science, as well as computer science, to
develop understanding of knowledge systems in humans (Anderson, 2000; Brown, 1958a;
Brown, 1958b; Carey, 1978; O’Rielly & Munakata, 2000) and artificial intelligence (Brachman
& Schmolze, 1985; Lehmann, 1992; Schank, 1975; Sowa, 1987), respectively. These theoretical
models share a major aspect in that they represent conceptual knowledge itself (i.e., contained in
network nodes), as well as the associative similarity between semantic concepts (i.e., links of
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varying distances between semantic nodes). These models are typically represented in vector
space with hierarchical small-world structure demonstrating strong, short-path local clustering of
highly interrelated concepts (i.e., semantic neighborhoods), forming larger scale constellations
with more distantly related concepts (Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 2005). Such a structure of the
semantic network space has been derived using computational methods and psycholinguistic
principles (Johanssen & Pina, 2015; Kozima & Ito, 1996).
The key principles involved in scaling semantic space are conceptual similarity and
concept clustering, as they are crucial to the hierarchical organization of semantic networks.
Because of this, these principles have been examined in individuals using a wide range of tasks,
including semantic fluency, free association, lexical triadic comparison and sorting tasks, and
confrontation naming (for an example, see Chan, Salmon, & Pena, 2001). The most effective
methods involve clustering analyses to evaluate semantic structure by examining similarity (or
dissimilarity) between juxtaposed exemplars in fluency tasks (Sung, Gordon, & Schretlen, 2016).
Such analyses act as a measure of the organization and distance between concepts in semantic
network space and have been successfully applied to healthy individuals and various clinical
groups, including Alzheimer’s and Huntington’s diseases (Chan et al., 1993) and schizophrenia
(Prescott, Newton, Mir, Woodruff, & Parks, 2006). Although triadic comparison tasks have
remained popular in cognitive research, the structure of the task limits spontaneous semantic
network access as it relies exclusively on the spread of semantic network activation and may
better represent a cognitive priming paradigm.
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a data-visualizing, dimension reduction technique
that compares the similarity of data points in a distance matrix (Torgerson, 1958). Chan and
colleagues (1993) used MDS and clustering analyses to demonstrate that semantic fluency data
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could be used to scale semantic network space and yield cognitive maps of healthy elderly and
clinical populations. They also demonstrated that disorganization and atypical clustering in
semantic networks could be detected using this method. It should be noted that this method has
been criticized previously for not addressing the temporal component of fluency tasks (e.g.,
output “in spurts”), the likelihood of semantic clustering during performance (Verheyen et al.,
2016; Voorspoels et al., 2014), and potentially inadequate model fit in scaling techniques
(Storms, Dirikx, Saerens, Verstraeten, & De Deyn, 2003). However, these claims have been
largely refuted (see Chan & Ho, 2003; Hout & Goldinger, 2016; Sung et al., 2016). As such,
Chan et al.’s (1993) MDS techniques are accepted as useful to scale semantic network space.
Semantic Network Activity can be Quantified
Just as fluency tasks can be used to scale semantic network space, they can also be used
to quantify semantic network activation as it spreads from node to node (Whiteside, Kealy,
Semla, Luu, Rice, Basso, & Roper, 2015). Doing so relies on spreading activation models which
indicate juxtaposed exemplars reflect the activation of closely related concepts as network space
is explored to produce responses (Kenett & Thompson-Schill, 2017). Activation is typically
described to occur within a given semantic neighborhood until concepts within that
neighborhood are exhausted, and activation then extends to include broader or dissimilar
semantic neighborhoods (Patra, Bose, & Marinis, 2020).
This differs from Chen et al.’s (1993) technique because their MDS method restricts the
lists of words generated by respondents to scale semantic distance between pairs of the twelve
words that are most frequently produced. Recognizing the need to evaluate the spontaneous
spread of activation between network nodes that is not restricted (i.e., not just the activation
between most commonly produced words), researchers have developed several computational
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models (Christensen & Kenett, 2020; Kenett, Levi, Anaki, & Faust, 2017; Pakhomov, Hemmy,
& Lim, 2017). The most successful of these techniques uses fluency data to estimate semantic
network structure and activation within these structures (Zemla & Austerweil, 2018; Zemla,
Kenett, Jun, & Austerweil, 2016) and has been used to develop an automatic analysis tool: the
Semantic Network and Fluency Utility (SNAFU; Zemla, Cao, Meuller, & Austerweil, 2020).
SNAFU is unique in that it applies criteria to category fluency data that goes beyond the
traditional total number of exemplars produced. Specifically, SNAFU allows for the assessment
of word clusters, in which subcategories of exemplars may be used to define semantic
neighborhoods (Abwender, Swan, Bowerman, & Connolly, 2001), as well as when switches
between semantic clusters occur (Hills, Jones, & Todd, 2009, 2012). Further, SNAFU accounts
for nested static and fluid clusters that are produced as responses are generated according to
techniques described by Hills and colleagues (2009; 2012). Static clusters are defined as
contiguous exemplars that belong to the same primary category and subclass, whereas fluid
clusters include related words belonging to the same primary category only. For example,
respondents might produce the list of words “cat, dog, rabbit, zebra, giraffe, dolphin, manatee…”
which would describe the fluid cluster for mammals, but would contain nested static clusters for
mammalian house pets (i.e., “cat, dog, and rabbit”), jungle mammals (i.e., “zebra and giraffe”),
and marine mammals (i.e., “dolphin and manatee”). This method is extremely useful to fully
assess semantic network activation, because it generates several measurements, such as the total
number of exemplars produced, number of clusters explored (i.e., semantic neighborhoods, both
fluid and static), and the size of within-semantic neighborhood “runs” (i.e., the number of
exemplars produced within each cluster, both fluid and static). As such, these variables were
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generated using SNAFU criteria to analyze the category fluency data and assess semantic
network activation for the current project, as described in the Method section below.

Clinical Disorders and the Semantic Network-Cognition Connection
A wide range of cognitive deficits is associated with various neurologic and psychiatric
conditions. As understanding of psychiatric disorders has improved over the last half century, so
has the refinement of sensitive, psychometrically-sound neuropsychological assessment
instruments. This has led to extensive characterizations of cognitive profiles associated with
different neuropsychiatric diagnoses. Disorder-related cognitive profiles are clinically useful in
diagnosis, treatment planning, and prognosis, and may offer insights into the mood-cognition
interaction in healthy individuals. Because the theoretical basis of this research relies on the
interactions among mood, semantic network activity, and cognitive abilities (specifically,
executive functions), evidence from select literature concerning this interaction is reviewed in
depression, Alzheimer’s disease, and schizophrenia below.
Depression
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is among the most common occurring psychiatric
conditions (Authors, 2013) and is characterized by persistent sad or depressed mood and is
impairing across functional domains. MDD is also commonly associated with loss of interest and
pleasure, low self-esteem and energy, and changes in psychomotor behavior, sleep, appetite, and
libido (NIMH, 2016).
Initial models of neuropsychological impairments in depression reflected reduced effort
as a mediating force (Cohen, Weingartner, Samllberg, Pickar, & Murphy, 1982). While effort
may be affected in depression, the condition is also associated with a range of cognitive deficits
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in several domains that is both striking and likely beyond the effects of reduced effort alone
(Elliott, 2002). MDD has been associated with short-term memory (Breslow, Kocsis, & Belkin,
1980; Colby & Gotlib, 1988) and long-term memory deficits (Whitehead, 1974), verbal
processing changes (Horan, Pogge, Borgaro, Stokes, & Harvey, 1997), and reduced working
memory, motor and processing speed, executive function, and problem-solving (Channon,
Baker, & Robertson, 1993; Harvey, Le Bastard, Pochon, Levy, Allilaire, & Dubois et al., 2004;
Nebes, Butters, Mulsant, & Pollock, 2000; Weiland-Fielder et al., 2004). Given these findings,
the cognitive profile of depression is consistently described as one that is “frontal-subcortical,”
which is supported by early PET studies reporting hypofrontal activity in MDD patients (Baxter,
1991; Bench, Friston, Brown, Scott, & Dolan 1992; Drevets, Videen, Price, Preskorn,
Carmichael, & Raichle, 1992; Mayberg, Lewis, Regenold, & Wagner, 1994). It has been
previously suggested that the effects this profile comprises are so wide-ranging in their presence
and severity between cognitive domains, that it, alone, can be used to differentiate depression
from other psychiatric conditions. However, this complexity hinders understanding of the
underlying mechanism between depression severity and these effects (Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez,
& Dykman, 1993; McClintock, Husain, Greer, & Cullum, 2010).
Depression comprises features that are affective, cognitive, and behavioral. For example,
patients may feel sad (e.g., emotional), believe they have no self-worth (e.g., cognitive), and
socially isolate themselves (e.g., behavioral). In their severest form, non-affective depressive
symptoms may resemble frank dementia (for a review of depressive pseudodementia, see Kang
et al., 2014). In many patients, especially those who are otherwise healthy, the affective features
of depression precede cognitive and behavioral symptoms (Keyes, 2002; Pruessner, Hellhammer,
Pruessner, & Lupien, 2003). It is therefore possible that depressive mood states result in non-
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affective depression symptoms. That being said, it is unclear whether the development of
affective and non-affective symptoms share a common mechanism, develop independently of
each other, or whether depressive symptoms that emerge later in the disorder are reactive to
those that were initially present (e.g., reduced self-worth, which is a cognitive symptom, may be
reactive to poor task completion over time due to reduced energy and/or enjoyment, which are
behavioral and affective features).
As described by Sedikides (1992), sad moods lead to avoidant behaviors, in addition to
thinking that is egocentric, but also problem-focused and ruminative. The latter two points may
be critical to understanding the interaction between mood and cognition. From the affect-asinformation perspective, depressive states should signal dangerous or problematic situations,
which lead to systematic, detail-oriented processing (i.e., Sedikies’ “problem-focused” thinking),
as opposed to internal knowledge-based, heuristic processing. However, the details that are
emphasized in negative mood-related analytic processing may be restricted due to the ruminative
qualities of depressive states. Rumination has been reported to impair concentration
(Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003), which may also affect the ability to update working
memory. This was demonstrated by Joorman and Gotlib (2008), who used a lexical category
membership task to show that depression was associated with difficulty removing irrelevant
material from working memory, which they theorized was related to rumination. These authors
later extended their work using negative affective priming tasks and concluded that depressed
patients indeed ruminate more than others and that they, additionally, exhibit a lack of inhibition
in processing negative material. These effects may contribute to depressive cognitive symptoms
because they result in reduced cognitive reappraisal (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010) and working
memory interference (Joormann, Levens, & Gotlib, 2011). This is controversial, as some suggest
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that the process of updating working memory (i.e., executive control) reduces its own capacity,
independent of mood (Schmeichel, 2007). Therefore, the question of rumination warrants close
examination. Interpreted differently, rumination may reflect a propensity to focus on specific
thoughts or ideas in daily life (i.e., restricted concept access/semantic network activity) and
during select cognitive tasks, which may lead to increased, though restricted, phonological loop
activity (i.e., likely beneficial to various goal-oriented behaviors). In its most severe form,
however, rumination may lead to perseveration (which is likely detrimental to various goaloriented behaviors that require cognitive and/or behavioral flexibility). This is somewhat
inconsistent with generally accepted findings that working memory is reduced in depressive
states but that it remains congruent with the reduced distractibility findings described above (e.g.,
increased small-detail focus and reduced likelihood to report false memories). It stands to reason
that cognitive skills may be situationally tuned by mood as put forth by Schwarz (2002), but that
an important mechanism for such tuning involves semantic network activity as suggested by
Bower (1981).
The frontal-subcortical profile described in depression involves not only working
memory, but also systems responsible for memory and cognitive control. Autobiographical
memory tends to be reduced and overgeneralized in depression (Moore, Watts, & Williams,
1988). This has been replicated using the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) by Dalgleish
and colleagues (2007), who, in a series of studies, showed that reduced autobiographical
specificity reflected issues of accessing relevant information. They further suggested that this
effect represents reduced cognitive control to exert the necessary attention to complete AMT
tasks. In a Stroop-like task using visual stimuli depicting words superimposed on neutral faces
and negative visual imagery, Padmala, Bayer, and Pessoa (2011) showed that irrelevant, negative
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stimuli reduced cognitive control. These authors interpreted their findings to indicate that
behavioral adjustments to environmental demands are affected by negative entities. It should be
noted that this study was conducted in non-depressed individuals; however, it is reasonable to
extend these findings to depressed individuals considering that affective and cognitive
experiences are often biased toward negative material. Stated differently, feelings and thoughts
experienced by depressed individuals are likely troubling (i.e., signal danger and serve as a
cognitive-tuning function), repeated (i.e., via rumination), and restricted (i.e., limited as to the
conceptual information accessed and taxing on cognitive control systems that work to increase
adaptive functioning).
Clearly, the effects of depression on cognitive functioning are varied. Because the
organization and activity of semantic networks are argued to be essential to various cognitive
skills, these effects must be: 1) somewhat persistent, because semantic network organization is
likely less variable than mood states, and 2) present in skills involving language.
As to the persistence of these effects, it must be noted that some have reported that the
cognitive effects of depression are state-dependent (Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001).
However, there is a wealth of evidence suggesting that depression-related deficits do persist,
even after remission of the disorder (Grant, Thase, & Sweeney, 2001; Marcos, Salmero,
Gutierrez, Catalan, Gasto, & Lazaro, 1994; Tham, Englebreckston, Mathe, Johnson, Olsson, &
Aberg-Wisted, 1997). For example, Paelecke-Habermann, Pohl, and Leplow (2005)
demonstrated sustained deficits in attention and executive functions on three separate tests from
each domain in individuals with remitted depression. Similarly, they reported a dose-dependent
relationship such that the greatest impairments were exhibited by patient groups with the most
severe depression prior to remission. This suggests that the mechanism acting between mood
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disturbance has long-lasting effects and that there is a direct relationship between depression
severity and cognitive impairment severity. The latter was further supported in a recent metaanalysis indicating that depression severity was associated with the severity of impairment in
episodic memory, executive functions, and processing speed (McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009).
Regarding the effect of depression on linguistic skills, a body of research indicates that
there is indeed an interaction. A commonly replicated finding in studies of the neuropsychology
of depression is reduced verbal fluency (for a review, see Henry & Crawford, 2005) and slowed
semantic processing (Abdullaev, Kennedy, & Tasman, 2002; Iakimova et al., 2009). These
effects are quite common and persistent. In their longitudinal study of patients with MDD,
Schmidt and colleagues (2011) found prolonged semantic fluency deficits, even after significant
symptom reduction. Similarly, melancholic depressed patients have been shown to exhibit
greater difficulty on language-based tasks, including tests of fluency and basic vocabulary,
compared to their non-melancholic counterparts, suggesting that poorer information processing,
word retrieval, and reduced language output may be associated with negative moods (Naismith et
al., 2003). These findings, in sum, suggest the involvement of semantic networks in depression,
however, the exact mechanism remains unclear. Semantic networks may be affected in terms of
their organization, their activity, or both (Gotlib & McCann, 1984). Specifically, there may be
several mechanisms that account for this in depression, such as reduced concept accessibility via
network disorganization, limited access and activation due to depression-related semantic
network activity suppression, or automatic semantic activation of negative thoughts shifting
accessibility weights toward negative rather than positive or neutral material, as previously
reported (Scott, Mogg, & Bradley, 2001; Weintraub, Segal, & Beck, 1974). Although the exact
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mechanism for these findings remains elusive, select evidence from the neuroanatomy literature
may support such a conclusion.
Several neuroanatomic models of depression have emerged. Many of these state that
differences in regional brain activity are likely associated with the range of symptoms in
depression, including those that are affective, cognitive, and behavioral (for a review, see Shenal,
Harrison, & Demaree, 2003). Generally speaking, a number of studies has reliably shown that
the left hemisphere appears to be associated with positive affect and approach motivation (Allen
& Kline, 2004; Cacioppo, 2004; Davidson, 1998; Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen,
1990), whereas the right hemisphere is associated with negative affect and withdrawal
motivation (Allen & Kline, 2004; Cacioppo, 2004; Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen,
1990; Heller & Nitschke, 1998; Lee et al., 2004; Speilberg, Stewart, Levin, Miller, & Heller,
2008). Interestingly, the left prefrontal cortex and left hemisphere are important for verbal
working memory and semantic accessibility, respectively (D’Esposito et al., 1998; Gray, 2001;
Martin & Chao, 2001; Petrides, 1995). Moreover, approach behavior is crucial to openness,
curiosity, interest, and creativity (i.e., the “broadened” aspects of cognition in healthy positive
moods). These findings are, therefore, consistent with the literature suggesting a link between
positivity, semantic and verbal accessibility, and exploration as described by Schwarz (2002) and
Frederickson (2004). Conversely, these authors discuss that withdrawal plays a role in becoming
closed to experience and exhibiting narrowed mindsets. These hemispheric differences also
underlie global versus regional attentional focus (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), further
supporting the connection between positivity, semantic accessibility, cognitive broadening, and
relational processing, as well as the connection between negativity, cognitive narrowing, and
item-specific processing.
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Beyond hemispheric differences, specific brain regions have been implicated in
depression. These include the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), prefrontal cortex (PFC; in
particular, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, or DLPFC), and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). The
ACC is involved in many roles, including attention, self- and situational monitoring, and error
detection (Carter, Botvinick, & Cohen, 1999; Carter, Braver, Barch, Botvinick, Noll, & Cohen,
1998). Given these roles, the ACC is believed to represent a key area to cognitive control and
error processing. An fMRI study by Mitterschiffthaler and colleagues (2008) investigated nonmedicated MDD patients’ response latencies during an emotional Stroop task and found that
latency was positively correlated to ACC activity, both of which were significantly greater in
patients than in healthy controls. These findings suggest that the ACC is relevant to stimuli
selection or conflict. Likewise, the ACC is directly involved when conflict arises in semantic
accessibility and language. Peterson and colleagues (1998) observed increased ACC activation
when people were asked to name a verb that corresponded to a noun and indicated that these
effects were thought to be related to semantic selection (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). Thus, the
interference effect and semantic selection involves ACC activity and may involve a similar
mechanism that exists in reduced working memory capacity and propensity towards rumination
in depression. Interestingly, the ACC may also be involved in aspects of speech production,
particularly volitional emotional intonation (Jurgen & von Cramon, 1982). In other words, the
ACC could be considered an area contributing to executive processes, which may include speech
directed towards the self (i.e., rumination and/or internal self-appraisals) and others. This is not
surprising given imaging literature proposing functional overlap between the ACC and DLPFC,
as these areas are strongly activated in language processing and emotional regulation (Klumpp &
Deldin, 2010; Rogers et al., 2004). For example, an fMRI study of depressed patients indicated
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that activation in these areas (as well as the amygdala, which shares both numerous and strong
reciprocal connections with the ACC and indirectly to the DLPFC via the medial PFC or MPFC;
see Eden, Schrieber, Anwander, Keuper, Laeger, & Zwanger, 2015; Ray & Zald, 2012) was
correlated with semantic processing deficits and depression severity (Sass, Habel, Kellerman,
Mathiak, Gauggel, & Kircher, 2014). The DLPFC appears to be particularly important to
linguistic function as well, as DLPFC lesion patients exhibit difficulties on neuropsychological
measures requiring language comprehension and production, whereas MPFC lesion patients
show no such deficit (Wallesch, Kornhuber, Kollner, Haas, & Hufnagl, 1983). Further, the
DLPFC has been implicated in language switching in bilinguals in studies using fMRI and
transcranial magnetic stimulation (Hernandez, Dapretto, Mazziotta, & Bookheimer, 2001;
Hernandez, Martinez, & Kohnert, 2000; Nardone, De Blasi, Bergmann, Caleri, Tezzon, &
Ladurner et al., 2011). This area may also be critical to working memory function involving
material rehearsed in the phonological loop, but not the visuospatial sketchpad (Aoki et al.,
2011), as well as a host of other executive processes, including those that may be compromised
in depression (Koenigs & Grafman, 2009). These findings, together, present sizeable functional
overlap between the ACC and DLPFC in emotion, language, and cognition.
The OFC may share similar functional overlap as it is densely connected to both the ACC
and DLPFC (and amygdala). Regional cerebral blood flow studies after induced elated or
depressed moods have implicated the OFC in representing emotion and underlying cognitive
deficits in depression, including reduced verbal fluency, and mental and motor speeds (Baker,
Frith, & Dolan, 1997). In addition, an fMRI study of never-medicated, recovered depressed
patients by van Wingen and colleagues (2010) implicated that the amygdala, ACC, PFC, and
OFC were important in encoding and retrieval of emotional stimuli, as had been previously
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suggested by others (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 1999; Rolls, 1999).
Thus, the ACC, PFC, and OFC may represent a suite of frontal areas that act to process
emotional information, contribute to cognitive and linguistic skills, and aid adaptive responding.
A review by Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, and Lane (2003) confirmed reduced regional blood flow in
the ACC, DLPFC, and OFC in acute depression, as well as increased metabolism and blood flow
in these areas following recovery from depression. Further, these authors indicate that
postmortem studies report significant neuronal loss in these frontal areas as well as the
amygdala, further suggesting their involvement in depression. The ACC-DLPFC-OFC-amygdala
complex is vastly interconnected, and it shares very strong dopaminergic connections with the
ATL hub that has been associated with semantic network activity (Ashby et al., 1999; Goschke
& Bolte, 2014; Mohedano-Moriano et al., 2015; Moll, Eslinger, & de Oliveira-Souza, 2001;
Pessoa, 2015). Indeed, depression may result from compromised dopaminergic and serotonergic
neurotransmitter systems (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). In depression, reduced activity within
these areas may alter executive control processes important in emotion regulation (Fox, 1994;
Wang et al., 2008), and these activity patterns may differentiate non-pathological sad from happy
moods (Habel, Klein, Kellermann, Shah, & Schneider, 2005). In sum, there is a wealth of
evidence to suggest a neuroanatomical interaction between mood and the frontal-executive and
linguistic deficits that may be present in depression.
Alzheimer’s Disease
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is a neurodegenerative disorder characterized by cortical
atrophy (Terry, Peck, DeTeresa, Schecter, & Horoupian, 1981) and increased presence of
cortical amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles (Terry & Katzman, 1983). Pathological
studies have shown that the areas most affected by the disorder include the mesial temporal lobe
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structures, the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex, as well as fronto-temporo-parietal association
cortices (Hyman, van Hoesen, Damasio, & Barnes, 1984). Significant neuronal loss has also
been found in the nucleus basalis of Meynert and locus coeruleus, which compromises
subcortical-cortical cholinergic and adrenergic systems (Bondareff, Mountjoy, & Roth, 1982;
Mann, Yates, & Marcyniuk, 1984; Whitehouse, Price, Struble, Clark, Coyle, & DeLong, 1982).
Affective and behavioral changes are not uncommon in AD, however, cognitive symptoms tend
to be the most striking feature of the disorder. Given enough time, disease progression will
eventually lead to dementia, which is proposed by some to be diagnosable by the presence of at
least two of the following three symptoms: memory impairment disproportionate to age, aphasia,
and apraxia.
Given these diagnostic criteria, a range of cognitive deficits has been described in AD.
These include memory impairments, characterized by poor encoding and rapid forgetting, which
result from mesial temporal lobe and basal forebrain involvement. Poor visuospatial construction
and ideational abilities to plan and execute everyday tasks have been noted as well, which
suggest conceptual difficulties (Ochipa, Gonzalez-Rothi, & Heilman, 1992). A range of
linguistic changes are common in AD, too, including poor confrontation naming, reduced
semantic fluency (in normative between-groups semantic fluency comparisons and nonnormative, within-subject semantic versus phonemic fluency differences), and in very severe
cases, complete loss of semantic knowledge (Cummings, Benson, Hill, & Read, 1985; FaberLangendoen et al, 1988; Seines, Carson, Rovner, & Gordon, 1988; for a discussion of semantic
dementia, see Hodges, Patterson Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992). Conceptual and linguistic
impairments are most likely due to temporoparietal pathology and cholinergic dysfunction
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(Muramoto, Sugishita, & Ando, 1984), and are of particular interest in understanding the
connection between language and cognition.
Several lines of research have suggested disorganization and disintegration of semantic
networks, even in the early stages of AD (Butters & Heindel, 1990; Martin, 1987; Smith,
Murdoch, & Chenery, 1989). While degradation of semantic network access (and potentially
subsequent mental slowing) may occur in healthy aging (Cerella & Fozard, 1984), reduced
semantic activity is significant and functionally impairing in AD. It had been previously
theorized that this mechanism results in the characteristic naming and fluency deficits seen in
AD, but earlier studies were limited by a lack of specific analyses to examine semantic network
organization and activity (Grober, Buschke, Kawas, & Fuld, 1985; Martin, 1987; Smith,
Murdoch, & Chenery, 1989).
Using these earlier findings as a theoretical base, Chan and colleagues used MDS and
pathfinder analyses to visualize degradation of semantic networks in AD patients when engaged
in semantic fluency tasks (Chan, Butters, Paulsen, Salmon, Swenson, & Maloney, 1993; Chan,
Butters, Salmon, & McGuire, 1993). In these studies, they showed that conceptual information
was atypically organized in AD patients compared to healthy controls and other neurologic
groups. These findings were crucial to show the effect of semantic network disorganization in
AD, but failed to address the progressive nature of AD. Because the cognitive symptoms of AD
worsen over time, it is essential to demonstrate that semantic network changes are similarly
progressive to argue that they play a key role in cognition. Chan, Butters, and Salmon (1996),
again, used MDS and pathfinder analyses but focused on disease stage and employed a linguistic
triadic comparison task. They found that as the disease worsens, AD patients exhibited
progressive loss of abstraction in using attributes to categorize concepts, suggesting that there
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were fewer and weaker associations between semantically linked concepts. These analyses also
reproduced evidence of semantic network disorganization in AD, which was later found to be
highly correlated with global cognitive decline (Salmon, Butters, & Chan, 1999). It is, therefore,
reasonable to argue that AD represents a disorder of conceptual knowledge, and it is plausible
that semantic network disorganization and dysfunction underlies these cognitive symptoms.
Specifically, encoding deficits may reflect an inability to store and organize novel information
into semantic networks effectively, and reduced naming, fluency, and praxis may additionally
represent reduced semantic network activity.
The clinical presentation of AD is varied, however, and symptomatology may overlap
with other progressive and non-progressive dementing disorders common in mid- and late-life.
The symptoms that are frequently reported by patients and their collaterals, even in the earliest
disease stages of AD, include cognitive slowing and memory difficulties that resemble retrieval
deficits to those who are untrained (e.g., repeating questions, misplacing items, and forgetting
appointments; Swainson et al., 2001). However, numerous research studies have demonstrated
that AD reflects a true loss of semantic knowledge, as opposed to retrieval deficits or mental
slowing. Naming difficulties suggest loss of semantic meaning and semantically-related concepts
represented by nearby semantic network nodes, accessed either visually in confrontation naming
tasks or via responsive auditory tasks (Bayles & Tomoeda, 1983; Hodges, Salmon, & Butters,
1991; Huff, Corkin, & Growdon, 1986; Moreaud, David, Charnellet, & Pellat, 2001; Rasmusson,
Carson, Brookmeyer, Kawas, & Brandt, 1996). As for fluency measures, increased latency and
poorer performance in semantic fluency versus letter fluency in AD patients suggest difficulties
accessing semantic meaning, as opposed to deficits in lexical search (Rohrer, Salmon, Wixted, &
Paulsen, 1999). Similarly, fluency studies indicate that there is a loss of knowledge related to the
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attributes shared by exemplars belonging to semantic categories, which would be expected to be
preserved if conceptual information were truly spared (Grober, Buschke, Kawas, & Fuld, 1985;
Martin & Fedio, 1983; Troster, Salmon, McCullough, & Butters, 1989). In semantic priming and
lexical decision tasks, abstract conceptual knowledge over concrete information appears to be
degraded (Chertkow, Bub, & Seidenberg, 1989), except for emotional semantic concepts, which
appear intact until later stages of the disorder (Giffard, Laisney, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2015).
These findings are consistent with the notion that concrete words and abstract semantic
information are processed differently (Altarriba & Bauer, 2007). Taken together, the results of
these studies demonstrate that semantic network disorganization and dysfunction are heavily
contributory to the cognitive symptoms of AD.
Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a psychological disorder of atypical thinking and perception, which is
characterized by a number of symptom categories. These include positive symptoms, such as
delusions and hallucinations, and negative symptoms, such as anhedonia, avolition, abulia, and
alogia. Disorganized speech and behavior and atypical affective experiences are common
symptoms as well. Additionally, a core feature, and likely the best predictor of patient
functioning, is cognitive dysfunction (Bozikas & Andreou, 2011; Goldberg, Keefe Goldman,
Robinson, & Harvey, 2010).
Cognitive impairments in schizophrenia affect attention, working memory, declarative
memory, and linguistic skills (Cirillo & Seidman, 2003; Kurtz, Moberg, Gur, & Gur, 2001; Tan,
2008). There appears to be some overlap between the schizophrenia and AD literature in terms of
changes in memory and, perhaps more importantly, verbal skills to suggest that semantic
networks may be similarly involved in schizophrenia. For example, investigations of verbal
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fluency have evidenced that semantic fluency is reduced in schizophrenia. Importantly,
individuals with schizophrenia have been found to exhibit reduced semantic fluency without
increased intrusion responses (Allen & Frith, 1983). This implies that reduced fluency is not due
to atypical thoughts or intellectual or attentional deficits, but rather, conceptual deficits. Thus, as
in AD, poor semantic organization and conceptual access could be a feature of schizophrenia.
Investigations specific to semantic network activity in verbal fluency in schizophrenia have
implicated degraded hierarchical semantic organization via reduced subordinate class exemplar
production (Rossell, Rabe-Hesketh, Shapleske, & David, 1999). In addition, these authors noted
that slower output during fluency tasks likely suggests disorganization and, importantly, poor
semantic network access (but not activation, as activity appeared to spread at rates similar to
those observed in healthy controls). The latter represents a key feature of semantic network
activity in schizophrenia: access appears affected, whereas activation may be spared. This is
further supported by studies reporting no impairments of letter verbal fluency (Gourovitch,
Goldberg, & Weinberger, 1996) or design fluency (Phillips, James, Crow, & Collinson, 2004).
Curiously, the design fluency studies reported by Philips et al. (2004) showed that patients
produced less nameable designs versus unnamable designs compared to controls, suggesting
deficits in cross-modal semantic access to psychomotor and visuospatial sketchpad activity. A
study of the effects of auditory and visual priming using lexical decision tasks conducted by
Surguladze and colleagues (2002) further demonstrated that cross-modal semantic
representations may result in language impairments observed in the disorder. However, these
authors argued that increased cross-modal (semantic) activity is responsible for these deficits.
These findings must be carefully considered as they offer a window into a potentially
important mechanism in schizophrenia. Increased semantic network activation is a plausible
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cause of semantic processing deficits (Rossell & David, 2006; Rossell, Rabe-Hesketh, Shapleski,
& David, 1999), as well as formal thought disorder. Formal thought disorder (FTD) refers to
disorganized thinking and speech, which may occur in schizophrenia, as well as other
psychological disorders such as depression and mania (Yudofsky & Hales, 2003). As originally
put forth by Maher, Manschreck, Hoover, and Jenkins (1987) and Spitzer, Braun, Hermle, and
Maier (1993), FTD may be conceptualized as aberrant over-activation of semantic nodes (i.e.,
“hyperpriming”). More recent studies of semantic priming tasks found that schizophrenic
patients with FTD demonstrated greater indirect priming in unrelated word conditions,
supporting excessive automatic spread of semantic network activation (Mortiz, Woodward,
Kuppers, Lausen, & Schickel, 2003). Similarly, verbal triadic comparison tasks have also yielded
findings to support semantic over-activation in schizophrenic FTD patients (Tallent, Weinberger,
& Goldberg, 2001).
Abnormally increased semantic network activity may underlie many FTD symptoms,
especially those common in schizophrenia. These include thought-blocking, derailment,
incoherence, perseveration, tangentiality, and paraphasic and neologistic speech (Videbeck,
2008). Semantic network over-activity likely represents a mechanism that reduces signal-tonoise ratios in conceptual activation. When this occurs, distantly related concepts may be coactivated leading to tangential and disorganized thought patterns. Significantly reduced noise
suppression may result in overloaded network activity, leading to derailment and thought
blocking, as well as delusional thinking (Rossell & David, 2006), press of speech, and flight of
ideas similar to that observed in acute mania (Ryu, An, Ha, Kim, Ha, & Cho, 2012). Poor noise
suppression may also contribute to negative schizophrenia symptoms, and in extreme cases, lead
to a catatonic presentation (Taylor 1990).
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Beyond theoretical discussion, evidence exists to indicate that semantic networks
contribute to schizophrenia symptoms. Analyses of verbal fluency data, including MDS analyses
similar to those applied to AD patients discussed above, have evidenced disorganized semantic
systems, leading to production deficits beyond severity of poverty of speech (Aloia, Gourovitch,
Weinberger, & Goldberg, 1996; Bowie, Reichenberg, Rieckmann, Parrella, White, & Harvey,
2004; Harvey & Keefe, 1997a). In addition to degraded semantic networks, fluency studies have
also demonstrated atypical spread of conceptual activation, which researchers have argued
underlies tangential, circumstantial, and illogical thinking in schizophrenia-related FTD (Harvey,
Sukhodolsky, Parrella, White, & Davidson, 1997; Paulsen, Romero, Chan, Davis, Heaton, &
Jeste, 1996; Sumiyoshi, Matsui, Sumiyoshi, Yamashita, Sumiyoshi, & Kuachi, 2001).
Neurobiological investigations have further implicated a semantic network contribution
to the cognitive symptoms observed in schizophrenia. Electrophysiological studies involving
lexical decision tasks have shown enhanced N400 signals in patients compared to healthy
controls (Condray, Siegle, Cohen, van Kammen, & Steinhauer, 2003). Because N400 relates to
processing meaningful stimuli, in particular, semantic processing of words (Kutas & Hillyard,
1980), these findings are indicative of automatic and aberrant spread of semantic network
activation. Klumpp and colleagues (2010) also reported enhanced N400 in a semantic processing
task involving emotionally-valenced words, which was interpreted as abnormal interactions
between semantic networks and emotion processing systems. Together, these findings suggest a
link between emotion, semantic network activity, and cognition in schizophrenia. From an
anatomic standpoint, PET studies have reliably reported reduced blood flow and glucose
metabolism in prefrontal structures important to working memory, declarative memory, and
cognitive control (Carter et al., 1998; Hill et al., 2004). Critically, hypofrontality has been
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observed in areas with sizeable overlap between those implicated in depression studies, including
the ACC and DLPFC (Glahn et al., 2005), as well as inferior temporoparietal areas similar to
those implicated in the AD literature (Andreasen et al., 1997). Reduced metabolic activity in
these areas is associated with negative symptoms, such as anhedonia and abulia (Wolkin et al.,
1992), which are also common in depression, and has previously been correlated with
dopaminergic dysfunction (Weinberger & Berman, 1988). This is important as dopamine has
also been implicated in mood disturbances seen in both depression and schizophrenia (Brown &
Gershon, 1993; Swerdlow & Koob, 1987). Further, intact dopaminergic function is critical to
maintaining cortical signal-to-noise ratios (Winterer & Weinberger, 2004), which are necessary
for affective processing (Wentura, 1999) and semantic network activation calibration (Kischka et
al., 1995). In sum, the neurophysiological, neuroanatomic, and neurochemical evidence is
compelling and suggestive of an interaction between affect, semantic network activity, and
executive and other cognitive functions in schizophrenia, similar to findings reported in the
literature pertaining to clinical disorders of mood and semantic network function.

Summary of the Theoretical Basis of the Current Research
Emotions represent responses to stimuli that inform us of appraisal processes and
influence behavior and cognition. Mood effects have been observed across various cognitive
domains, including perception, attention, working memory, learning, and memory formation. In
sum, positive affect generally favors relational processing, which relies on heuristic, top-down
processes. This leads to increased openness, creativity, semantic accessibility, and enhances a
majority of cognitive skills. Conversely, negative moods favor analytic processing involving
detail-oriented, bottom-up processes, which may hinder many cognitive abilities, except for a
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significantly smaller subset of abilities that appear to be enhanced. Much of the variability in
these mood-related effects on cognition may largely be due to effects on the cognitioncontrolling set of abilities known as executive functions, which are the main areas of focus of
investigation.
Multiple models have been proposed to explain the effects of mood on cognition. The
cognitive tuning model involving Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) affect-as-information hypothesis
is effective in describing many cognitive research findings, but it focuses heavily on processing
style effects. Because processing style and many cognitive abilities are affected by (and assessed
via methods relying on) linguistic functions, language may also play a role in the moodcognition interaction. Bower’s (1981) earlier theoretical model examining the mood-cognition
relationship emphasized the role of semantic networks, which are essential to organizing and
accessing conceptual knowledge. His Network model did not find much initial research support
due to theoretical limitations and has largely fallen out of favor. However, more recent studies of
healthy and clinical populations have shown that mood affects concept organization and activity
within semantic networks and that these aspects of semantic networks are significantly
contributory to a wide range of cognitive skills, including those known to be influenced by
mood. Additionally, converging neuroanatomic, neurophysiological, and neurochemical
evidence further suggests that semantic network activity plays a role in the interaction between
mood and executive function, as well as cognition, overall.

The Current Research Study
Overview
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The current study was designed to examine whether semantic network activity is a
significant mediator in the relationship between trait mood and executive function in the general
population. Such an investigation is important given that mood disorders are among the most
commonly occurring psychological conditions (Steel, Marnane, Iranpour, Chey, Jackson, & Patel
et al., 2014) and that clinical and subclinical negative moods (i.e., depressive states) are
associated with reduced functioning and poorer health outcomes (Naicker, Galambos, Zeng,
Senthilselvan, & Colman, 2013). Further, in older groups, despite descriptions of a frontalsubcortical “depressed” neuropsychological profile, differential diagnoses between neurologic
and psychiatric disorders often remain difficult, and the effects of these conditions, when cooccurring, may be poorly differentiable (Downing, Caprio, & Lyness, 2013). Thus, investigating
semantic network activity as a factor that may drive the relationship between mood and
executive function may serve as the basis for future research, novel interventions for mood
disturbance, and further clarification of potential subtypes of depression (i.e., depressive states
that predominantly affect mood, behavior, or cognition). Additionally, because most
investigations of semantic network activity describe function in individuals with clinical
conditions in which these systems are impaired, a gap exists in our understanding of semantic
networks in healthy individuals and their contribution to executive functions. Therefore,
examining the effects of mood on semantic networks and the role these networks play in
executive abilities in the general population is essential.
Study Aims
The main goal of the current study was to identify a theoretical mechanism that unifies
seemingly disparate findings from the mood-cognition literature, which explores semantic
network activity as a key mediator variable in the interaction between mood and executive
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functions. The current study is innovative in that it applied techniques to assess semantic
network activity to the general population that were developed recently or which, to date, have
typically been used in clinical samples. Most studies of semantic network activity have failed to
fully characterize that of healthy individuals, generally, and, specifically, the differences in this
activity that exist between individuals as a function of mood. Differences in semantic network
activity are universal and associated with cognitive functioning broadly, and thus their
investigation must be addressed. To accomplish this goal, the following study aims and a priori
hypotheses were developed:

Aim 1: To examine the effects of trait mood on executive and other cognitive skills,
including attention, working memory, inhibition, verbal fluency, naming, and verbal
learning and memory in a healthy population.
Hypothesis 1: It was hypothesized that negative mood traits would account for a
proportion of variability in neuropsychological measures assessing select
frontal/executive functions (i.e., attention, working memory, and verbal fluency). This
was based on evidence that depressive symptomatology is associated with reduced
initiation, attention, working memory, and semantic fluency, frequently described as the
frontal-subcortical neuropsychological profile described above (Chepenik et al, 2007).
Furthermore, many of these cognitive skills have been shown to be impaired in
individuals with significant depressive disorders throughout the lifespan, importantly,
above and beyond expected cognitive changes that occur in healthy aging. Select
emotion-cognition literature posits a benefit of reduced mood to a small subset of
executive functions, including distraction tolerance (i.e., a form of inhibition) and
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familiarity judgment (i.e., recognition memory search and access). Other aspects of
cognition, such as general intellect, vocabulary, and visual confrontation naming, remain
preserved regardless of mood (Basso, Miller, Estevis, & Combs, 2013). Thus, negative
mood features were not expected to significantly contribute to variability in measures of
intellectual function, vocabulary knowledge, and basic visuospatial skills. However,
congruent with a majority of the mood-cognition literature, poorer performance on tests
of basic attention, working memory, and verbal fluency (i.e., a subset of executive
function skills) in individuals reporting more negative moods was expected. These
individuals were also expected to perform better on inhibition and focused attentional
tasks, which is congruent with the literature.

Aim 2: To examine the effects of trait mood on semantic network activity
(operationalized as semantic network access and semantic network activation) in the
general population using validated test instruments and specialized analyses previously
developed to assess these functions in various clinical samples.
Hypothesis 2: Semantic network activity (defined as semantic network access and
semantic network activation) was assessed in individuals reporting different mood states
(i.e., negative and positive mood symptom self-report), by applying tests of speeded
verbal skills and/or specialized analyses of performance on these tests. Specifically, a
timed auditory naming test was used that was originally developed to assess language
function in surgical epilepsy patients to investigate semantic network access. Individuals
reporting more negative moods were expected to demonstrate reduced semantic network
access, as evidenced by greater naming latencies on this task. Additionally, semantic
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network activation was described by applying analyses to a category fluency measure,
which are similar to those previously used to examine semantic network organization.
We expected individuals reporting more negative trait moods to exhibit reduced semantic
network activation. This result was expected to occur in one and/or two ways.
Specifically, participants reporting more negative moods were expected to produce
exemplars that were either 1) restricted to fewer semantic neighborhoods, and/or 2)
limited in number within any given neighborhood. The former result may indicate a
paucity of inter-neighborhood network search, and the latter may indicate of a paucity of
intra-semantic neighborhood search. This hypothesis was consistent with previous
findings that less negative and/or more positive moods increase semantic activation,
processing speed, and phonological loop activity (Storbeck, 2013), which may underlie
positive mood-related improved verbal learning and memory (via phonological loop
rehearsal) and verbal generativity.

Aim 3: To examine the role of semantic network activity on executive skills as a function
of trait mood via structural equation modeling and exploratory analyses.
Hypothesis 3: Trait mood was expected to be directly correlated with semantic
network activity, such that more negative trait moods would be associated with greater
restriction of semantic network activity (i.e., poorer performance on measures of
semantic access and activation from Hypothesis 2 above). Further, restricted semantic
network activity was expected to mediate the relationship between trait moods and
executive function test performance. Specifically, more negative self-reported trait moods
were expected to be associated with greater between-group differences on measures
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involving linguistic/semantic elements (i.e., tasks involving actual words with semantic
meaning) than on those that lack these elements (i.e., tasks recruiting visuospatial
sketchpad rather than phonological loop resources). This was based on findings reported
in the literature summarized above across various clinical populations demonstrating a
correlation between atypical semantic network activity and poorer performance on a
range of cognitive tasks.
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CHAPTER TWO

Method

Overall Design
This study was conducted as a new research study with original data collection. Human
Subjects Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, consistent with Queens College and City
University of New York IRB policies, was granted on June 12, 2019. Informed consent was
obtained from each participant prior to their participation, and relevant demographic information,
such as age, gender identity, racial/ethnic identity, and subjective English language proficiency
was collected via a brief demographic questionnaire. All participants were asked to complete two
self-report mood questionnaires, as well as a battery of seven standardized neuropsychological
measures, each of which is described below. Following completion of the study procedures,
participants were debriefed and compensated for their participation with 2.0 Psychology 101
research credits.
All data were collected in a Queens College laboratory setting. Data were secured and
analyzed to yield descriptive measures and between-group comparisons for responses on the
demographic and mood questionnaires and the neuropsychological test instruments. Measures of
semantic network activity were additionally entered into a mediation model to assess whether
semantic network activity was a significant mediator of the relationship between mood and
executive function test results.
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Participants
Participants included English-speaking Queens College students aged 18-35 years. A
total of 122 participants were recruited for the study, and 120 participants were retained for data
analyses. Two participants were excluded from the analyses due to poor English language
proficiency. All participants were recruited via the Queens College Human Subjects Pool of
Introductory Psychology (Psychology 101) students, who are asked to participate in research
studies as a course requirement. As participants were recruited from the Queens College Subjects
Pool, it was expected that the sample may be somewhat unevenly distributed in terms of gender,
because females are overrepresented in college psychology courses (Gregor & O’Brien, 2015),
and age, due to the general age range of the student population enrolled in 100-level courses.
However, the sample was expected to otherwise approximate the general population of American
adults relatively well, given the size of the Psychology major at Queens College, which is an
urban public college. Inclusion criteria for the study included: 1) enrolled as a Queens College
student, 2) aged 18 to 35 years, 3) fluent in English (by age 13 or earlier), 4) normal color vision,
and 5) no history of neurological disorder, head injury, or psychiatric disorder. Participants who
did not satisfy all of the inclusion criteria were excluded from the study.

Research Procedure
As described in the Overall Design section, participants completed one demographic
information questionnaire, two self-report mood questionnaires, as well as a battery of seven
standardized neuropsychological assessment instruments. Greater detail for each measure is
provided below.
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Demographic Questionnaire
Participants completed a brief paper-and-pencil demographic questionnaire. The
questionnaire contained 7 items, with a single question each related to self-reported
characteristics including: 1) gender, 2) age, 3) native language, 4) racial/ethnic identity, 5)
handedness, and 6) college major. The final item on the questionnaire asked participants to selfrate their English proficiency relative to a typical Queens College student on a 7-point Likerttype scale.

Mood Self-Report Measures
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X)
The PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) is a 60-item self-report paper-and-pencil
questionnaire that independently assesses positive and negative affective features and was
developed as an expanded version of the original 20-item PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988). The underlying assumption of the PANAS is that positive and negative affect are
orthogonal dimensions, and, thus, each contributes variance to understanding how positive and
negative affect guide cognition and behavior. Participants were given a list of 60 emotion words
and phrases and asked to rate the extent to which they felt or experienced each, in general, using
a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very slightly/not at all) to 5 (extremely strongly). The
PANAS-X has shown excellent reliability and validity and is only modestly influenced by
demographic factors (Crawford & Henry, 2004).

Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II)
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The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 21-item paper-and-pencil self-report
measure with strong psychometric properties that assesses the presence and severity of a range of
depressive symptoms. The BDI-II has shown excellent reliability and validity in both clinical
and nonclinical samples and measures unique aspects of depressive syndromes (via multiple
factor analyses, generally a Cognitive-Affective symptom cluster and a Somatic-Vegitative
symptom cluster are retained across different populations; see Whisman, Perez, & Ramel, 2000;
Wang & Gorenstein, 2013). An item related to suicidality was removed from the BDI-II form
that was administered to participants in this study to reduce the possibility that imminent
intervention would be needed during the research procedure. Participants rated the remaining 20
BDI-II items using a scale ranging from 0 (symptom not experienced) to 3 (symptom
experienced with great severity).

Neuropsychological Test Battery
The neuropsychological test battery included the following seven standardized
assessment instruments.

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV): Digit Span Subtest
The WAIS-IV (Wechsler, 2014) is an intellectual function test that generally involves the
administration of 10 subtests, each test loading onto 1 of 4 specific cognitive indices (i.e., 3
Verbal Comprehension Index subtests, 3 Perceptual Reasoning Index tests, 2 Working Memory
Index tests, and 2 Processing Speed Index tests). One subtest from the WAIS-IV was used for the
proposed study: Digit Span.
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Digit Span is a Working Memory Index subtest that includes 3 separate trials.
Participants completed each trial by verbally reproducing strings of numbers in a certain order
after the numbers were orally presented by the examiner. The first trial is a Digits Forward trial
in which participants reproduce strings of digits in the same order they were presented and was
used as a measure of basic auditory attention. The remaining two trials, Digits Backward and
Digit Sequencing, were completed by reproducing strings of digits in the reverse order of their
presentation and reproducing strings of digits in order from lowest to highest, respectively; these
portions of the task were used as a measure of auditory working memory.

Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT)
The COWAT (Benton, 1969) is a timed measure of verbal fluency in which examinees
were prompted with a letter cue in 3 trials (i.e., F, A, and S) and asked to give as many unique
words as possible beginning with the cued letter in 60 seconds per trial. Participants were
instructed to exclude proper nouns and variations of exemplars they produce with an identical
semantic meaning differing by word suffix prior to completing each trial. The letter cue trials
were followed by a single, 60-second category fluency trial in which examinees were asked to
name as many animals as possible, regardless of the letter beginning its name. The COWAT was
used to make between-group comparisons of both letter and semantic verbal fluency.
The category fluency portion was also used to measure semantic network activation, as is
considered appropriate from multidimensional scaling (MDS) analyses pioneered by Chan et al.
(1993). These authors theorized that the serial position of exemplars produced on a category
fluency task is informed by the spread of activation between juxtaposed semantic network nodes.
As above, however, these methods rely on assessing semantic distance between all possible
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contiguous combinations of only the most commonly produced exemplars. Because this method
does not consider all exemplars produced by any given participant, SNAFU criteria, recently
described by Zemla et al. (2020), was used to analyze semantic fluency responses. This method
analyzed the entire list of animals generated by each participant, such that each exemplar was
coded as belonging to a specific semantic neighborhood, as defined by either animal type (e.g.,
exemplars, such as “poodle, cocker spaniel, or welsh corgi,” were coded together as belonging to
a dog-related semantic neighborhood) or degree of relatedness (e.g., exemplars, such as “dog,
cat, or mouse,” were coded together as belonging to a related, domesticated mammalian semantic
neighborhood). This allowed the number of semantic neighborhoods explored by each
participant, as well as the average number of exemplars belonging to each neighborhood that a
given participant produced, to be quantified. In addition, this allowed the average continuous
run size within each semantic neighborhood to be measured. These results were entered into
analyses independently across participants to make between-group comparisons of semantic
network activation (i.e., total number of semantic neighborhoods accessed, total number of
exemplars produced within each neighborhood, and total number of exemplars produced during
a within-neighborhood run) between trait mood groups.

Auditory Naming Test (ANT)
The Auditory Naming Test was originally developed by Hamberger and Seidel (2001,
2003) to examine the differences between auditory and visual naming abilities and to examine
their anatomic dissociation in temporal lobe epilepsy patients. This test has good psychometric
properties and involves 50 timed auditory responsive naming trials for concrete nouns, which are
based on brief verbal descriptions (e.g., “a house pet that purrs” should yield the response “cat”).
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Examinees were allowed 20 seconds to name the item before a phonemic cue would be provided.
Three scores are typically derived from this test: 1) total correctly named items, 2) mean
response time for correct responses (within the 20-second time limit), and 3) total tip-of-thetongue responses (i.e., the sum of correct responses requiring 2 or more seconds and correct
responses after a phonemic cue is provided).
The Auditory Naming Test was used to assess both naming ability (i.e., total number
correct), as well as semantic network access (i.e., mean correct response latencies) according to
Collins and Loftus’ (1975) theory of semantic processing (e.g., the provision of disambiguating
words activate semantic network nodes to narrow semantic search traces to the target word, as in
“a house pet that purrs” leads to the access of the target node, “cat,” apart from all other possible
house pets), which is also consistent with prior research procedures using naming latencies to
characterize semantic network activity (Warren, 1977). For the analyses, only the total number
correct and latency scores were considered. The tip-of-the-tongue response score was not
considered, because semantic network access was operationalized as latency to produce the
target word for each item, regardless of the duration of time required to generate the correct
response.

Wechsler Memory Scale – Fourth Edition (WMS-IV): Symbol Span Subtest
The WMS-IV (Wechsler, 2014) is an instrument that assesses various aspects of memory
functioning. It comprises 7 subtests, loading onto 5 memory index scores (i.e., Auditory
Memory, Visual Memory, Visual Working Memory, Immediate Memory, and Delayed
Memory). The Symbol Span (SSp) subtest is a Visual Working Memory index test involving
multiple immediate recall trials of series of abstract figures and their sequence after a 5-second
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presentation of each series. SSp was the only WMS-IV subtest administered in this study, and it
served as a measure of non-verbal (i.e., visual and non-semantic) working memory.

North American Adult Reading Test (NAART)
The NAART (Blair & Spreen, 1989) is a reading test of 61 irregularly pronounced words,
which assesses examinees’ familiarity with the test words and their ability to phonetically
decipher unfamiliar irregular words. The NAART has been shown to provide reliable and valid
estimates of verbal intelligence across age groups and exhibits excellent concurrent validity with
other measures of verbal intellect. The NAART was administered to participants to estimate
intellectual functioning by instructing participants to read the words on the NAART form aloud.
They were additionally instructed to attempt to mentally sound out any unfamiliar words before
providing a verbal response for those words. Responses were compared to accepted
pronunciations of each word to determine whether each response was correct.

Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS): Color-Word Interference Test and
Trail Making Test
The D-KEFS (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001) is a comprehensive set of nine stand-alone
tasks meant to assess various executive functions. Two tasks from the D-KEFS were used for the
purpose of this study: the Color-Word Interference Test and the Trail Making Test.
Color-Word Interference Test
The Color-Word Interference Test is a variation of the Stroop Color-Word Test involving
four trials. The first trial involves identifying swatches of colors printed in an array (i.e., a color
identifying/naming trial), the second involves reading printed color names (i.e., a word-reading
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trial), the third involves naming the color of the font in which a disparate color name is printed
(i.e., an inhibition trial), and the fourth involves switching between identifying the disparate font
color or reading the disparate color name (i.e., an inhibition and code-switching trial). The ColorWord Interference Test was administered to participants, and the time to complete each trial was
recorded.
Trail Making Test
The D-KEFS Trail Making Test is a variation of graphomotor speeded sequencing (i.e., a
processing speed) and switching (i.e., cognitive flexibility) tasks introduced in the U.S. Army
Individual Test Battery (US Army, 1944) and the Halstead-Reitan Battery (Reitan, 1955) of the
1940s and 1950s. The D-KEFS version involves five trials, which involve a speeded visual
scanning and cancellation trial, a number-sequencing trial, a letter-sequencing trial, a numberletter sequencing trial, and a motor speed trial in which participants trace a dashed line as quickly
as possible. Participants were directed to complete each trial according to the Administration
Manual, and the time to complete each trail successfully was recorded.

Deese-Roediger-McDermott Paradigm (DRM)
The DRM (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) is an adaptation of a single-trial, free recall,
verbal list-learning task developed by Deese (1959). The task was designed to assess false
memory formation by examining the number of false-positive intrusion responses for related
non-list items (i.e., “critical lures”) on a list of highly related words. The Stadler, Roediger, and
McDermott (1999) modification involves a single presentation of 18 non-inter-related word lists
of 15 highly intra-related words each, followed by immediate free recall trials between list
presentations. The 18 word lists used for this study were those identified by Stadler and

71

colleagues (1999) as the lists of words most frequently inducing false memories (i.e., participants
reporting the specific critical lure associated with a given list’s trial) upon immediate recall of
the word list. Participants were read each of the 18 lists of words at a rate of 1 word per 2
seconds by the examiner and instructed to provide all of the words from the list that they could
recall. The number of correctly recalled words and false-positive responses (i.e., produced
critical lures; operationalized as aberrant semantic network activation) were recorded.

Data Analyses
Descriptive Statistics
Data collected via the demographic questionnaire, mood assessment questionnaires, and
neuropsychological test battery using methods described above were analyzed using SPSS
version 25 and Microsoft Excel version 15.19.1. For each result collected on the measures
described above, descriptive statistics were calculated for the entire sample. The descriptive
statistics calculated included the mean, standard deviation, median, and minimum and maximum
values to better understand the range and distribution of the values obtained.
Identifying Participant Groups for the Basis of Between-Groups Comparisons
The first aim of this study was to examine the effect of trait mood on several executive
functions, therefore, two participant groups were identified using mood questionnaire results.
The PANAS-X positive and negative affect scale scores were used as the study independent
variables and to define participant groups. Three different models were created according to
methods used to define groups as described in the Results section below. Briefly, the first model
assessed between-group differences of “high positive” and “low positive” trait mood groups,
using only the PANAS-X positive scale score to assess the contribution of positive trait moods to
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executive functions and semantic network activity (termed the Positive Trait Mood Model). The
second model considered only the PANAS-X negative scale score to define “high negative” and
“low negative” trait mood groups to assess the contribution of negative trait mood to executive
function and semantic network activity (termed the Negative Trait Mood Model). The third
model considered both the PANAS-X positive and negative scale scores to define a “negative”
trait mood group (i.e., participants whose difference between positive and negative affect scales
fell below the median difference of the entire study sample) and a “positive” trait mood group
(i.e., participants whose difference between positive and negative affect scales fell above the
median difference of the entire study sample). The third model, termed the Difference Model,
therefore, allowed the contribution of both positive trait mood and negative trait mood to be
considered, as well as the degree to which the disparity between positive and negative trait
moods contributed to the findings.
Between-Groups Comparisons
For each model, once participant groups were identified, the first study aim to compare
executive function test results across trait mood groups was addressed. Because the entire study
sample was divided into two participant groups in each model, independent samples t-tests were
applied to each model to compare means and identify significant between-groups differences on
all of the neuropsychological measures collected. All tests were 2-tailed and applied at the 0.05
alpha-level of significance.
Assessing Semantic Network Activity
The second and third aims of the study were to examine the effects of trait mood on
semantic network activity, via measures of semantic network access and activation, and to
examine potential effects of semantic network activity on the relationship between trait mood
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and executive function. Semantic network access was operationalized as the average response
latency on the Auditory Naming Test, and independent samples t-tests were applied to compare
Auditory Naming Test response latencies between the two trait mood groups in each model (2tailed test at 0.05 alpha-level). Semantic network activation was operationalized as the COWAT
category fluency (i.e., Animal Naming) results using SNAFU criteria. Analyses of the COWAT
category fluency data compared total number of exemplars produced between trait mood groups
for each model, as well as the mean number of semantic neighborhoods searched, the mean
number of exemplars produced within each neighborhood, and the mean number of exemplars
produced in contiguous neighborhood runs (according to the coding scheme described in the
COWAT section above; independent samples t-test, 2-tailed, alpha=0.05). Any significant
between-group differences identified in semantic network access (i.e., Auditory Naming Test
latency results) and/or semantic network activation (i.e., COWAT category fluency total
exemplars, mean semantic neighborhoods, mean exemplars per neighborhood, and mean
exemplars in neighborhood runs) were entered into a structural equation model using ALSCAL
in SPSS 25. Post-hoc analyses using these data were explored via mediation analysis using
Preacher and Hayes’ (2004) bootstrapping method in SPSS 25 through Haye’s PROCESS
version 3.5 macro (i.e., Model 4, simple mediation model; Hayes, 2017). Post-hoc canonical
correlation analyses were also applied to each model to identify the most useful of the three
models and to further explore relationships between executive function and semantic network
activity results between the different trait mood groups.
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CHAPTER THREE

Results

Power Analysis
The sample included 120 subjects, which was calculated to yield sufficient power via a
power analysis in GPower (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996; effect size R2 = .20,  = 0.05,
number of tested predictors = 1, and total number of predictors = 7; 1- = 0.8).

Participant Characteristics of the Entire Study Sample and the 3 Models’ Samples
Demographic Questionnaire data were analyzed to examine participant characteristics for
the entire study sample and the samples produced for each of the 3 study models. The 3 study
models were generated to assess the effect of: 1) positive trait mood alone on semantic activity
and executive functions, 2) negative trait mood alone on semantic activity and executive
functions, and 3) positive and negative trait moods together on semantic activity and executive
functions. The entire study dataset included all 120 retained participants. The Positive Trait
Mood model (i.e., the Positive Model) included 117 participants, the Negative Trait Mood model
(i.e., the Negative Model) included 115 participants, and the Positive and Negative Trait Mood
model (i.e., the Difference Model) included 112 participants. The study models differ in sample
size because the criterion used to classify participants into comparison groups differed in each
model. For the Positive Model, participants from the study dataset were classified into High and
Low Positive Trait Mood groups using the median PANAS-X Positive Affect score (i.e., the
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High Positive trait mood group included participants with scores above the median Positive
Affect score, and the Low Positive trait mood group included participants with scores below the
median Positive Affect score). For the Negative Model, participants from the study dataset were
classified into High and Low Negative Trait Mood groups using the median PANAS-X Negative
Affect score (i.e., the High Negative trait mood group included participants with scores above
the median Negative Affect score, and the Low Negative trait mood group included participants
with scores below the median Negative Affect score). For the Difference Model, difference
scores between PANAS-X Positive Affect and Negative Affect scores were generated, and the
median difference score was used to classify participants from the study dataset into Positive
(i.e., participants with difference scores above the median Positive Affect-Negative Affect score
difference score) and Negative (i.e., below the median Positive Affect-Negative Affect score
difference score) trait mood groups. Because a median score was used to identify groups in each
model, individuals whose scores fell at the median score for that model criterion were excluded
from the analysis of that model, leading to differing sample sizes between the study models.
Demographic Questionnaire data for the entire study dataset and the 3 study models are
summarized in Table 1 below. A two-way ANOVA was applied to participants’ age and selfreported English language proficiency, and a Kruskal-Wallis test was applied to all categorical
variables; no significant differences were observed between any samples (refer to Table 5 below
for mood survey and neuropsychological test results for the entire study sample).
Notably, participants, on average, indicated that they were as proficient or slightly more
so than the entire Queens College student population (ratings of 4 indicate ratings of “As
proficient” in English compared to the average student at Queens College). Participants’ trait
moods were evaluated using results from the BDI-II and PANAS-X. On the BDI-II, all
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participants in each sample obtained a non-depressed score (range=0-9), and because these
results were so tightly clustered, BDI-II data were not used to define participant groups in any of
the three study models. The BDI-II results were highly unusual, but likely reflected adequate
pre-screening procedures as the exclusion criteria included the presence of any mental disorder,
such as depression. As above, PANAS-X affect score data were used to define participant
groups in all 3 models. The PANAS-X scoring system yields a positive emotion scale score and
a negative emotion scale score, which are independent of each other, as specific survey items
load onto either scale (i.e., no PANAS-X items load onto both the positive and negative scales).
Consistent with published normative data (Watson & Clark, 1994), participants tended to rate
themselves higher on the positive scale than on the negative scale in the entire study sample and
in each of the 3 model samples. Because the PANAS-X positive and negative affect scales are
independent of each other, three models were generated: 1) a model that considered the effect of
positive moods only (i.e., using the PANAS-X positive affect scale score); 2) a model that
considered the effect of negative moods only (i.e., using the PANAS-X negative affect scale
score); and 3) a model that considered the combined effect of positive and negative trait moods
(i.e., using the PANAS-X positive and negative mood scale scores). Results obtained in each of
the 3 study models are described in the subsequent sections below.
Table 1. Descriptive and Statistical Demographic Data for the Total Study and 3 Mood Model Samples
Total Study
Positive
Negative
Difference
Between-Model
Sample
Model
Model
Model
Comparisons*
(n=120)
(n=117)
(n=115)
(n=112)
Age
M
SD
20.38 3.29

M
SD
20.29 3.22

M
SD
20.58 3.51

M
SD
20.35 3.28

n
%
51 42.50
69 57.50

n
%
51 43.59
66 56.41

n
50
65

n
48
64

F(3, 460) =
0.112; p=0.89

Gender
Male
Female
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%
43.48
56.52

%
42.86
57.14

Kruskal-Wallis
p=0.39

Race/Ethnicity
Caucasian
African
American
Asian
Hispanic/
Latinx

n
44
17

%
36.67
14.17

n
44
17

%
37.61
14.53

n
44
17

%
38.26
14.78

n
42
16

%
37.50
14.29

38
21

31.67
17.50

35
21

29.91
17.95

34
20

29.75
17.39

34
20

30.36
17.86

n
103
17

%
85.83
14.16

n
101
16

%
86.32
13.68

n
99
16

%
86.09
13.91

n
96
16

%
85.71
14.29

Kruskal-Wallis
p=0.22

n
96
24

%
80.00
20.00

n
93
24

%
79.49
20.51

n
92
23

n
91
21

%
81.25
18.75

Kruskal-Wallis
p=0.39

M
4.57

SD
0.95

M
4.58

SD
0.97

M
4.55

M
4.56

SD
0.95

Kruskal-Wallis
p=0.78

Handedness
Right
Left
Native Language
English
Other

Self-Rated English
Proficiency

%
80.00
20.00

SD
0.94

F(3, 460) =
0.00326; p=1.00

College Major
n
%
n
%
n
%
Psychology
77
64.17
74
63.25
74 64.35
Undecided
19
15.83
19
16.24
18 15.65
Other
24
20.00
24
20.51
23 20.00
*No statistically significant differences between all samples observed

n
71
18
23

%
63.39
16.07
20.54

Kruskal-Wallis
p=0.34

Model 1: The Positive Trait Mood Model (Positive Model)
Positive Model: Participant Groups
To address Aims 1 and 2 of the study and evaluate the contribution of positive moods to
measures of executive function and semantic network activity, participant groups were defined
using PANAS-X positive scale scores (median=29). A single median-split was performed on the
entire study dataset to identify two groups: 1) a high positive trait mood group, and 2) a low
positive trait mood group. Participants whose PANAS-X positive scale scores were greater than
the median were assigned to the high positive trait mood group, and participants whose PANASX positive scale scores were less than the median were assigned to the low positive trait mood
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group. Three participants from the entire study sample were excluded from the Positive Model,
because their PANAS-X positive affect scale score fell at the median score of 29 and they could
not be assigned to either the high positive trait mood or low positive trait mood group. Refer to
Table 1 for demographic information pertaining to the Positive Model.
Positive Model: Mood Survey and Neuropsychological Test Results
Descriptive statistics pertaining to the mood survey and neuropsychological test results
are summarized in Table 2 below. Independent samples t-tests were applied to compare means
across the high and low positive trait mood groups across these variables and are also reflected in
Table 2. The implications of the results are described below.
Table 2. Positive Trait Mood Model Mood and Neuropsychological Descriptive and Statistical Data
Entire Positive High Positive
Low Positive
Between-Groups
Model Sample Mood Group
Mood Group
Comparisons (High
(n=117)
(PANAS-X
(PANAS-X
versus Low Group)
Positive Affect Positive Affect
> 29; n=59)
< 29; n=58)

PANAS-X Positive
Affect
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT
Total Correct
Latency
COWAT
FAS
Animals
Total
Number
Neighborhoods
Neighborhood
Exemplars
Neighborhood
Run Size
DRM
Total Correct
Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color-Word
Color Naming
Word Reading

M
29.62

SD
8.42

M
36.52

SD
4.40

M
22.5

SD
4.86

df
115

t
16.36

p-value
<.001*

3.93
102.77

3.57
8.78

3.42
102.97

3.06
9.14

4.30
102.57

3.88
8.53

115
115

1.36
0.24

0.18
0.81

49.80
1.32

0.63
0.25

49.71
1.29

0.82
0.24

49.90
1.33

0.31
0.23

115
115

1.65
0.92

0.10
0.36

44.34

5.47

44.81

5.86

44.26

5.31

115

0.53

0.60

24.00
4.61

4.15
0.55

26.58
4.70

4.17
0.56

21.33
4.53

3.35
0.70

115
115

7.50
1.45

<.001*
0.15

6.73

0.66

6.87

0.78

6.66

0.69

115

1.54

0.13

4.12

0.58

4.17

0.75

3.82

0.72

115

2.57

0.01*

138.64
7.12

30.56
3.36

138.16
7.45

34.30
2.66

136.20
5.93

29.05
3.21

115
115

0.33
2.79

0.74
0.006*

26.48
22.68

3.37
2.39

26.71
22.94

3.50
2.45

26.17
22.13

3.10
2.27

115
115

0.88
1.85

0.38
0.06
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Color-Word
51.21
7.56
52.68
Switching
60.88
7.63
63.58
D-KEFS Trail Making
Scanning
21.60
3.32
21.33
Number
30.94
4.28
30.55
Sequencing
Letter Sequencing
30.29
4.16
30.23
Number-Letter
72.48
7.64
76.48
Sequencing
Speed
20.64
2.04
20.29
WAIS-IV DS
Total
27.80
2.59
27.77
DSF
10.81
1.55
10.98
DSB
7.87
2.70
7.45
DSS
8.38
1.46
8.16
WMS-IV SSp
27.61
4.36
27.42
*Statistically significant result at alpha-level = 0.01

8.32
7.90

49.13
56.67

6.18
5.26

115
115

2.62
5.56

0.01*
<.001*

3.39
4.72

21.90
31.03

3.33
4.06

115
115

0.92
0.59

0.36
0.56

3.80
7.10

30.33
67.17

4.29
5.29

115
115

0.13
8.03

0.89
<.001*

1.94

20.87

1.96

115

1.61

0.11

2.58
1.57
2.69
1.39
4.51

27.83
10.70
8.43
8.47
26.80

2.55
1.32
2.86
1.54
4.12

115
115
115
115
115

0.13
1.04
1.91
1.14
0.78

0.90
0.30
0.06
0.26
0.43

BDI-II: Participants in the high positive trait mood and low negative trait mood groups
did not differ significantly on their self-rated depressive symptomatology.
NAART: Estimated verbal IQ on the NAART was not significantly different between
groups, suggesting that participants in the high positive trait mood group and the low positive
trait mood group demonstrated similar intellectual functioning.
ANT: There were no statistically significant differences in participants’ ANT total and
latency scores, suggesting that the ability and speed at which words could be identified based on
their verbal descriptions (i.e., semantic network access) was similar across mood groups.
COWAT: Participants in the high positive trait mood and low negative trait mood groups
produced a similar number of exemplars on the letter fluency task which were not significantly
different. Participants in the high positive trait mood group produced significantly more animal
names than did participants in the low positive trait mood group on the category fluency task
(Animal Naming), which suggested that a higher trait positive mood was associated with greater
semantic network activation. Participants in the high positive trait mood group also produced
significantly more consecutive within-semantic neighborhood animal names than did those in the
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low positive trait mood group, which also suggested that more positive moods are associated
with greater semantic network activation (and in particular, greater sustained intra-neighborhood
search). There were no significant between-groups differences in the number of semantic
neighborhoods explored, or the total number of exemplars produced in each neighborhood.
DRM: The number of target words produced on the DRM were not statistically
significant between the high positive trait mood and low negative trait mood groups, indicating
similar verbal list-learning and memory between groups. However, participants in the high
positive trait mood group produced significantly more critical lures on the DRM than did
participants in the low positive trait mood group, which, additionally, suggested that higher
positive trait moods are associated with greater semantic network activation/poorer inhibition of
this activation (in particular, activation that is aberrant as reflected by generating conceptually
proximal non-target words).
D-KEFS: Color-Word Interference Test: There were no significant between-groups
differences for the Scanning, Color Naming, Word Reading, or Speed trials. However,
participants in the low positive trait mood group required significantly less time to complete the
D-KEFS Color-Word inhibition trial than did participants in the high positive trait mood group,
which suggested that lower positive trait moods are associated with more efficient inhibition of
prepotent responses. Participants in the low positive trait mood group also required significantly
less time to complete the D-KEFS Color-Word Switching trial compared to participants in the
higher positive trait mood group, further suggesting that low positive trait moods are associated
with more efficient inhibition, and, additionally, code-switching abilities in a visuo-lexical
paradigm.
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Trail Making: There were no significant between-groups differences in sequencing
numbers, letters, or alternating between these stimuli while sequencing them. However,
participants in the low positive trait mood group required significantly less time to complete the
D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching trial than did participants in the high positive
trait mood group, which also suggested that lower positive trait moods are associated with better
inhibition and code-switching abilities in a visuo-graphomotor paradigm.
WAIS-IV Digit Span: There were no significant between-groups differences across
DSF, DSB, DSS trails or the total DS score, suggesting auditory attention and working memory
between groups was similar.
WMS-IV Symbol Span: WMS-IV SSp performance was not significantly different
between the high positive trait mood and low positive trait mood groups, suggesting that nonverbal working memory was similar between groups.
Positive Model: Structural Equation Model
To address Aim 3, structural equation modelling (SEM) was attempted using ALSCAL in
SPSS 25. The PANAS-X positive affect scale score was used as the sole grouping variable, and
the COWAT Animal Naming variables were entered as predictor variables. BDI-II scores were
not entered as a grouping variable nor were ANT variables entered as predictor variables, due to
non-significant between-group differences on these measures. SEM failed, and a structural
equation could not be produced.
Positive Model: Post-Hoc Analyses
Because the Positive Model SEM was unsuccessful, post-hoc analyses were applied to
address Aim 3, to explore relationships between variables in the dataset, and to examine any
influence exerted by semantic network activity in the mood-executive function relationship.
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Positive Model: Correlation Analyses
Given failure of the SEM procedure, correlation analyses were conducted between all
mood and neuropsychological variables in the dataset to explore any relationships among them.
See Appendix 1.1 for all Positive Model correlation analysis results. Correlations that were
statistically significant are highlighted below.
The PANAS-X positive affect scale score was moderately correlated with BDI-II scores,
such that participants who reported higher positive trait moods on the PANAS-X also reported
less depressed moods on the BDI-II. This result indicated that participants reliably reported their
moods across the study mood measures and, to a lesser extent, suggested the existence of a single
negative-positive mood dimension as assumed in the study design. Participants also appeared to
reliably report their English language proficiency, as higher self-ratings were weakly, albeit
positively, correlated with better single-word reading performance on the NAART, and faster
word identification on the ANT when given definitions of the target words.
The PANAS-X positive affect scale score was moderately correlated with the total
Animal Naming score such that participants reporting higher positive trait moods produced more
animal names, suggesting that positive moods were associated with increased semantic network
activation. In addition, PANAS-X positive affect scale scores were weakly associated with
Animal Naming average neighborhood run size, such that participants reporting higher positive
trait moods demonstrated greater sustained intra-neighborhood semantic activity. Similarly, the
PANAS-X positive affect scale score was moderately correlated with total DRM critical lures,
such that participants reporting higher positive trait moods produced more critical lures than
participants reporting less positive trait moods, suggesting increasingly positive moods to be
associated with greater (aberrant) semantic network activation and poorer inhibition of this
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activation. This was additionally supported by a weak correlation between BDI-II scores and
DRM critical lures such that participants reporting less depressed moods produced more falsepositive DRM responses.
The PANAS-X positive affect scale score was weakly correlated with the D-KEFS ColorWord Switching scores such that higher positive trait moods were associated with greater
latencies to complete the reading inhibition and code switching visuo-lexical task (i.e., poorer
inhibition performance). The PANAS-X positive affect scale score was also moderately
correlated with the D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching, indicating higher positive
trait moods were associated with poorer inhibition, notably, within a different modality (i.e.,
visuographomotor).
Animal Naming total scores were moderately correlated to D-KEFS inhibition tasks (i.e.,
D-KEFS Color-Word Switching and D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching), such that
participants who produced more exemplars in a category fluency task demonstrated poorer
inhibition performance. Animal Naming mean neighborhood run size was also moderately
correlated with DRM critical lures, which indicated that participants who exhibited greater intraneighborhood semantic network activation also demonstrated greater aberrant semantic network
activity in a verbal learning and memory task. DRM critical lure responses were also moderately
correlated with these D-KEFS inhibition tasks, further suggesting that greater semantic network
activation is associated with poorer inhibition.
Positive Model: Factor Analyses
Exploratory factor analyses were conducted to describe the Positive Model variability,
given the significant correlations noted above. Factor analysis was applied to identify the initial
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factor solution and determinant; the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test and Bartlett’s test of sphericity
were applied. Extractions were made using eigenvalues > 1, and varimax rotation was applied.
The first exploratory factor analysis was conducted using every mood and
neuropsychological variable in the Positive Model to assess all components within the model.
This factor analysis failed as the degree of dissimilarity between the variables was too great for
successful modeling (determinant=1.48E-6; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)=0.476). The analysis
retained 8 factors which explained 72.23% of the model variance. Although the number of
factors retained was fewer than the total number of individual variables entered into the matrix, it
was greater than the total number of independent measures used in the study protocol, further
supporting model failure.
Because the all-variables model failed, a second exploratory factor analysis was applied
to a restricted set of variables, which included the 6 variables with significant between-group
differences described above. Specifically, these were the significant semantic network activation
variables (i.e., Animal Naming total and Animal Naming average neighborhood run size) and the
significant inhibition variables (i.e., D-KEFS Color Word Interference Test Color-Word trial, DKEFS Color Word Interference Test Switching trial, D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter
Switching trial, and DRM critical lures). The 6-variable restricted factor analysis was successful
(determinant=0.337; KMO=0.591, p=0.001) with no multicolinearity observed (r for all variables
in matrix < 0.520). The analysis retained 2 components which accounted for 57.75% of the
model variance. The rotated factor solution converged in 3 iterations and showed the
components to be strongly related to semantic network activation (Component 1; Animal
Naming total factor loading=0.584 and Animal Naming neighborhood run size factor
loading=0.569) and inhibition (Component 2; D-KEFS Color-Word trial factor loading=0.824,
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D-KEFS Switching factor loading=0.776, D-KEFS Number-Letter Switching trail factor
loading=0.794, and DRM critical lures factor loading=0.688).
Positive Model: Mediation Analyses
Because of the apparent strong dichotomy between components identified by the
restricted 6-variable factor analysis, post-hoc mediation analysis was conducted to assess
potential mediation of mood to inhibition (X-Y, c` path) through semantic network activity (via
M; a1, b1 path) using the same 6 variables. Analyses were applied using Hayes’ PROCESSv3.5
SPSS macro in SPSS 25.
A 3x3 matrix was generated to test all 9 possible combinations of the semantic network
activation variables as mediators of each inhibition variable regressed onto the independent
variable mood group, and the inhibition variables as mediators of each semantic network
activation variables regressed onto the independent variable mood group. Although DRM
critical lures loaded on the “inhibition” factor, it was entered into the mediation analysis as a
semantic activation variable due to the generative nature of the DRM task and the fundamental
difference between critical lure provision and the explicit, effortful response suppression
required in the D-KEFS inhibition tasks. Every iteration of the simple mediation model failed
(all bootstrapped confidence intervals for all a1 to b1 paths included 0).
Positive Model: Canonical Correlation Analyses
Because the SEM procedure and mediation analyses failed, an ad-hoc post-hoc analysis
was applied to evaluate canonical correlations between the inhibition and semantic network
activation variable sets that produced the successful restricted-variable factor analysis.
Canonical correlation analysis indicated that on the basis of positive trait moods,
semantic network activation was generally positively correlated with greater inhibition
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interference (i.e., poorer inhibition performance; Wilks lambda=0.39; p=0.001). The canonical
correlation coefficient (r=0.49) explained 82.10% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 1.08,
demonstrating good model fit. The primary canonical root was significant (F=4.29; p=0.001).
Moderate-to-strong positive correlations were observed between the inhibition variables and the
primary canonical correlate, such that greater inhibition interference was observed with greater
semantic network activation, especially as task demands increased to include code switching (rDKEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching=0.59; rD-KEFS Color Word Interference Color-Word=0.25; rD-KEFS Color Word
Interference Switching=0.62; rDRM Critical Lures=0.65).

Moderate-to-strong positive correlations were

observed between the semantic network activation variables and the primary canonical correlate,
such that semantic network activity increased over the duration of a spontaneous list-generating
task (rAnimal Naming Total=0.62), but less so in focused intra-neighborhood search strategies that
excluded inter-semantic neighborhood switches (rAnimal Naming Neighborhood Run Size=0.41).

Model 2: The Negative Trait Mood Model (Negative Model)
Negative Model: Participant Groups
To address Aims 1 and 2 of the study and evaluate the contribution of negative trait
moods to measures of executive function and semantic network activity, a second model was
generated using the entire study sample. Participant groups were defined using the median
PANAS-X negative affect scale score (median=23). A single median-split was again performed
on the entire study dataset to identify two groups: 1) a high negative trait mood group, and 2) a
low negative trait mood group. Participants whose PANAS-X negative affect scale scores were
greater than the median were assigned to the high negative trait mood group (PANAS-X negative
affect scale score>23; N=58), and participants whose PANAS-X negative affect scale scores
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were less than the median were assigned to the low negative trait mood group (PANAS-X
negative affect scale score<23; N=57). Five participants were excluded from the Negative Model
analyses, because their PANAS-X negative affect scale score fell at the median score of 23 and
they could not be assigned to either the high negative trait mood or low negative trait mood
group. Refer to Table 1 for demographic data pertaining to the Negative Model dataset.
Negative Model: Mood Survey and Neuropsychological Test Results
Descriptive statistics pertaining to the mood survey and neuropsychological test results
are summarized in Table 3 below. Independent samples t-tests were applied to compare means
across the high and low negative trait mood groups on these variables and are also reflected in
Table 3. The implications of the results are described below.
Table 3. Negative Trait Mood Model Mood and Neuropsychological Descriptive and Statistical Data
Entire
High Negative Low Negative Between-Groups
Negative
Mood Group
Mood Group
Comparisons
Model Sample (PANAS-X
(PANAS-X
(High versus Low
Negative
Negative
Group)
Affect > 23;
Affect < 23;
(n=115)
n=58)
n=57)

PANAS-X Negative
Affect
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT
Total Correct
Latency
COWAT
FAS
Animal Naming
Total
Number
Neighborhoods
Neighborhood
Exemplars
Neighborhood
Run Size
DRM
Total Correct
Critical Lures

M
22.42

SD
7.08

M
27.83

SD
4.41

M
15.88

SD
2.86

df
t
p-value
113 17.21 <.001*

4.82
103.53

3.68
8.87

5.00
102.45

3.62
8.48

4.30
104.83

3.64
9.14

113
113

1.03
1.45

0.30
0.15

49.83
1.33

0.61
0.25

49.82
1.34

0.60
0.22

49.83
1.32

0.64
0.24

113
113

0.09
0.47

0.93
0.64

44.49

5.50

44.83

5.83

44.08

5.17

113

0.73

0.47

23.59
4.25

4.26
0.60

21.47
4.48

3.08
0.68

26.21
4.28

4.04
0.67

113
113

7.08
1.59

<.001*
0.12

6.50

0.71

6.63

0.68

6.76

0.75

113

0.97

0.33

3.82

0.81

3.11

0.72

3.87

0.77

113

5.47

<.001*

136.64
6.14

32.33
3.15

136.24
5.10

31.11 137.13 34.42 113
3.17
7.50
2.80 113

0.15
4.30

0.88
<.001*
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D-KEFS Color-Word
Color Naming
26.53
3.42
26.66
Word Reading
22.66
2.41
22.83
Color-Word
50.68
7.70
48.83
Switching
59.94
7.52
57.34
D-KEFS Trail Making
Scanning
21.66
3.36
22.21
Number Sequencing
31.04
4.42
32.00
Letter Sequencing
30.49
4.17
30.66
Number-Letter
70.86
7.50
68.24
Sequencing
Speed
20.62
2.17
20.97
WAIS-IV DS
Total
27.62
2.66
27.79
DSF
10.85
1.53
10.72
DSB
7.36
1.66
7.31
DSS
8.37
1.50
8.55
WMS-IV SSp
26.81
4.09
26.52
*Statistically significant result at alpha-level = 0.01

3.27
2.54
7.28
6.59

26.38
22.46
52.92
63.08

3.67
2.28
7.75
7.49

113
113
113
113

0.43
0.82
2.92
4.37

0.67
0.41
0.004*
<.001*

3.19
4.33
4.20
6.90

21.01
30.88
30.29
74.04

3.50
4.35
4.23
7.01

113
113
113
113

1.92
1.38
0.47
4.48

0.06
0.17
0.64
<.001*

1.64

20.21

2.47

113

1.92

0.06

2.18
1.49
2.00
1.35
4.19

27.42
10.98
7.38
8.17
27.12

3.19
1.35
2.11
1.66
4.02

113
113
113
113
113

0.73
0.98
0.18
1.35
0.78

0.47
0.33
0.86
0.18
0.44

BDI-II: No significant difference was observed in the self-reported depressive
symptomatology of the high negative and low negative trait mood groups.
NAART: No significant difference was observed between the high negative trait mood
and low negative trait mood groups’ single word reading, suggesting intellectual functioning
between groups was similar.
ANT: No significant differences were observed between the high negative trait mood and
low negative trait mood groups’ ability and speed to identify words based on their verbal
descriptions, suggesting semantic network access was similar between groups.
COWAT: Letter fluency (FAS) was not significantly different between the high and low
negative trait mood groups. However, participants in the low negative trait mood group
produced significantly more animal names on Animal Naming than did participants in the high
negative trait mood group, which suggested that less negative trait moods are associated with
greater semantic network activation. Participants in the low negative trait mood group produced
significantly more consecutive within-semantic neighborhood animal names than did those in the
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high negative trait mood group, which suggested that less negative trait moods are associated
with greater semantic network activation (in particular, continued intra-neighborhood search).
The number of semantic neighborhoods explored or the number of exemplars produced within
each neighborhood was not significantly different between groups.
DRM: The total number of DRM targets produced on the DRM between the low
negative trait mood group and the high negative trait mood group were similar, suggesting
similar verbal list-learning and memory across groups. However, participants in the low
negative trait mood group produced significantly more critical lures than did participants in the
high negative trait mood group, which suggested that less negative trait moods are associated
with greater (aberrant) semantic network activation/poorer inhibition of this activation.
D-KEFS: Color-Word Interference Test: Color-naming and word-reading speed was not
significantly different between the high negative trait mood and low negative trait mood groups.
Participants in the high negative trait mood group, however, required significantly less time to
complete the Color-Word trial than did participants in the low negative trait mood group, which
suggested that more negative trait moods are associated with more efficient inhibition.
Participants in the high negative trait mood group also required significantly less time to
complete the Switching trial compared to participants in the low negative mood group, which
further suggested that more negative trait moods are associated with more efficient inhibition, as
well as more efficient code-switching.
Trail Making: Scanning, Number Sequencing, Letter Sequencing, and Speed trials were
not significantly different between high negative trait mood and low negative trait mood groups.
However, participants in the high negative trait mood group required significantly less time to
complete the Number-Letter Switching trial than did participants in the low negative trait mood
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group, which, similar to Color-Word Interference Test results, suggested that more negative trait
moods are associated with more efficient inhibition and code switching.
WAIS-IV Digit Span: No significant differences were observed between the high
negative trait mood and low negative trait mood groups on DSF, DSB, DSS or DS total score,
suggesting auditory attention and working memory were similar between groups.
WMS-IV Symbol Span: SSp performance between the high negative trait mood and
low negative trait mood groups was not significantly different, suggesting similar non-verbal
working memory abilities between groups.
Negative Model: Structural Equation Model
To address Aim 3, SEM for the Negative Model data was attempted using ALSCAL in
SPSS 25. The analysis was conducted similarly as in the Positive Model; for the Negative
Model, the PANAS-X negative affect scale score was used as the sole grouping variable, and the
Animal Naming variables were entered as predictor variables. Neither the BDI-II score nor the
ANT variables were entered as predictor variables, because there were no significant betweengroup differences in these variables (as in the Positive Model). Similar to the Positive Model
SEM, the Negative Model SEM also failed, and a structural equation could not be generated.
Negative Model: Post-Hoc Analyses
Because the Negative Model SEM was unsuccessful, post hoc analyses as conducted in
the Positive Model were applied to the Negative Model to address study Aim 3 and explore
relationships among Negative Model variables.
Negative Model: Correlation Analyses
Correlation analyses were conducted between all mood and neuropsychological variables
in the Negative Model dataset to examine any relationships among them. Refer to Appendix 1.2
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for all Negative Model correlation analysis results. Statistically significant correlations are
highlighted below.
The PANAS-X negative affect scale score was strongly correlated with BDI-II scores
such that participants reporting higher negative trait moods on the PANAS-X reported more
depressed moods on the BDI-II. This result further suggested that participants reliably reported
negative mood severity across the study mood measures. Participants, again, appeared to
reliably report their English language proficiency, as higher self-ratings were moderately
correlated with better single-word reading on the NAART and faster word identification based
on their definitions on the ANT.
The PANAS-X negative affect scale score was strongly correlated with the total Animal
Naming score such that participants reporting less negative trait moods produced significantly
more animal names, suggesting that less negative trait moods were associated with increased
semantic network activation. In addition, PANAS-X negative affect scale scores were weakly
associated with Animal Naming average neighborhood run size, such that participants reporting
less negative trait moods demonstrated greater sustained intra-neighborhood semantic activity.
Similarly, the PANAS-X negative affect scale score was moderately correlated with total DRM
critical lures such that participants reporting less negative trait moods produced more critical
lures than participants reporting more negative trait moods, suggesting increasingly negative
moods to be associated with less (aberrant) semantic network activation/better inhibition of this
activation. This was further supported by a weak correlation between BDI-II scores and DRM
critical lures such that participants reporting less depressed moods produced more false-positive
DRM responses.
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The PANAS-X negative affect scale score was moderately correlated with D-KEFS
Color-Word Switching scores such that higher negative trait moods were associated with shorter
latencies to complete the reading inhibition and code switching task (i.e., better inhibition
performance). The PANAS-X negative affect scale score was also moderately correlated with
D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching, indicating higher negative traits moods were
associated with more efficient inhibition as well.
Animal Naming total scores were moderately correlated with D-KEFS Color-Word
Switching and D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching, such that participants who
produced more exemplars in a verbal fluency task generally demonstrated poorer inhibition
performance. Animal Naming mean neighborhood run size was also weakly correlated with
DRM total hits, which, again, indicated that participants who exhibited greater intraneighborhood semantic network activation demonstrated better learning and memory for
semantically-related words. DRM critical lure responses were also moderately correlated with
D-KEFS Color-Word Switching and Trail Making Number-Letter Switching scores, further
suggesting greater semantic network activation to be related to poorer inhibition performance.
Negative Model: Factor Analyses
As in the Positive Model, exploratory factor analyses were conducted using the Negative
Model data to further explore correlations between negative trait mood and neuropsychological
variables. The analysis was applied to describe the initial solution and the determinant and
rotated factor solution. The analysis was conducted using identical criteria as used in the
Positive Model (i.e., extraction eigenvalues > 1, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test, Bartlett’s test of
sphericity, varimax rotation).
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The first exploratory factor analysis for the Negative Model was applied using all mood
and neuropsychological variables as in the Positive Model. The all-variables factor analysis
again failed (determinant=9.758E-6; KMO=0.435), retaining 7 factors that explained 69.03% of
the model variance.
A second restricted-variable exploratory factor analysis was applied, again, using the
same 6 variables as in the Positive Model, which in the Negative Model also yielded significant
between-groups differences. These included semantic network activation variables (i.e., Animal
Naming total and Animal Naming average neighborhood run size) and inhibition variables (i.e.,
D-KEFS Color Word Interference Test Color-Word trial, D-KEFS Color Word Interference Test
Switching trial, and D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching trial, and DRM critical
lures). The restricted factor analysis was successful (determinant=0.290; KMO=0.613, p=0.001)
with no evidence of multicolinearity (r for all variables in matrix < 0.520). The analysis retained
2 components which accounted for 58.16% of the model variance. The rotated factor solution
converged in 3 iterations and showed that, similar to the Positive Model, the Negative Model
factor analysis components were strongly related to semantic network activation (Component 1;
Animal Naming total factor loading=0.769, Animal Naming neighborhood run size factor
loading=0.549) and inhibition (Component 2; D-KEFS Color-Word trial factor loading=0.914,
D-KEFS Switching factor loading=0.750, D-KEFS Number-Letter Switching trail factor
loading=0.849, DRM critical lures factor loading=0.607).
Negative Model: Mediation Analyses
Because the Negative Model restricted factor analysis identified dichotomous
components similar to those identified in the Positive Model, a post-hoc mediation analysis was
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conducted to assess mediation of mood to inhibition (X-Y; c` path) through semantic network
activity (via M; a1, b1 path) using similar criteria via Hayes’ (2017) PROCESSv3.5 SPSS macro.
Similar to the Positive Model, a 3x3 matrix was generated to test the 9 possible
combinations of the semantic network activation variables as mediators of each inhibition
variable regressed onto the independent variable mood group, and the inhibition variables as
mediators of each semantic network activation variables regressed onto the independent variable
mood group. As in the Positive Model, the DRM critical lures score was entered into the
Negative Model mediation analyses as a semantic activation variable despite loading on the
“inhibition” component of the Negative Model factor analysis (see rationale in Positive Model:
Mediation Analyses section above). Also, as in the Positive Model, every iteration of the
Negative Model simple mediation model failed (i.e., all bootstrapped confidence intervals for all
a1 to b1 paths included 0).
Negative Model: Canonical Correlation Analyses
Canonical correlations were analyzed between the inhibition and semantic network
activation variable sets that produced the successful Negative Model restricted-variable factor
analysis.
Canonical correlation analysis indicated that on the basis of negative moods, semantic
network activation was generally positively correlated with inhibition interference (i.e., greater
semantic network activation was associated with more time to complete speeded tasks involving
effortful inhibition; Wilks lambda=0.38; F=4.49; p=0.001). The primary canonical correlation
coefficient (r=0.56) explained 87.31% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 1.01, indicating
adequate model fit. Again, the primary canonical root was significant (F=4.27; p=0.001).
Moderate-to-strong positive correlations were observed between the inhibition variable latencies
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and the primary canonical correlate such that poorer inhibition performance was observed with
greater semantic network activation, again, as task demands increased (rD-KEFS Trail Making NumberLetter Switching=0.65; rD-KEFS Color Word Interference Color-Word=0.63; rD-KEFS Color Word Interference Switching=0.70;

rDRM Critical Lures=0.66). Similar to Positive Model findings, moderate-to-strong positive
correlations were observed between the semantic network activation variables and the primary
canonical correlate such that semantic network activity increased over the duration of listgenerating tasks (rAnimal Naming Total=0.69), but the increase in semantic network activity was
smaller in focused intra-neighborhood search strategies that excluded inter-semantic
neighborhood cluster switches (rAnimal Naming Neighborhood Run Size=0.38).

Model 3: The Effect of Positive and Negative Mood (Difference Model)
Difference Model: Participant Groups
To address Aims 1 and 2 of the study and evaluate the contribution of positive and
negative trait moods to measures of executive function and semantic network activity, especially
considering the similar findings between the Positive and Negative Models, participant groups
were defined in a third model using both PANAS-X positive affect scale scores and negative
affect scale scores. As above, the PANAS-X yields positive and negative affect scales that are
independent of one another, and because participants tend to give higher positive ratings than
negative ratings of their moods, it is difficult to discern a mood variable that would exist along a
single negative-to-positive mood axis as described by the circumplex model. Similarly,
independent positive and negative mood ratings may mask each other and cannot simply be
collapsed into dichotomous more positive/less negative and less positive/more negative groups
(i.e., some respondents might rate themselves high in both positive and negative emotion, low in

96

both positive and negative emotion, or any combination). Indeed, a fourth 2x2 model was
attempted using the median PANAS-X positive and negative mood scores from the Positive and
Negative Models as part of the data analysis, but was not conducted due to large discrepancies in
sample sizes among the 4 groups it generated (i.e., NHigh Positive/High Negative=9; NHigh Positive/Low
Negative=46;

NLow Positive/High Negative=47; NLow Positive/Low Negative=10; 8 participants excluded), further

suggesting the need for a model that considered mood as a single dimension.
To address this need, the Difference Model was constructed, which considered both the
PANAS-X positive affect scale score and the PANAS-X negative affect scale score. To do this,
a difference score was generated for each participant to compare positive and negative trait mood
ratings, by subtracting the PANAS-X negative affect scale score from the PANAS-X positive
affect scale score. This not only yields a single variable (termed PANAS-XDifference) that
considers both positive and negative mood ratings, but it also reflects the magnitude of disparity
between individuals’ positive and negative self-ratings (i.e., the absolute value of PANASXDifference). Once PANAS-XDifference scores were calculated for each participant, a single mediansplit was performed on the entire study dataset to identify two groups: 1) a “positive” trait mood
group, and 2) a “negative” trait mood group. Participants whose PANAS-XDifference score was
greater than the median difference score were assigned to the positive trait mood group
(PANAS-XDifference score>11), and participants whose PANAS-XDifference score was less than the
median difference score were assigned to the negative trait mood group (PANAS-XDifference
score<11). Eight participants were excluded from Difference Model analyses because their
PANAS-XDifference scores fell at the median difference score of 11 and could not be assigned to
either the positive or negative trait mood group. Refer to Table 1 for demographic data
pertaining to Difference Model participant characteristics.

97

Difference Model: Mood Survey and Neuropsychological Test Results
Descriptive statistics pertaining to the mood survey and neuropsychological test results
are summarized in Table 4 below. Independent samples t-tests were applied to compare means
across the positive and negative trait mood groups across these variables and are also reflected in
Table 4. The implications of the results are described below.
Table 4. Difference Model Mood and Neuropsychological Descriptive and Statistical Data
Entire
Positive Trait
Negative Trait Between-Groups
Difference
Mood Group
Mood Group
Comparisons
Model Sample (PANASPANAS(High versus Low
XDifference > 11;
XDifference < 11; Group)
(n=112)
n=56)
n=56)

PANAS-X Difference
(Positive-Negative)
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT
Total Correct
Latency
COWAT
FAS
Animals
Total
Number
Neighborhoods
Neighborhood
Exemplars
Neighborhood
Run Size
DRM
Total Correct
Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color-Word
Color Naming
Word Reading
Color-Word
Switching
D-KEFS Trail Making
Scanning
Number Sequencing
Letter Sequencing
Number-Letter
Sequencing
Speed

M
7.60

SD
13.18

M
18.89

SD
5.72

M
-3.77

SD
8.76

df
t
110 16.21

3.60
102.92

3.57
8.71

3.13
103.38

3.08
8.08

4.07
102.57

3.66
8.62

110
110

1.48
0.51

0.14
0.61

49.81
1.31

0.62
0.25

49.76
1.29

0.69
0.25

49.93
1.34

0.20
0.22

110
110

1.77
1.12

0.08
0.26

44.33

5.43

44.38

5.28

44.27

5.72

110

0.11

0.92

23.87
4.24

4.15
0.63

26.86
4.34

3.19
0.68

20.97
4.13

3.05
0.51

110
110

9.99
1.85

<.001*
0.07

6.60

0.75

6.66

0.72

6.53

0.76

110

0.93

0.35

3.75

0.77

3.94

0.81

3.57

0.73

110

2.54

0.01*

137.48
6.14

31.18
3.12

137.30
7.86

31.81
2.68

138.20
4.53

32.86
2.86

110
110

0.15
6.36

0.88
<.001*

26.49
22.54
50.71
59.89

3.25
2.34
7.56
7.62

26.31
22.68
53.17
64.45

3.24
2.42
8.27
7.40

26.30
22.40
48.77
56.27

3.25
2.28
6.65
5.45

110
110
110
110

0.02
0.63
3.10
6.66

0.99
0.53
0.02*
<.001*

21.49
31.36
30.38
71.89

3.30
4.32
4.00
7.92

21.07
30.79
30.31
77.52

3.37
4.23
3.09
6.75

22.13
31.93
30.60
66.57

3.25
3.26
4.25
4.84

110
110
110
110

1.69
1.60
0.41
9.87

0.09
0.11
0.68
<.001*

20.67

3.31

20.37

1.97

21.00

1.78

110

1.78

0.08

98

p-value
<.001*

WAIS-IV DS
Total
27.78
2.51
27.82
DSF
12.59
1.39
12.45
DSB
7.62
1.62
7.34
DSS
8.39
1.42
8.03
WMS-IV SSp
27.04
3.92
27.17
*Statistically significant result at alpha-level = 0.01

2.78
1.27
1.75
1.40
3.74

27.73
12.73
7.89
8.50
26.87

2.27
1.31
1.29
1.30
4.24

110
110
110
110
110

0.21
1.15
1.89
1.84
0.40

0.84
0.25
0.06
0.07
0.69

BDI-II: No significant difference was observed between the positive and negative trait
mood groups BDI-II scores, indicating similar depressive symptomatology between groups.
NAART: NAART estimate verbal IQ was not significantly different between the positive
and negative trait mood groups suggesting equivalent intellectual functioning between groups.
ANT: No significant differences were observed between ANT total scores and average
response latencies between the positive and negative trait mood groups, indicating similar
semantic network access between groups.
COWAT: Letter fluency (FAS) results were not significantly different between the
positive and negative trait mood groups. Participants in the positive trait mood group produced
significantly more animal names than did participants in the negative trait mood group on the
category fluency task (Animal Naming), which suggested again that higher positive trait moods
are associated with greater semantic network activation. Participants in the positive trait mood
group also produced significantly more consecutive within-semantic neighborhood animal names
than did those in the negative trait mood group, which additionally suggested that more positive
trait moods are associated with greater intra-neighborhood semantic network activation. The
number of semantic neighborhoods explored and the average number of exemplars produced
within them did not differ significantly between positive and negative trait mood groups.
DRM: Participants in the positive and negative trait mood groups produced a similar
number of target DRM words that was not significantly different, suggesting equivalent verbal
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list learning and memory between groups. Participants in the positive trait mood group produced
significantly more critical lures on the DRM than did participants in the negative trait mood
group, which suggested that more positive trait moods are associated with greater (aberrant)
semantic network activation/poorer inhibition of this activation.
D-KEFS: Color-Word Interference Test: No significant differences were observed
between the positive and negative trait mood groups’ performance on Color Naming and Word
Reading. Participants in the negative trait mood group required significantly less time to
complete the Color-Word trial than did participants in the positive trait mood group, which
suggested that more negative trait moods are associated with more efficient inhibition. Negative
trait mood group participants also required significantly less time to complete the Switching trial
than positive trait mood group participants, suggesting that more negative trait moods are
associated with more efficient inhibition and code switching abilities.
Trail Making: Participants in the negative trait mood group required significantly less
time to complete the Number-Letter Switching trial than did participants in the positive trait
mood group, which also suggested that more negative moods are associated with more efficient
inhibition and code switching. No significant between-groups differences were observed on the
Scanning, Number Sequencing, Letter Sequencing, and Speed trials, suggesting psychomotor
speed and basic sequencing abilities to be similar between groups.
WAIS-IV Digit Span: No significant between-groups differences were observed on
WAIS-IV DSF, DSB, DSS, and total DS score, suggesting similar auditory attention and
working memory across trait mood groups.
WMS-IV Symbol Span: No significant between-groups differences were observed on
WMS-IV SSp, suggesting similar non-verbal working memory between trait mood groups.
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Difference Model: Structural Equation Model
To address Aim 3, SEM for the Difference Model dataset was attempted using ALSCAL
in SPSS 25 using methods identical to those used in the Positive and Negative Models. The
PANAS-XDifference score was used as the single grouping variable, and the Animal Naming
variables were entered as predictor variables. Similar to the Positive and Negative Models,
neither BDI-II scores nor ANT variables were entered as predictors in the SEM, because there
were no significant between-group differences in these values in the Difference Model analyses.
The Difference Model SEM also failed and did not produce a structural equation.
Difference Model: Post-Hoc Analyses
Because the Difference Model SEM was unsuccessful, post-hoc analyses were applied to
address Aim 3 and to explore relationships in the Difference Model as were conducted for the
Positive and Negative Models.
Difference Model: Correlation Analyses
Correlation analyses were conducted between all variables in the Difference Model
dataset to examine any relationships among them. Refer to Appendix 1.3 for all Difference
Model correlation analysis results. Significant correlation analysis findings are highlighted
below.
The PANAS-XDifference score was moderately correlated with BDI-II scores such that
participants reporting more negative trait moods on the PANAS-X reported more depressed
moods on the BDI-II. This result suggested that, as in the Positive and Negative Models,
participants reliably reported negative mood intensity across the study mood measures.
Participants again appeared to reliably report their English language proficiency, as higher self-
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ratings were moderately correlated with better single-word reading on the NAART and faster
word identification on the ANT.
The PANAS-XDifference score was strongly correlated with the total Animal Naming score
such that participants reporting more positive trait moods produced significantly more animal
names, suggesting that more positive moods were associated with increased semantic network
activation. In addition, PANAS-XDifference scores were weakly associated with Animal Naming
average neighborhood run size, such that participants reporting more positive trait moods
demonstrated greater sustained intra-neighborhood semantic activity. Similarly, the PANASXDifference score was moderately correlated with total DRM critical lures such that participants
reporting more positive trait moods produced more critical lures than participants reporting more
negative trait moods, again suggesting increasingly positive moods to be associated with greater
(aberrant) semantic network activation/poorer inhibition of this activation. This was also further
supported by a weak correlation between BDI-II scores and DRM critical lures such that
participants reporting more less depressed (i.e., more positive/less negative) moods produced
more false-positive DRM responses.
The PANAS-XDifference scale score was moderately correlated with the D-KEFS ColorWord Switching scores such that more negative trait moods were associated with more efficient
inhibition and code-switching. The PANAS-XDifference score was also moderately correlated with
D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching, indicating that more negative trait moods were
associated with better inhibition performance, as well.
Animal Naming total scores were strongly associated with the D-KEFS Color-Word
Switching and Trail Making Number-Letter Switching trials, such that participants who
produced more exemplars in the verbal fluency task demonstrated poorer inhibition performance
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across modalities. Animal Naming mean neighborhood run size was also moderately correlated
with DRM total hits, which, again, indicated that participants who exhibited greater intraneighborhood semantic network activation demonstrated better learning and memory for
semantically-related words. DRM critical lure responses were also moderately positively
correlated with D-KEFS Color-Word Switching and Trail Making Number-Letter Switching
latency scores, further suggesting that greater semantic network activation was associated with
poorer inhibition and code-switching performance. In addition, Animal Naming mean
neighborhood run size was moderately correlated with ANT latency scores, such that participants
who produced a greater number of continuous semantic clusters on a fluency task (i.e.,
demonstrated greater intra-neighborhood semantic network activation) required less time to
identify a target word based on its definition, suggesting that semantic network access when
given primes is more efficient in individuals exhibiting greater semantic network activation.
Difference Model: Factor Analyses
As in the Positive and Negative Models, exploratory factor analyses were applied to the
Difference Model to describe its initial and rotated factor solutions. The model determinant,
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin, and Bartlett sphericity were assessed; extractions were made using
eigenvalues > 1, and varimax rotation was applied.
The first exploratory factor analysis for the Difference Model was conducted using all
mood and neuropsychological variables, which, similar to the factor analyses applied to the
Positive and Negative Models, failed (determinant=2.044E-7; KMO=0.475). The Difference
Model analysis retained 9 factors which explained 72.64% of the model variance. Again, as in
the Positive and Negative Models, the Difference Model pattern of results suggested that a
restricted analysis would increase power to identify relationships among variables of interest.
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A second exploratory factor analysis was applied to a restricted set of variables, which
included the same 6 variables with significant between-groups differences that were identified
via Difference Model between-groups comparisons (and were identical to those identified by
similar analyses applied in both the Positive and Negative Models). These included semantic
network activation variables (i.e., Animal Naming total, Animal Naming average neighborhood
run size) and inhibition variables (i.e., D-KEFS Color Word Interference Test Color-Word trial,
D-KEFS Color Word Interference Test Switching trial, and D-KEFS Trail Making NumberLetter Switching trial, and DRM critical lures). The restricted factor analysis was successful
(determinant=0.272; KMO=0.606, p=0.001) without evidence of multicolinearity (r for all
variables in matrix < 0.536). The analysis retained 2 components which accounted for 60.19%
of the model variance. The rotated factor solution converged in 3 iterations and showed, similar
to the Positive and Negative Models, the components were strongly related to semantic network
activation (Component 1; Animal Naming total factor loading=0.723, Animal Naming
neighborhood run size factor loading=0.651) and inhibition (Component 2; D-KEFS Color-Word
trial factor loading=0.850, D-KEFS Color-Word Switching factor loading=0.803, D-KEFS
Number-Letter Switching trail factor loading=0.727, DRM critical lures factor loading=0.603).
Difference Model: Mediation Analyses
Because the Difference Model restricted factor analysis identified dichotomous
components similar to those identified in the Positive Model and the Negative Model, a similar
post-hoc mediation analysis was conducted to assess mediation of mood to inhibition (X-Y; c`
path) through semantic network activity (via M; a1, b1 path) to the Difference Model data.
Analyses were applied using Hayes’ PROCESSv3.5 SPSS macro.
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Similar to the procedures used in the Positive Model and the Negative Model, a 3x3
matrix was generated to test the 9 possible combinations of the semantic network activation
variables as mediators of each inhibition variable regressed onto the independent variable mood
group, and the inhibition variables as mediators of each semantic network activation variables
regressed onto the independent variable mood group. As in the Positive and Negative Models,
the DRM critical lure total was entered into the Difference Model mediation analyses as a
semantic activation variable despite its “inhibition” factor loading (see Positive Model:
Mediation Analyses section above for rationale). Also, as in the Positive and Negative Models,
every iteration of the Difference Model simple mediation model failed (all bootstrapped
confidence intervals for all a1 to b1 paths included 0), except for the iteration with D-KEFS
Color-Word Switching acting as a mediator of DRM Critical Lures. D-KEFS Color-Word
Switching appeared to weakly mediate the relationship between mood and DRM critical lures
(i.e., the direct effect of X on Y, mood group on DRM critical lures (c` path)=2.47; p=0.0048;
Bootstrapped CI=0.78<x<4.15; indirect effect of X on Y, mood group on DRM critical lures via
M, D-KEFS Color-Word Switching, (a1b1 path)=0.86; Bootstrapped CI=0.01<x<1.71).
Difference Model: Canonical Correlation Analyses
A post-hoc analysis was applied to evaluate canonical correlations between the inhibition
and semantic network activation variable sets that produced the successful Difference Model
restricted-variable factor analysis and identified the mediation of mood on DRM critical lures by
D-KEFS Color-Word Switching.
Canonical correlation analysis indicated that on the basis of positive and negative moods,
greater semantic network activation was generally positively correlated with greater inhibition
interference (i.e., poorer inhibition performance; Wilks lambda=0.38; F=4.49; p=0.001). The
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primary canonical correlation coefficient (r=0.71) explained 95.26% of the variance with an
eigenvalue of 1.04, indicating adequate model fit. Again, the primary canonical root was
significant (F=5.28; p=0.001). Moderate-to-strong positive correlations were observed between
the inhibition variables and the primary canonical correlate such that greater inhibition
interference (i.e., poorer inhibition performance) was observed with greater semantic network
activation; also, similar to the Positive Model and Negative Model findings, this effect was
stronger as task demands increased to include code-switching (rD-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter
Switching=0.85; rD-KEFS Color Word Interference Color-Word=0.75; rD-KEFS Color Word Interference Switching =0.35; rDRM
Critical Lures=0.74).

Similar to the Positive and Negative Models’ findings, moderate-to-strong

positive correlations were also observed between the semantic network activation variables and
the primary canonical correlate such that semantic network activity increased over the duration
of list-generating tasks (rAnimal Naming Total=0.76), but less so in focused intra-neighborhood search
strategies that excluded inter-semantic neighborhood switches (rAnimal Naming Neighborhood Run
Size=0.42).

Post-Hoc Comparison between the Entire Study Sample and 3 Trait Mood Models
A final post-hoc analysis was performed to evaluate the mood survey and
neuropsychological test results between the entire study sample and the 3 study models
generated for the analysis. One-way ANOVA was applied to the 4 data sets at the 0.05-alpha
level. Results of the ANOVA are shown in Table 5 below and, importantly, indicate that no
statistically significant differences were found between the entire study sample and the 3 study
models on any of the mood or neuropsychological variables. This suggests that the 4 samples
generally well approximated each other, as would be expected, given that all 3 trait mood models
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were generated using the entire study dataset and that all 4 datasets were of generally similar
sample size.
Table 5. Descriptive and Statistical Mood and Neuropsychological Data for the Total Study and 3
Mood Model Samples
Entire Study Positive Model Negative
Difference
BetweenSample
Sample
Model
Model Sample Models
Sample
Comparisons*
(n=120)
(n=117)
(n=115)
(n=112)
(df = 3, 460)
M
29.02

SD
8.65

PANAS
Positive Affect
PANAS-X
21.37 7.06
Negative Affect
BDI-II
3.94 3.59
NAART IQ
102.99 8.77
ANT
Total Correct
49.81 0.62
Latency
1.32 0.24
COWAT
FAS
44.39 5.46
Animals
Total
23.89 4.18
Number
4.30 0.59
Neighborhoods
Neighborhood
6.65 0.70
Exemplars
Neighborhood
3.84 0.72
Run Size
DRM
Total Correct
137.5 31.1
Critical Lures
6.60 3.21
D-KEFS ColorWord
Color Naming
26.50 3.33
Word Reading
22.61 2.38
Color-Word
50.89 7.60
Switching
59.92 7.58
D-KEFS Trail
Making
Scanning
21.58 3.33
Number
31.09 4.33
Sequencing
Letter
30.39 4.12
Sequencing
Number-Letter 71.54 7.88
Sequencing
Speed
20.65 2.34

M
29.62

SD
8.42

M
28.98

SD
8.21

M
29.31

SD
8.79

F
0.14

p-value
0.935

20.64

6.93

22.42

7.08

21.31

7.11

1.26

0.287

3.93
102.77

3.57
8.78

4.82
103.53

3.68
8.87

3.60
102.92

3.57
8.71

2.41
0.16

0.066
0.921

49.80
1.32

0.63
0.25

49.83
1.33

0.61
0.25

49.81
1.31

0.62
0.25

0.02
0.12

0.996
0.946

44.34

5.47

44.49

5.50

44.33

5.43

0.02

0.996

24.00
4.61

4.15
0.55

23.59
4.25

4.26
0.60

23.87
4.24

4.15
0.63

0.20
2.39

0.895
0.062

6.73

0.66

6.50

0.71

6.60

0.75

2.16

0.092

4.12

0.58

3.82

0.81

3.75

0.77

2.40

0.064

138.64
7.12

30.56
3.36

136.64
6.14

32.33
3.15

137.48
6.14

31.18
3.12

0.08
2.44

0.971
0.064

26.48
22.68
51.21
60.88

3.37
2.39
7.56
7.63

26.53
22.66
50.68
59.94

3.42
2.41
7.70
7.52

26.49
22.54
50.71
59.89

3.25
2.34
7.56
7.62

0.01
0.08
0.12
0.47

1.000
0.972
0.949
0.703

21.60
30.94

3.32
4.28

21.66
31.04

3.36
4.42

21.49
31.36

3.30
4.32

0.05
0.20

0.985
0.900

30.29

4.16

30.49

4.17

30.38

4.00

0.05

0.987

72.48

7.64

70.86

7.50

71.89

7.92

0.89

0.447

20.64

2.04

20.62

2.17

20.67

3.31

0.01

0.999
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WAIS-IV DS
Total
27.74 2.60 27.80
2.59
27.62
2.66
27.78
DSF
11.21 1.48 10.81
1.55
10.85
1.53
11.59
DSB
7.63 2.30
7.87
2.70
7.36
1.66
7.62
DSS
8.38 1.47
8.38
1.46
8.37
1.50
8.39
WMS-IV SSp
27.13 4.09 27.61
4.36
26.81
4.09
27.04
*No statistically significant differences between all samples observed
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2.51
1.39
1.62
1.42
3.92

0.11
2.41
1.11
0.01
1.69

0.953
0.066
0.344
1.000
0.168

CHAPTER FOUR

Discussion
Study Aims and Results
This study was designed with 3 specific aims: 1) to characterize the effect of trait mood
on executive functions and other cognitive skills (Aim 1), 2) to characterize the effect of mood
on semantic network activity (Aim 2), and 3) to evaluate the contribution of semantic network
activity to trait mood-executive function relationships via structural equation modeling and
exploratory analyses (Aim 3). Participant demographic data were collected using a brief
questionnaire that was developed for this study, and information regarding participants’ trait
moods was collected using the PANAS-X and BDI-II. Mood data from the PANAS-X was used
to generate 3 study models, the Positive Model, Negative Model, and Difference Model. Each of
the 3 study aims was addressed for each study model. Prior to initiation of this research,
hypotheses for each study aim were generated.
To address Aim 1, a collection of standardized neuropsychological instruments was
administered to each participant. This included assessments of executive functions involving
verbal fluency (i.e., the COWAT FAS and Animal Naming), verbal learning (i.e., the DRM),
verbal attention and working memory (i.e., the WAIS-IV Digit Span subtest), non-verbal
working memory (i.e., the WMS-IV Symbol Span subtest), and inhibition (i.e., the D-KEFS
Color-Word Interference subtest and Trail Making subtest). Intellectual functioning was
estimated using a test of single-word reading (i.e., the NAART). Hypotheses surrounding Aim 1
stated higher negative trait moods (and/or lower positive trait moods) would be associated with
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poorer attention, working memory, and verbal fluency, and better inhibition given prior findings
of increased creativity and propensity for top-down, relational processing in more positive
moods and increased bottom-up, detail-oriented processing in more negative moods (Clore &
Huntsinger, 2007; Lee & Sternthal, 1999; Storbeck & Clore, 2005). The most recent of these
models extend on Clore’s “affect-as-information” approach and attribute these findings to the
feedback that affective states provide to cognitive processes. Huntsinger, Isbell, and Clore
(2014) posited that relational processing styles free cognitive reserves by reducing focus on
extraneous detail (which may also favor global versus local feature detection; see Huntsinger,
Isbell, & Clore, 2012) and, generally, represent the default processing style in positive moods to
facilitate conceptual access in dealing with incoming information from the environment (such as
in priming effects and creativity). According to this “affect-as-cognitive-feedback” model,
negative affect signals danger or uncertainty in the environment and, subsequently, inhibits
relational processing in favor of referential processing (or in the authors’ words, represents a
“stop signal” to switch processing style and attend to local, bottom-up environmental features).
While these effects are flexible and context-dependent, a main conclusion that can be drawn is
that cognitive inhibition underlies the switch to bottom-up processing styles observed in negative
affective states from top-down processing styles observed in positive affective states.
Means comparisons was conducted using independent samples t-tests for Aim 1. In all
three study models, there were no significant differences between mood groups on any of the
demographic data, NAART-estimated IQ, or depressive symptoms on the BDI-II, indicating that
participant groups generally well approximated each other. As expected, given the study
inclusion and exclusions criteria, participants generally ranged in age from their late teens to
mid-twenties. There were more Caucasian participants than those identifying with any other
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racial/ethnic group and the majority of participants were right-hand dominant. Most participants
were native English-speakers and rated themselves to be as proficient (or slightly more) than the
typical Queens College student. These results were similar between trait mood groups in each
study model, as well as between each model and the entire study sample.
Just as participant characteristics were generally similar, so too were their performances
across most measures of executive functions. In each study model, there were no significant
differences between groups in basic graphomotor speed and speeded scanning and sequencing on
the D-KEFS Trail Making and speeded color naming and word reading on the D-KEFS ColorWord Interference Test. Verbal attention and working memory scores were also not significantly
different between groups in each study model on the WAIS-IV Digit Span, nor was non-verbal
working memory on the WMS-IV Symbol Span. This suggested minimal impact of trait mood
on motor and mental speed, basic processing, attention, and working memory across modalities.
There appeared to be somewhat disparate effects, however, of mood on select aspects of
verbal skills. Verbal list-learning and memory, as assessed by the DRM, was not significantly
different between mood groups in each model, nor was letter fluency on the COWAT FAS.
Interestingly, however, there were significant differences observed between mood groups on
category fluency via Animal Naming. Together, these differences suggest that mood may affect
lexical activation to mentally search for related words, as opposed to lexical access processes
needed to identify specific target words (and, thus, suggested differences between semantic
network access and semantic network activation as indicated by Aim 2 results). Specifically, it
appeared that moment-to-moment semantic activation and search strategies within semantic
neighborhoods was more efficient in more positive trait moods and less efficient in more
negative trait moods, but no difference in strategy efficacy was observed between semantic
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neighborhoods (i.e., there were no significant differences in the number of neighborhoods
explored or the amount of exemplars produced belonging to each neighborhood, on average,
over the duration of the trial). Considered together, this indicates that mood significantly
impacted overall category fluency performance and focused and sustained intra-neighborhood
search, but not inter-neighborhood search.
Significant differences between trait mood groups were also observed on measures of
inhibition. This included measures of basic inhibition (i.e., on the D-KEFS Color-Word
Interference Test Color-Word trial), inhibition including code switching (i.e., on the D-KEFS
Color-Word Interference Switching trial and the D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter
Sequencing trial), and inhibition involved in suppressing aberrant semantic activity (i.e., via
DRM critical lures). These significant findings are consistent with prior models suggesting
affect regulates inhibitory, and conversely, semantic priming functions (Storbeck & Clore,
2008), which are important to concept-formation and processing style selection (Gasper & Clore,
2002).
The analysis described above identified a group of 6 variables on which significant
differences were observed between trait mood groups across all 3 study models: 1) Animal
Naming total score, 2) Animal Naming average neighborhood run size, 3) DRM critical lures, 4)
D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test Color-Word trial, 5) D-KEFS Color-Word Interference
Test Switching, and 6) D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching. In the Positive Model,
participants who reported higher positive trait moods performed better on fluency variables (i.e.,
Animal Naming total score and average neighborhood run size) and worse on inhibition-related
variables (i.e., D-KEFS inhibition variables and DRM critical lures) than those who reported
lower positive trait moods. Similar results were obtained in the Negative Model, such that
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individuals who reported higher negative trait moods performed worse on category fluency
measures and better on inhibition measures than those who reported less negative trait moods.
This was interesting because the results were bidirectional and consistent with each other, which
indicated that not only does trait mood significantly affect semantic fluency and inhibition, but
that valence specifically is impactful to these executive skills. These findings additionally
suggested that emotional valence may be uni-axial. Difference Model analyses revealed similar
effects, such that those participants reporting more positive/less negative trait moods performed
better on fluency and worse on inhibition measures than did those who reported less
positive/more negative trait moods. Because the Difference Model considers positive and
negative trait moods together as opposed to either positive or negative mood features alone, it is
assumed that the Difference Model more accurately characterized trait mood valence along a
negative-positive axis than did either the Positive Model or the Negative Model. Perhaps most
importantly, the size of the effect of mood on these fluency and inhibition variables appeared to
be greatest in the Difference Model versus the Positive Model and Negative Model, highlighting
the effectiveness of considering positive and negative trait mood aspects together rather than as
dichotomous, separable valences.
Ultimately, Aim 1 of the study was satisfied, because the results identified the effects of
enhanced category fluency and poorer inhibition in more positive trait moods and enhanced
inhibition and poorer category fluency in more negative trait moods. That being said, our initial
hypotheses were only partially supported. While this is consistent with prior findings on fluency
and inhibition (Chepenik et al., 2017), this research did not replicate findings of mood-related
differences in attention, working memory, and verbal learning between trait mood groups that
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have previously been reported (Clore & Palmer, 2019; Eich & Forgas, 2003; Gotlieb & Joorman,
2010) in any study model.
Aim 2 of the study was to evaluate the effect of trait mood on semantic network access
and activation. Semantic network access was measured using latency scores in an auditory
responsive naming test (i.e., the ANT). Semantic network activation was evaluated using a
category fluency task (i.e., the COWAT Animal Naming test). SNAFU criteria (Zemla et al.,
2020) were applied to category fluency results, which yielded several values to characterize
semantic network activation: 1) total number of exemplars produced, 2) total number of semantic
neighborhoods explored over the duration of the 60-second trial, 3) the average number of
exemplars produced within each semantic neighborhood over the duration of the 60-second trial,
and 4) the average number of consecutive within-neighborhood exemplars produced. The use of
these measures allowed for semantic network activation to be more fully assessed than
traditional fluency scores, because total network activation, inter-semantic neighborhood
activation, and intra-semantic neighborhood activation could be characterized and compared.
Aim 2 hypotheses stated that higher negative trait moods (and/or lower positive trait moods)
would be associated with poorer naming performance (i.e., greater naming latency being
indicative of reduced semantic network access) and poorer category fluency (i.e., reduced
semantic activation as evidenced by producing fewer exemplars, exploring fewer semantic
neighborhoods, and/or producing fewer exemplars within each semantic neighborhood
consecutively and/or nonconsecutively on average). These hypotheses were generated based on
prior studies indicating increased relational processing and verbal fluency in more positive
moods (Abele-Brehm, 1992; Clark et al., 2001), given that responsive naming and other
linguistic abilities rely on relational symbolic decoding (Clark & Pulman, 2007; Kramsch, 2015).
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Similar to analyses from Aim 1, between-groups means comparisons were conducted
using independent samples t-tests in each study model. Analyses of Auditory Naming Test
performance indicated that study participants generally performed well on the test and that there
was no significant difference in naming latency between trait mood groups in each study model.
This suggested that participants had grossly similar word knowledge/vocabulary size, that
semantic network access was not affected by trait mood, and that targeted selection of specific
concepts occurs at similar speeds across mood states. However, results of analyses on semantic
network activation, that is the non-targeted, spontaneous spread of activity from activated
concepts to those that are closely related, clearly indicated an important effect of trait mood. As
above, Positive Model results revealed greater overall semantic network activation (via Animal
Naming total score) and contemporary intra-neighborhood semantic search (via average
neighborhood run size) in higher positive trait moods, but non-significant differences in interneighborhood search (via number of semantic neighborhoods searched) or non-sustained intraneighborhood search (via the average number of exemplars produced within each semantic
neighborhood). Again, similar results were found in the Negative Model such that those
reporting higher negative trait moods demonstrated significantly reduced overall semantic
network activation and intra-neighborhood search but similar inter-neighborhood and nonsustained intra-neighborhood search. This pattern of results was reinforced by the Difference
Model; those participants reporting more positive/less negative trait moods exhibited
significantly enhanced overall semantic network activation and intra-neighborhood activation
than those reporting less positive/more negative trait moods, whereas inter-neighborhood and
non-sustained intra-neighborhood search between groups were similar. Again, this effect
appeared to be largest in the Difference Model than in either the Positive Model or the Negative
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Model, which continued to support the effectiveness of considering positive and negative mood
features together rather than either alone (or as strictly dichotomous). Aim 2 hypotheses were
also partially supported: overall semantic network activation did appear to be affected by mood,
as hypothesized (and especially so regarding sustained intra-neighborhood activation), such that
more positive trait moods were associated with enhanced category fluency and more negative
trait moods were associated with reduced category fluency; however, semantic network access
(i.e., ANT naming latency) was not significantly different between mood groups. In addition, it
should be noted that FAS total scores did not differ significantly between mood groups in any
study model. This suggested that there is a disparity in linguistic activity associated with
searching for words that are not conceptually related (as in the FAS) versus those that are (as in
Animal Naming). Given that the category fluency measure relies on conceptual relatedness,
whereas letter fluency does not explicitly require it (for examples pertaining to this in AD, see
Cerhan, Ivnik, Smith, Tangalos, Petersen, & Boeve, 2010; Henry, Crawford, & Philips, 2004),
this may explain our findings of significant between-mood-group differences in Animal Naming
and non-significant differences in FAS total scores.
Aim 3 of the study sought to examine the role of semantic network activity in the
relationship between trait mood and executive function. Although moods have reliably been
shown to affect various cognitive skills, the mechanism underlying these relationships remains
unclear. It was theorized that the informative value of moods, according to Schwarz and Clore’s
(1983) affect-as-information hypothesis, could relate to/affect access of conceptual knowledge;
thus, Aim 3 sought to evaluate whether semantic network activity (i.e., the selection of linguistic
semantic knowledge) accounts for relationships between trait mood and various executive
functions. Therefore, it was hypothesized that Aim 2 results would show that higher negative
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trait moods restrict semantic network activity, whereas higher positive trait moods enhance
semantic network activity and that these effects would mediate mood-executive function
relationships identified via Aim 1 results. It was hoped that these effects could be identified
using SEM, and Aim 3 also sought to further characterize additional relationships among trait
mood, executive functions, and semantic network activity via exploratory analyses.
To address Aim 3, structural equation modeling was attempted for each study model.
Unfortunately, SEM failed in every case, and a structural equation could not be produced. It is
not entirely clear why this procedure failed, but it is believed that, at least in part, the
dissimilarity between the executive functions assessed in this study was sufficiently large so as to
lead to model failure, and, in addition, there may have been issues related to multicolinearity.
Several post-hoc analyses were applied, however, to attempt to identify a mediational role of
semantic network activity between mood and executive function and to further explore
relationships among the study variables.
Exploratory analyses were conducted in a stepwise fashion in order to identify
relationships among study variables and to assess the role of semantic network activity in them.
First, correlation analyses were conducted, which revealed that mood questionnaire results were
generally consistent (i.e., those who reported less positive and/or more negative trait moods on
the PANAS-X reported more depressed moods on the BDI-II), as were objective and subjective
measures of vocabulary knowledge (i.e., single-word reading on the NAART was positively
correlated with single-word identification and speed on the ANT and self-ratings of English
proficiency). These analyses also revealed significant correlations of varying strength between
PANAS-X mood scores and each of the 6 variables on which significant t-test results were
observed, which included semantic network activation measures (i.e., Animal Naming total score

117

and average neighborhood run size), inhibition measures (i.e., D-KEFS Color-Word Interference
Test Color-Word and Switching trials and D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching
trial), and DRM critical lures. No other significant correlations between any of the study
measures were noted. This pattern of results was noted in each study model and is described in
greater detail below.
Positive Model Post-Hoc Analyses
In the Positive Model, higher positive trait moods on the PANAS-X were correlated with
greater category fluency and intra-network search on Animal Naming and with poorer
performance on D-KEFS inhibition tasks when compared to those who reported less positive
trait moods. Those reporting higher positive trait moods on the the PANAS-X also produced
more critical lures on the DRM, as did participants who indicated less depressed self-report on
the BDI-II. Relationships between variables were also identified: those who produced more
animal names demonstrated worse performance on D-KEFS inhibition tasks and produced more
DRM critical lures (i.e., exhibited poorer suppression of non-target words). Those who produced
more DRM critical lures also tended to perform more poorly on D-KEFS inhibition tasks. In
sum, these findings suggest interrelationships among mood, semantic network activation, and
inhibition that were included in the study hypotheses and indicated that more positive trait
moods were associated with enhanced verbal fluency (i.e., semantic activation) and poorer
inhibition.
Because these relationships were identified via correlation analysis, exploratory factor
analysis was applied to the Positive Model. An initial factor analysis was conducted using all of
the variables in the model; however, this analysis failed, possibly due to the number of executive
function-related variables in the model and the extent of dissimilarity among these variables.
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Because there appeared to be a degree of interrelatedness between mood, semantic network
activation, and inhibition, a second factor analysis was conducted that considered only the
semantic network activation and inhibition variables for which significant results were found.
Interestingly, the restricted factor analysis retained two factors related to semantic activation
(onto which Animal Naming total score and average neighborhood run size loaded) and
inhibition (onto which D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Color-Word and Switching trials and
Trail Making Number-Letter Switching and DRM total critical lures loaded). The DRM critical
lure loading suggested that, despite the DRM task’s semantic nature, increased critical lure
provision (i.e., worse performance) was related not to increased semantic activation, per se, but
rather to reduced suppression (i.e., inhibition) of this activity.
An important aspect of Aim 3 was to demonstrate that semantic network activity drives
the relationship between trait mood and executive function. Although SEM failed in the Positive
Model, results from correlation and factor analyses strongly suggested the existence of such a
relationship. Mediation analysis was conducted to evaluated whether semantic network
activation values (gleaned from Aim 2 analyses) accounted for the effects of positive trait mood
on inhibition (gleaned from Aim 1 analyses); however, this failed to yield a significant result.
Therefore, canonical correlation analysis was applied to the Positive Model data to characterize
relationships between the groups of semantic network activation variables and the inhibition
variables that produced a successful factor analysis. This did yield significant results, such that
higher positive trait moods were associated with greater semantic network activation and poorer
inhibition, whereas lower trait moods were associated with reduced semantic network activation
and enhanced inhibition. This expanded on the basic correlation analyses, because it provided
direct evidence that positive trait mood did simultaneously and significantly affect semantic
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network activation (in particular, in sustained within-semantic neighborhood search strategies)
and global, multimodal inhibitory processes (as opposed to those associated with any single DKEFS inhibition task).
Negative Model Post-Hoc Analyses
To evaluate the effect of negative trait mood on these relationships, post-hoc analyses
were applied to the Negative Model dataset that were identical to those applied to the Positive
Model dataset. Essentially, the results of these analyses were complimentary to those obtained
using Positive Model data. Higher negative trait moods were correlated with reduced category
fluency and intra-neighborhood search on the Animal Naming task and with enhanced inhibition
on the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test Color-Word and Switching trials and the D-KEFS
Trail Making Number-Letter Switching trial. Higher negative trait moods (and greater
depressive symptomatology via greater BDI-II scores) were associated with fewer DRM critical
lure responses (i.e., more effective suppression of aberrant semantic activity). Fewer DRM
critical lure responses were also associated with more effective inhibition across D-KEFS
inhibition tasks. As such, the initial relationships among positive trait moods, semantic network
activation, and inhibition from the Positive Model held true and were consistent in the Negative
Model (i.e., the Positive Model indicated more positive moods were associated with increased
semantic network activation/fluency and poorer inhibition, whereas the Negative Model
indicated that more negative moods were associated with reduced semantic network
activation/fluency and enhanced inhibition). This indicated that it was not positive moods alone
that accounted for our findings and, further, that mood valence significantly affected these
cognitive skills. The strength of these correlations was similar between the Positive Model and
the Negative Model, consistent with the notion that positive moods and negative moods
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contributed equally to these effects or that, rather, “positive” and “negative” moods represent
relative positions along a single emotional valence axis.
The initial all-factors exploratory factor analysis failed in the Negative Model, but a
similarly restricted analysis to include the variables on which significant between-groups t-test
results were found was successful. As in the Positive Model, the Negative Model restrictedvariable analysis factor solution retained the same components with identical sets of variables
(i.e., a semantic activation component onto which Animal Naming total score and average
within-neighborhood run size loaded and an inhibition component onto which the D-KEFS
inhibition variables and DRM critical lures loaded). This pattern of results reinforced the
Positive Model conclusion that endorsing critical lures on the DRM was related to poorer
inhibition rather than semantic over-activation.
Mediation analysis was conducted for the Negative Model to evaluate whether semantic
network activation accounted for the observed effects of negative trait moods on inhibition. This
analysis failed, similar to that conducted for the Positive Model. Canonical correlation analysis
was applied to assess relationships between the group of fluency variables and the group of
inhibition variables with significant t-test results. This analysis yielded results that were the
inverse of those obtained in the Positive Model: for the Negative Model, higher negative trait
moods were associated with poorer semantic network activation/category fluency and enhanced
inhibition. Similar to the post-hoc correlation analysis, the canonical correlation strength was
similar between the Negative Model and the Positive Model. Together, these points further
reinforced findings from the Positive Model and the conclusion that negative trait moods and
positive trait moods are not necessarily discrete states but represent relative positions/differences
in emotional valence.
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Difference Model Post-Hoc Analyses
Post-hoc analyses were carried out in the Difference Model that were identical to those
applied in the Positive Model and Negative Model. This allowed positive trait moods and
negative trait moods to be simultaneously considered as opposed to one or the other as in the
Positive Model and the Negative Model. Correlations similar to those from the Positive Model
and Negative Model were observed in the Difference Model: more positive/less negative trait
moods were associated with increased semantic network activation/category fluency on Animal
Naming (and particularly so for intra-network rather than inter-network search) and reduced
inhibition on D-KEFS inhibition measures and via greater number of DRM critical lures,
whereas less positive/more negative trait moods were associated with reduced semantic network
activation/category fluency and enhanced inhibition. Not only did this support findings from the
Positive Model and Negative Model, but crucially, it yielded stronger correlations between these
variables than in both the Positive Model and Negative Model. This suggested that it is essential
to consider positive and negative trait mood features together when evaluating the cognitive
effects of mood as opposed to considering either positive or negative features alone. Similar to
other models, indirect relationships were observed between PANAS-XDifference scores and BDI-II
scores, and BDI-II and DRM critical lure scores, and direct relationships between DRM critical
lures and D-KEFS inhibition trial latencies (i.e., poorer inhibition performance). Thus, similar
correlations between these variables were observed in the Difference Model and were generally
notably stronger when compared to those indicated by the Positive Model and Negative Model.
Difference Model factor analysis failed when all model variables were entered into the
model, but it was successful when restricted to the set of 6 variables in which significant t-test
results were obtained. This, again, retained two components, identical to factor analysis results
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from the Positive Model and Negative Model: a component comprising the 2 significant
semantic network activation variables (i.e., Animal Naming total score and average withinneighborhood run size) and a component comprising the 4 inhibition variables (i.e., D-KEFS
Color-Word Interference Test Color-Word and Switching trials, D-KEFS Trail Making NumberLetter Switching trial, and DRM critical lures).
Mediation analysis was conducted in the Difference Model to assess whether semantic
network activation accounted for the observed effects of mood on inhibition. Similar to results
from the Positive Model and Negative Model, no mediating relationships were observed, except
for the iteration in which Color-Word trial scores from the D-KEFS Color-Word Test weakly
and partially mediated mood-related effects on DRM critical lures. This suggested a mediational
role of inhibition on lexico-semantic processes, as opposed to semantic activity mediating
inhibition (or any other executive skill) as originally hypothesized. Interestingly, this mediating
relationship was observed only in the Difference Model but neither in the Positive Model nor the
Negative Model. Thus, it appears that neglecting either negative or positive mood features
masked this effect, which only became apparent once both features were considered
simultaneously.
Difference Model canonical correlations found relationships broadly between semantic
network activation and inhibition, as reported in the Positive Model and Negative Model. That
is, more positive trait moods were associated with increased semantic network
activation/category fluency and reduced inhibition, and more negative trait moods were
associated with reduced semantic network activation/category fluency and enhanced inhibition.
While Difference Model results were similar to those obtained in the Positive Model and the
Negative Model, canonical correlation strength was greater in the Difference Model compared to
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the other models (as was similar to the univariate correlation analyses applied to each model).
This, further, supported conclusions drawn from the Positive Model and the Negative Model that
emotional valence represents a single dimension as opposed to comprising dichotomous positive
and negative aspects.

Significance
This study is innovative because it contributes to the scientific understanding of
relationships among mood, semantic network activity, and executive functions. Although the
literature details various effects on executive functions across a range of moods (that naturally
occur or are experimentally induced), researchers have failed to provide a clear mechanism that
explains why such effects are observed. The most compelling theory that has been put forth to
date is Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) Cognitive Tuning Model, which states that cognitive skills
are situationally optimized by moods that serve as alarms for what given situations require. This
research sought to identify the mechanism by which moods “tune” cognitive skills, as both
negative and positive trait moods have been shown to enhance some of these skills while
hindering others in ways that are contextually important.
Specifically, much of the research summarized in the Introduction indicates a very broad
conclusion in the cognitive psychology literature, which states that positive moods generally
enhance cognitive skills. While this may be true for a range of abilities, such as learning and
memory, generativity, and processing speed, it may not be for others, as indicated in research on
false memory (Knott, Threadgold, & Howe, 2014; for a developmental perspective on this, see
Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010). The present research has replicated some of
these findings, specifically, that greater positive trait moods enhanced verbal fluency, whereas
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higher negative trait moods yielded more effective inhibition and code-switching abilities (Gabel
& McAuley, 2020). It must be noted, however, that mood effects described elsewhere were not
found in this study (e.g., positive moods have been found to enhance processing speed and
learning and memory, but these findings were not replicated; see Piccirilli, Arcelli, Baratta, &
Ferretti, 2019 for background information and an intervention study in a healthy, aged
population). The present research did not meet its ultimate goal to identify the mechanism by
which moods “tune” executive function, but, rather, it identified an association between semantic
network activation and inhibition across trait moods that warrants further examination.
Literature review resulted in the hypothesis that semantic network activity includes at
least two processes: semantic network access (i.e., the targeted spread of activity towards a target
concept) and semantic network activation (i.e., the non-targeted spread of activity away from
active nodes towards proximally related, non-active concepts). It was thought that the
mechanism by which executive functions are situationally tuned is controlled by both semantic
network access (i.e., to ensure that necessary concepts are activated) and semantic network
activation (i.e., to ensure that informative and important surround concepts are co-activated).
The current analyses, however, indicated that semantic network access did not vary significantly
between those participants reporting more negative trait moods versus those reporting more
positive trait moods. This finding was surprising as it suggests that conceptual access to
semantic knowledge either is 1) at most, minimally affected by mood, 2) at most, minimally
impactful to a broad range of executive functions, or 3) both minimally affected by mood and
minimally impactful to executive functions. This result, however, may be related to the
characteristics of the task used to assess semantic network access. The Auditory Naming Test
involves cues for 50 words that are relatively common to individuals who are fluent in English,
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including those without a college education, and those in urban areas (all of which being broadly
consistent with our research sample). The vast majority of the target words on the task represent
generally non-activating (or distressing) concepts for most people and, therefore, may not exert
much of an effect on semantic network access given the demands of the laboratory situation, nor
may they exert much of an effect on mood. In other words, more cognitively taxing (or
distressing/arousing) situations may be necessary to induce changes (or signal “alarm”) to a
sufficient degree to impact semantic network access such that there would be an observable
effect on the executive skills assessed (as discussed in Cochran, Lee, & Chown, 2006). In line
with our hypothesis, however, semantic network activation (as measured by the COWAT Animal
Naming test, a semantic fluency measure) did appear to be restricted in individuals reporting
higher negative trait moods and enhanced in those reporting higher positive trait moods. There
also appeared to be an effect of mood on the set of executive skills that require inhibition (i.e.,
suppression of responses via the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference test, D-KEFS Trail Making
test, and DRM), such that participants reporting higher negative trait moods more efficiently
inhibited prepotent responses than those reporting higher positive trait moods.
Differences in the number of critical lures produced on the DRM indicated that higher
negative trait moods led to significantly fewer false memories and that higher positive trait
moods led to significantly more false memories. It could be argued that this effect relates to
improved suppression of the spontaneous semantic network activation toward non-target critical
lures in each DRM word-list in higher negative trait moods. This inhibition may underlie
retrieval-induced forgetting effects initially described by Bower, who argued that effective
memory retrieval requires memory traces for unnecessary content to be suppressed. It could,
therefore, be speculated that some elements of Bower’s theory, in particular, that semantic
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activity underlies different aspects of cognition, is not entirely inaccurate (for examples of the
link between inhibition and retrieval-induced forgetting, see Storm & Levy, 2012; Verde, 2012;
Williams & Zacks, 2001).
Significant differences between trait mood groups on the D-KEFS inhibition tasks were
also particularly interesting. Participants reporting higher positive trait moods exhibited greater
inhibition interference (i.e., poorer inhibition performance) in Stroop-like tasks (i.e., on the DKEFS Color-Word Interference test Inhibition and Switching trials), as well as on a motor setshifting and sequencing task (i.e., the D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching trial)
compared to those reporting higher negative trait moods. This indicated that the effect of mood
on inhibition was observed across modalities (i.e., visuo-lexical and graphomotor skills,
respectively) and was not restricted to verbal learning and memory processes involved in the
DRM. The presence of a multimodal effect of mood on inhibition suggests that it is exerted on
global inhibitory processes, as opposed to otherwise unaccounted factors that might exist within
a specific modality. In addition, it is possible that this global inhibiting process is responsible for
the differences observed in semantic network activation, such that suppressed activation noted in
higher negative trait mood groups represents a form of non-effortful inhibition. This potentially
drives the mediating effect observed in the Difference Model in which semantic activation
appeared to be weakly mediated by some aspect of inhibition, as opposed to inhibition being
mediated by semantic activity as originally hypothesized.
It is unfortunate that the analyses did not confirm a mediating effect of semantic network
activation on the mood-executive (or mood-inhibition) relationship as theorized. Although a
relatively large sample was included in the research, it is likely that the study was underpowered
to identify such a relationship given the sheer number of within-subject and environmental
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factors that are likely to contribute to cognitive test performance. It is also possible that the size
of the effect of mood on semantic network activity and on executive functions is relatively small,
at least within naturally occurring trait moods and/or within a laboratory setting. To account for
these factors, exploratory analyses were restricted to variables on which significant effects were
observed. While not ideal, this is a valid method to assess potential between-variable
relationships, because it improves the signal-to-noise ratio that could otherwise mask genuine
effects (Gilula & Haberman, 1986; Oort, 1992). This approach allowed relationships between
semantic network activation and inhibition to be identified. Interestingly, canonical correlation
analyses in the Positive Mood Model, Negative Mood Model, and Difference Model supported a
direct relationship between semantic network activation and inhibition interference, such that
those reporting higher positive trait moods (or lower negative trait moods) demonstrated
significantly greater semantic network activation and inhibition interference (i.e., poorer
inhibition performance) than those who reported higher negative trait moods (or lower positive
trait moods). This finding, as well as evidence of a mediating relationship between these
variables across trait moods from the Difference Model, indicates that future studies are needed
to clarify this relationship.

Model Comparison
Because the PANAS-X considers positive trait moods and negative trait moods
independently, analyses were conducted in a step-wise fashion to assess the effect on semantic
network activity and executive functions by 1) self-reported positive trait moods alone (i.e., the
Positive Model), 2) self-reported negative trait moods alone (i.e., the Negative Model), and 3)
the difference between self-reported positive and negative trait moods (i.e., the Difference
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Model). Although a structural equation model could not be produced in any trait mood model,
post-hoc analyses allowed for the comparison of the contributions of positive and negative trait
moods to semantic network activity and executive functioning in each model.
T-tests applied in the Positive Model showed that individuals reporting higher positive
trait moods demonstrated increased category fluency and greater inhibition interference
compared to those reporting lower positive trait moods. Importantly, the converse was shown in
the Negative Model; individuals reporting higher negative trait moods demonstrated reduced
category fluency and less inhibition interference than those reporting lower negative trait moods.
Together, these findings suggest that the effects of trait mood valence on semantic network
activation and on inhibition are dynamic and bidirectional, which would support Russell’s (1980)
theory that valence represents a single dimension of mood. Therefore, any trait mood state is
expected to fall at some location along a valence spectrum ranging from most negative to most
positive, further suggesting that positive and negative trait moods are not necessarily dissociable
as implied by the PANAS-X scoring system. It also stands to reason that the effect of positive
trait mood and the effect of negative trait mood, if truly bidirectional, work to “cancel each other
out.” If so, the most appropriate experimental model would be one that considers both positive
and negative trait moods. Indeed, the Difference Model relied on difference scores between the
PANAS-X positive and negative affect scales, which would more accurately approximate the
position of participants’ trait moods along the emotional valence spectrum than when positive or
negative trait moods are considered alone. This is additionally supported by the unreported 2x2
trait mood model given that the large majority of participants included in that model rated their
trait positive and negative moods dichotomously (i.e., gave ratings that were classified as high
positive/low negative or low positive/high negative) rather than similarly (i.e., gave ratings that
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were classified as high positive/high negative or low positive/low negative; 83% of the model
sample rated their trait moods as high positive/low negative or low positive/high negative versus
17% of the sample rated their trait moods as high positive/high negative or low positive/low
negative). Importantly, the Difference Model accounted for more variance than did the Positive
and Negative Models, and additionally, revealed the mediational relationship between inhibition
and semantic network activation that was not observed in either the Positive Model or Negative
Model, further indicating it to be the superior of the three.

Considerations and Other Limitations
Mood Dimensionality and Other Problematic Aspects of the PANAS-X
This research yielded evidence that trait mood does significantly contribute to semantic
network activation and inhibition. As above, these findings lend support to Russell’s circumplex
model, specifically, that the valence, or “pleasantness,” of an emotional state exists along a
single dimension. However, unique mood states of similar valence are thought to exist along this
dimension and represent unique experiences. For example, positive moods reflecting happiness
may differ in their valence: from calm (i.e., somewhat pleasant but not far from neutral), to
content (i.e., more pleasant and somewhat farther from neutral), to ecstatic (i.e., very pleasant
and quite far from neutral), to manic (i.e., extremely pleasant and farthest from neutral, to the
point of representing pathological happiness). The PANAS-X scoring system, however, appears
problematic because it collapses these differences by summing subjective ratings of similarly
valenced traits. At the same time, the scoring system may introduce redundancy (e.g., summing
ratings of the extent to which a participant is “sad” and “blue”) and may reduce internal validity
(e.g., assuming that “shy” is negatively valenced).
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Perhaps, more importantly, the PANAS-X does not account for arousal, the second
dimension of emotion described by Russell’s model, which refers to the extent to which an
emotional state is activating. Using the example above, the ecstatic and manic states would be
considered significantly more arousing than would be calm and content states. Prior research has
shown that the arousal component of emotional states is extremely important to human
experience (Gerber, Posner, Gorman, Colibazzi, Kensinger, & Corkin, 2004; Kuperman et al.,
2014; Vogt et al., 2008; Yu, et al., 2008; for a critical view, see Weaver & McNeill, 1992). As
natural external stimuli serve as alarms to problematic or dangerous elements of the
environment, the resultant emotional state primes decision-making and action (e.g., approach
versus avoidance and fight versus flight). Theoretically, there exists an arousal threshold
necessary for such signaling. It is difficult to induce super-threshold arousal states in
experimental paradigms (Barret & Russell, 1999) and is beyond the scope of the current project;
however, it is, at least, plausible that self-reported trait moods reflect low-level arousal states.
This may have led to significant findings between trait mood groups on fewer cognitive tasks
than expected. Specifically, it is possible that naturally-occurring emotional states that are
observed in the laboratory may not have been arousing enough to exert a sufficiently large effect
to be detected given the statistical power and research procedures associated with the current
study. Several other models of emotion extend beyond Russell’s 2 dimensions (Bailen, Green, &
Thompson, 2019; Barrett, 2010; Trnka, Lacev, Belcar, Kuska, & Tavel, 2016), which suggests
that there may be factors other than valence (and arousal) which contribute to these relationships
in meaningful ways yet remain elusive.
Unfortunately, the PANAS-X scoring system yields scores for positive affect and
negative affect using terms most closely associated with valence rather than arousal (or other
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emotional dimensions). The redundancy in select PANAS-X items hints toward differences in
valence intensity, but these differences may be too subtle to be differentiated by respondents
(and examiners administering the test). For example, among other descriptors, respondents are
asked to independently rate the extent to which they feel “sad,” “blue,” and “downhearted,” in
general. While it could be argued that these terms semantically represent negative emotions of
different valences, those differences may be too small to be fully appreciated. Further,
respondents who endorse these negative emotions might believe them all to reflect a singular
state and, therefore, rate each of these items similarly rather than discern any notable difference
among them (e.g., a respondent may be more likely to perceive herself or himself to be
adequately described by both “blue” and “downhearted” rather than think to herself or himself,
“While I do feel ‘blue,’ I am in no way ‘downhearted,’” while providing responses). In instances
in which the PANAS-X uses several synonyms reflective of a common positive or negative
mood state, positive or negative scale scores (or, in fact, both) may be inflated.
Category Fluency as a Measure of Semantic Network Activation
Significantly poorer category fluency performance was observed in individuals reporting
higher negative trait moods compared to those reporting higher positive trait moods. Although
category fluency is often used to measure semantic network activity (Avery & Jones, 2018;
Kenett, 2018; Martinez-Nicolas, Carro, Llorente, & Garcia Meilan, 2019), fluency may be
reduced in some individuals for reasons beyond spontaneous network activation. These could
include reduced vocabulary size, reduced English-language proficiency, reduced knowledge of
category exemplars (e.g., a layperson would be expected to underperform compared to a
zoologist in an animal-naming task), and negative/traumatic lifetime interactions with category
exemplars (e.g., a person who was viciously attacked by a dog in her or his youth may refuse,
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consciously or unconsciously, to utter the word “dog,” or conversely, remain atypically
entrenched in that set and search only for the names of dog breeds and/or dog-related animal
names such as “dingo” or “wolf”). Clearly, this list of confounds is extensive and includes those
that are psychological and non-psychological. It must be stated that the cognitive sequelae of
psychological defense mechanisms, such as those cited in the latter two examples above, have
been described throughout the 20th century and beyond (Smith & Solms, 2018; Weinstein &
Kahn, 1950), but have largely fallen out of favor for neurologically-based explanations
(Heilman, 2014).
With these points noted, however, the current findings suggest that our category fluency
results were genuinely reflective of semantic network activation. No significant differences
between negative and positive trait mood groups were observed in single-word reading of
irregular words on the NAART, single-word identification on the ANT, the number of exemplars
on the COWAT letter fluency trials, or on depressive symptomatology measured via the BDI-II.
This suggests that intellect, word familiarity, and vocabulary size did not differ appreciably
among groups, nor did depressive mood features that might contribute to psychological denial or
repression that could affect fluency performance. Similarly, analyses of the semantic
neighborhood search methods between trait mood groups revealed that those reporting higher
negative trait moods searched a similar number of semantic neighborhoods than their higher
positive trait mood counterparts, but that they produced fewer exemplars from each semantic
neighborhood searched. This finding indicates that negative trait moods may be associated with
reduced intra-semantic network activation, despite similar inter-semantic network activation.
This is significant because it further suggests that category fluency is a valid measure of
semantic network activation, which has been cited more frequently in various neuropsychiatric
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groups, as opposed to healthy individuals similar to those included in this study (D’Agostino et
al., 2017; Ho & Nation, 2018; Stoll, de Wit, Middleton & Buxbaum, 2019). Similarly, these
earlier studies have largely relied on techniques that evaluate verbal fluency performance using a
restricted set of exemplars (rather than on the entire list of exemplars produced), which precludes
a full analysis of neighborhood search strategies (see Salmon, Butters, & Chan [1999] for a
classic example). The differences between inter- and intra-network search also provide useful
information on the complexities of semantic search strategies, which has generally been
neglected in prior research on healthy individuals.
The current study identified clear differences between intra-neighborhood semantic
activation, which appeared dampened in higher negative trait moods compared to higher positive
trait moods, and inter-neighborhood activation, in which no significant differences between trait
mood groups were observed. Notably, this finding reinforces those that associate reduced intraneighborhood search with frontal-lobe lesions, neurodegenerative disorders, and schizophrenia,
whereas enhanced intra-neighborhood search (as found in higher positive trait mood groups) has
been associated with increased intellect and creativity in neurologically-healthy individuals (but
may be associated with pathological perseveration observed in some neuropsychiatric
conditions) (Benedek, Kenett, Umdasch, Anaki, Faust, & Neubauer, 2016; Paster, Parra
Rodriguez, Salmon, & Jacobs, 2018; Vonk et al., 2019).
The Complexity of Semantic Network Activation
The spontaneous spread of semantic network activity is complex and not adequately
understood. Some authors suggest that it is responsible for cognitive priming effects because
accessed concepts lead to co-activation of (or toward) closely related semantic nodes. According
to Rosch’s (1973, 1975a, 1975b) theory, this activity leads to the mental construction of

134

cognitive prototypes in early life (akin to Piaget’s [1952] mental representation sensorimotor
substage) and is essential to the organization of semantic networks. This makes sense from a
basic learning standpoint: when information is committed to memory, it must fit within an
existing framework (similar to Piagetian assimilation; see Piaget, 1952) for proper organization
and future access. This leads to common prototypes, for example, apples being red and sweet as
opposed to green and sour. However, this example highlights the fact that semantic networks
(and the prototypic nodes represented within them) must be flexible to access important nonprototypic information that everyday situations require (Eshrag & Mamdani, 1979; Fodor &
Lepore, 1996; Goguen, 1969; Zadeh, 1965). Semantic activity of these “fuzzy sets” allows for
adaptation to ever-changing environments and novel information (or in Piaget’s terms,
accommodation; see Piaget, 1952).
Superior fluency performance requires semantic activity to spread within a sufficiently
fuzzy conceptual category, but it also requires that spread to be restricted. For example, when
producing animal names, sufficient fuzziness allows activation to spread from “cow” to “pig” to
“deer,” but not to “beef,” “pork,” or “venison.” Because these animal-as-food names are closely
related to potential target nodes, it could be expected that there is some degree of spontaneous
co-activation within and between exemplars belonging to related semantic neighborhoods. Thus,
some level of inhibition is necessary in fluency tasks, as it allows for accurate intraneighborhood search and inter-neighborhood changes (say from farm animals, to house pets, to
ocean animals, but not to mythical creatures).
It would appear, then, that verbal fluency is not entirely dissociable from inhibition and
several other executive processes. Indeed, common fluency errors, such as repetitions and
intrusions, may represent inefficient working memory, self-monitoring, and error detection.
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Together, executive control comprises these functions (and others) and is essential to cognitive
flexibility and set-maintenance upon which successful fluency performance relies (including in
bilinguals and aphasia; for examples, see Carpenter, Rao, Penaloza, & Kiran, 2020; Patra, Bose,
& Marinis, 2020; Rao, 2016). These functions have been shown to activate medial and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (Dolcos, LaBar & Cabeza, 2004; Lane, Chua & Dolan, 1999),
which have also been implicated in verbal generativity, even to the extent that these executive
skills can accurately and reliably predict category fluency performance (Amunts, Camilleri,
Eickhoff, Patil, Heim & Weis, 2020). With all of these points considered, category fluency—
and by extension, semantic network activation—should not be considered fully semantically or
linguistically-based, because effective (i.e., non-aberrant) spreading of activation appears to
involve priming effects (e.g., via the examiner’s instructions to provide “names of all the animals
you can think of, including animals from a farm, animals from the jungle, animals from the
ocean, and animals you keep as a house pet,” and via inter-nodal activation from exemplar to
exemplar during task performance) and restriction via inhibitory processes (i.e., to maintain set
and ensure accurate inter-neighborhood switches). This may also be reflected in the present
DRM critical lure results derived from our post-hoc factor analyses. While it was not surprising
that the restricted factor analyses—that included 1) category fluency (i.e., semantic activation)
measures and 2) inhibition measures—retained exactly those factors (which further supported the
procedure’s accuracy), the fact that DRM critical lures loaded onto the inhibition factor rather
than the semantic activation factor was surprising. This implies that the production of critical
lures was related to reduced effectiveness of the inhibitory functions that restrict aberrant
semantic activity as opposed to processes that are strictly linguistic (as might be expected given
the linguistic nature of the DRM procedure). The latter of these could be explained by priming-
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like inter-nodal effects that characterize features of fluency performance that are commonly
observed (e.g., runs of nested subordinates within a superordinate such as “…bird, finch,
cardinal, blue jay, owl, screech owl, barn owl…” or semantically related/similar exemplars such
as “dog, cat, mouse…,”, “dog, wolf, coyote…,”, or “cat, rat, bat…”). Thus, verbal fluency may
involve the push and pull of priming and inhibition, and it may not be entirely orthogonal to
these executive functions.
The Complexity of Inhibition
Clearly, as supported by the current findings, inhibition is essential to semantic network
activity. Similar to semantic activation, inhibitory processes may be significantly more complex
than originally assumed. Inhibition is typically thought to serve as a cognitive brake pedal to
slow and/or stop neural activity associated with prepotent responding to increase cognitive
efficacy. However, it must be considered that the inhibition tasks used in this research reflect the
fact that inhibition may be effortful in some cases and non-effortful in others. For example, the
D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test Color-Word and Switching trials require respondents to
selectively read words or identify colors, and the D-KEFS Trail Making test Number-Letter
Switching trial asks respondents to sequence and alternate between stimuli. This form of
inhibition requires conscious effort to ensure task rules are followed, implying that we can
consciously “switch off” our neurologically based impulses, which has implications for more
complex human behaviors (e.g., making healthy food choices by inhibiting the impulse for fatty
and sweet foods in the goal-oriented behavior of dieting). Crucially, however, inhibition may
also occur unconsciously and non-effortfully, such as that driving effective verbal fluency
performance (i.e., by restricting the spread of semantic activation toward non-target exemplars
described above). Traditional fluency paradigms, such as that used in this study, are, therefore,
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likely to be insufficient to assess non-effortful versus effortful inhibition in linguistic functions
(which may both be involved in the paradigm by maintaining set and avoiding repetitions,
respectively). Updated fluency methods do involve trials in which examinees alternate between
multiple categories (such as in the D-KEFS), which may be useful to tease apart executive
contributions to verbal fluency; however, these methods rely on code switching, which is likely
to represent an executive function somewhat dissimilar to (and more complex than) simple,
effortful inhibition (as might be effectively measured by other procedures, such as the Hayling
task; see Cipolotti, Spano, Healy, Tudor-Sfetea, Chan, White et al., 2016; De Deyne, Navarro,
Perfors, & Storms, 2016). Future research efforts should focus on developing methods to clarify
the contribution of effortful inhibition to verbal fluency (such as a fluency task that asks
participants to “Name all the animals you can think of except for different types of birds.”).

Conclusions
In sum, this research identified an interesting relationship among mood, inhibition, and
semantic network activation, such that individuals reporting higher positive trait moods exhibited
greater inhibition interference and overall verbal fluency, whereas individuals reporting higher
negative trait moods exhibited less inhibition interference and overall verbal fluency. Those
reporting higher positive trait moods demonstrated greater intra-neighborhood semantic search
when compared to those reporting higher negative trait moods, while inter-neighborhood
semantic search was similar across trait mood groups. It also appeared that semantic network
activation involves inhibitory processes and, indeed, according to our Difference Model results,
may be mediated by it. Findings also suggested that negative and positive trait mood features are
not dissociable in discrete states, suggesting that mood questionnaires may more adequately
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reflect these states when negative and positive mood traits are considered together rather than
when considered separately.
The relationships between semantic network activation and inhibition identified in this
research are believed to be dynamic, complex, and very likely inseparable. The complex nature
of semantic network activity and of inhibition are not fully understood, and their relationship
warrants further investigation. While not without limitations, this work expands on the scientific
understanding of these cognitive abilities, and, as previously suggested, their relationship may
contribute to complex facets of the human experience, such as creativity, experiential openness,
distractibility, and processing styles. Although the mechanism by which cognitive skills are
optimized by situational factors could not be definitively identified, the linguistic aspects of
cognitive thought are implicated. It is hoped that this study will serve as the basis of future
research aimed to better understand the contribution of language to various cognitive skills and
to identify clinical applications in which these abilities are affected.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1.1. Positive Model Mood and Neuropsychological Test Correlations
Measure 1
English Proficiency Rating

Measure 2
PANAS Positive Affect
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
PANAS Positive Affect
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115

r
0.123
0.081
0.282
0.174
0.285
0.179
0.146
0.152
0.174
0.101
-0.013
0.009
0.004
0.100
0.007
0.152
0.022
0.030
0.028
0.018
0.111
0.092
0.094
0.086
0.090
0.115
-0.337
0.004
0.018
0.152
0.164
0.441
0.178
0.166
0.185
0.155
0.332
0.152
0.144
0.180
0.201

p-value
0.186
0.385
0.002*
0.061
0.002*
0.053
0.116
0.102
0.061
0.279
0.889
0.923
0.966
0.283
0.940
0.102
0.814
0.748
0.764
0.847
0.233
0.324
0.313
0.357
0.335
0.217
0.021*
0.966
0.847
0.102
0.077
0.001*
0.055
0.074
0.046*
0.952
0.001*
0.102
0.121
0.052
0.030*

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animal Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Word
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115

r
0.009
0.011
0.008
0.320
0.013
0.012
0.166
-0.115
-0.171
-0.156
0.003
0.008
0.130
-0.011
-0.013
-0.166
-0.090
-0.010
-0.112
-0.225
0.011
0.156
0.012
0.004
0.008
0.164
0.092
0.156
0.130
0.011
-0.037
0.041
0.029
-0.005
0.171
0.118
0.018
0.111
0.109
0.094
0.101
0.005
0.051
0.068

p-value
0.923
0.234
0.932
0.001*
0.889
0.898
0.074
0.217
0.065
0.093
0.974
0.932
0.162
0.234
0.889
0.074
0.335
0.915
0.229
0.047*
0.234
0.093
0.898
0.966
0.931
0.077
0.324
0.093
0.162
0.234
0.692
0.661
0.756
0.957
0.065
0.205
0.847
0.233
0.242
0.313
0.279
0.957
0.585
0.466

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
* Result significant at p < 0.05

142

df
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115

r
0.062
0.049
0.073
0.029
0.016
0.008
-0.033
-0.004
0.085
0.044
0.039
0.032
0.021
0.155
0.162
0.140
0.067
0.038
0.019
0.056
0.048
0.103
0.112
0.068
0.059
0.013
0.036
0.042
0.078
-0.003
0.089
0.091
0.076
0.070
0.057
-0.103
-0.133
-0.165
-0.142
-0.168
0.043
-0.133
0.100
0.108

p-value
0.507
0.600
0.434
0.756
0.864
0.932
0.724
0.966
0.362
0.638
0.676
0.732
0.822
0.095
0.081
0.132
0.473
0.684
0.839
0.549
0.607
0.269
0.229
0.466
0.527
0.889
0.700
0.653
0.403
0.974
0.340
0.329
0.415
0.453
0.542
0.269
0.153
0.754
0.127
0.070
0.645
0.887
0.283
0.246

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115

r
0.077
0.069
0.099
0.132
0.140
-0.158
0.019
0.076
0.070
0.081
0.086
0.014
0.157
0.098
0.132
0.163
0.069
0.022
0.015
0.014
0.006
0.009
-0.006
0.019
0.016
0.004
0.014
0.093
0.089
0.098
0.102
0.077
0.111
0.120
0.153
0.019
0.004
0.018
0.025
0.173
0.352
0.045
0.112
0.115

p-value
0.409
0.460
0.288
0.156
0.132
0.089
0.839
0.415
0.453
0.385
0.357
0.881
0.091
0.293
0.156
0.079
0.460
0.814
0.872
0.881
0.949
0.923
0.949
0.839
0.864
0.966
0.881
0.319
0.340
0.293
0.274
0.409
0.233
0.197
0.100
0.839
0.966
0.847
0.789
0.062
0.015*
0.630
0.229
0.217

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
Animals No. Neighborhoods Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
Animals Nei. Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
Animals Nei. Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115

r
0.396
0.008
0.044
0.046
0.036
0.039
0.028
0.166
0.176
0.046
0.036
0.029
0.031
0.014
0.016
0.026
0.034
0.049
0.020
0.022
0.103
0.111
0.120
0.124
0.063
0.164
0.086
0.032
0.012
0.013
0.041
0.050
0.015
0.015
0.009
0.031
0.011
0.102
0.110
0.154
0.163
0.144
0.170
0.497

p-value
0.011*
0.932
0.638
0.622
0.700
0.676
0.764
0.074
0.058
0.622
0.700
0.756
0.740
0.881
0.864
0.781
0.716
0.600
0.831
0.814
0.269
0.233
0.197
0.183
0.500
0.077
0.357
0.732
0.898
0.889
0.661
0.592
0.872
0.872
0.923
0.740
0.906
0.273
0.237
0.097
0.079
0.121
0.067
0.001*

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115

r
0.164
0.063
0.013
0.002
0.031
0.011
0.015
0.109
0.024
0.099
0.095
0.085
0.105
0.111
0.120
-0.006
-0.012
0.021
0.017
-0.028
-0.031
-0.045
0.011
-0.047
0.086
0.051
0.072
0.049
0.094
0.010
0.024
0.180
0.497
0.110
0.116
0.142
0.522
0.066
0.122
0.088
0.068
0.091
0.054
0.169

p-value
0.077
0.500
0.889
0.983
0.740
0.906
0.872
0.242
0.797
0.288
0.308
0.362
0.260
0.233
0.197
0.949
0.898
0.822
0.856
0.764
0.740
0.630
0.906
0.615
0.357
0.585
0.440
0.600
0.313
0.915
0.797
0.052
0.001*
0.238
0.213
0.127
0.001*
0.480
0.190
0.345
0.466
0.329
0.563
0.069

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115

r
0.107
0.103
0.172
0.169
0.155
0.122
0.142
0.089
0.044
0.056
0.060
0.048
0.155
0.085
0.112
0.097
0.086
0.051
0.140
0.046
0.023
0.092
0.104
0.080
0.166
0.044
0.028
0.035
0.170
0.031
0.088
0.061
0.045
0.057
0.079
0.058
0.072
0.080
0.173
0.043
0.006
0.018
0.016
0.022

p-value
0.251
0.269
0.064
0.069
0.095
0.190
0.127
0.340
0.638
0.549
0.520
0.607
0.095
0.362
0.229
0.298
0.357
0.585
0.132
0.622
0.801
0.324
0.264
0.391
0.074
0.637
0.764
0.708
0.067
0.740
0.345
0.514
0.630
0.542
0.397
0.534
0.440
0.391
0.062
0.645
0.949
0.847
0.864
0.814

Measure 1

Measure 2
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115
115

r
0.005
0.154
0.163
0.108
0.171
0.033
0.054
0.088
0.075
0.046
0.112
0.053
0.111
0.016
0.038
0.008
0.009
0.028
0.033
0.105
0.041
0.022
0.017
-0.003
0.058
0.032
0.011
0.022
0.018
0.024
0.143
0.015
0.020
0.041
0.038
0.013
0.169
0.158
0.161
0.154
0.167
0.155
0.130
0.178

p-value
0.957
0.097
0.079
0.246
0.065
0.724
0.563
0.345
0.422
0.622
0.229
0.570
0.233
0.864
0.684
0.932
0.923
0.764
0.724
0.260
0.661
0.814
0.856
0.974
0.534
0.732
0.906
0.814
0.847
0.797
0.124
0.872
0.831
0.661
0.684
0.889
0.069
0.089
0.083
0.097
0.072
0.095
0.162
0.055

Measure 1
WAIS-IV DSS

Measure 2
WMS-IV SSp
WMS-IV SSp

df
115
115

* Result significant at p < 0.05
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r
p-value
0.165 0.075
0.162 0.081

Appendix 1.2. Negative Model Mood and Neuropsychological Test Correlations
Measure 1
English Proficiency Rating

Measure 2
PANAS Negative Affect
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
PANAS Negative Affect
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113

r
0.021
0.013
0.336
0.180
-0.347
0.158
0.178
0.113
0.121
0.169
0.058
0.034
-0.019
-0.023
-0.036
-0.043
-0.015
-0.019
-0.030
-0.017
-0.022
0.101
0.089
0.110
0.113
0.076
-0.484
0.022
0.044
0.118
0.166
-0.567
-0.177
-0.156
-0.281
-0.017
-0.352
0.011
0.006
-0.180
-0.313
0.092

p-value
0.824
0.890
0.014*
0.054
0.011*
0.092
0.057
0.229
0.198
0.071
0.538
0.718
0.840
0.807
0.704
0.648
0.874
0.840
0.750
0.857
0.815
0.282
0.344
0.242
0.229
0.420
0.001*
0.815
0.641
0.209
0.076
0.001*
0.058
0.096
0.018*
0.857
0.010*
0.907
0.949
0.054
0.013*
0.328

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animal Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Word
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113

r
0.107
0.091
-0.479
-0.118
-0.163
-0.147
-0.155
-0.168
0.077
0.035
0.008
-0.011
-0.091
-0.164
-0.087
-0.023
-0.102
-0.114
-0.409
0.063
0.048
0.148
0.132
0.085
0.015
0.005
0.103
0.038
0.012
-0.032
0.055
0.080
0.062
0.126
-0.079
0.043
0.094
0.022
0.030
0.077
0.016
0.008
0.059

p-value
0.255
0.333
0.004*
0.209
0.082
0.117
0.098
0.073
0.413
0.710
0.932
0.907
0.333
0.080
0.355
0.807
0.278
0.225
0.012*
0.503
0.610
0.114
0.160
0.366
0.874
0.958
0.273
0.687
0.899
0.734
0.559
0.395
0.510
0.180
0.401
0.648
0.318
0.815
0.750
0.413
0.865
0.932
0.531

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113

r
0.067
0.027
0.035
0.083
0.113
0.105
0.066
0.018
0.026
0.005
0.013
0.033
0.135
-0.045
0.109
0.177
0.156
0.112
0.172
0.060
0.043
0.027
0.038
0.007
0.012
0.067
0.072
0.114
0.050
0.103
0.068
0.084
0.169
0.178
0.162
-0.065
-0.059
-0.028
-0.009
-0.014
0.005
0.030
0.143

p-value
0.477
0.775
0.710
0.378
0.229
0.264
0.483
0.849
0.783
0.958
0.890
0.726
0.150
0.632
0.246
0.058
0.096
0.233
0.066
0.524
0.648
0.775
0.687
0.941
0.899
0.477
0.444
0.225
0.596
0.273
0.470
0.372
0.071
0.057
0.084
0.490
0.531
0.766
0.924
0882
0.958
0.750
0.127

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113

r
0.128
0.088
0.067
0.112
0.105
0.138
0.095
0.147
0.064
-0.055
-0.089
-0.079
-0.052
0.167
0.158
0.177
0.169
0.141
0.120
-0.006
-0.012
0.132
0.150
-0.020
-0.008
-0.018
0.103
-0.028
0.129
0.177
0.103
0.111
0.101
0.141
0.157
0.176
0.127
0.170
0.105
0.098
0.178
0.378
0.092

p-value
0.173
0.350
0.477
0.233
0.264
0.141
0.313
0.117
0.497
0.559
0.344
0.401
0.581
0.074
0.091
0.584
0.071
0.134
0.201
0.950
0.899
0.160
0.110
0.832
0.932
0.849
0.273
0.766
0.169
0.584
0.273
0.238
0.283
0.133
0.094
0.060
0.176
0.069
0.264
0.297
0.057
0.002*
0.328

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
Animals No. Neighborhoods Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
Animals Nei. Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113

r
0.087
0.100
0.479
0.090
0.052
0.032
0.016
0.021
0.042
0.114
0.123
0.101
0.154
0.033
0.023
0.019
0.009
0.036
0.058
0.076
-0.120
0.070
0.138
0.088
0.072
0.066
0.017
0.180
0.055
0.138
0.102
0.095
0.130
0.135
0.089
0.072
0.077
0.148
0.070
0.122
0.108
0.102
0.100

p-value
0.355
0.288
0.001*
0.339
0.581
0.734
0.865
0.824
0.656
0.225
0.190
0.283
0.100
0.726
0.807
0.840
0.924
0.702
0.538
0.420
0.201
0.457
0.141
0.350
0.444
0.483
0.857
0.054
0.559
0.141
0.278
0.313
0.166
0.150
0.344
0.444
0.413
0.144
0.457
0.194
0.251
0.278
0.287

Measure 1

Measure 2
WMS-IV SSp
Animals Nei. Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113

r
0.069
0.113
0.411
0.012
0.020
0.115
0.130
0.028
0.021
0.038
0.129
0.026
0.045
0.086
0.104
0.138
0.083
0.161
0.035
0.049
0.147
0.176
0.051
0.039
0.062
0.159
0.046
0.093
0.067
0.078
0.044
0.103
0.031
0.038
0.181
0.438
0.046
0.033
0.079
0.513
0.098
0.113
0.065

p-value
0.464
0.229
0.001*
0.899
0.832
0.221
0.166
0.766
0.824
0.687
0.169
0.783
0.633
0.361
0.269
0.141
0.378
0.086
0.710
0.603
0.117
0.060
0.588
0.679
0.510
0.090
0.625
0.323
0.477
0.407
0.641
0.273
0.742
0.687
0.053
0.001*
0.625
0.726
0.401
0.001*
0.297
0.229
0.490

Measure 1

Measure 2
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
* Result significant at p < 0.05

155

df
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113

r
0.078
0.087
0.145
0.179
0.130
0.148
0.182
0.167
0.172
0.124
0.169
0.158
0.077
0.121
0.135
0.180
0.122
0.109
0.173
0.162
0.179
0.115
0.171
0.105
0.088
0.044
0.053
0.110
0.171
0.133
0.108
0.124
0.165
0.112
0.076
0.040
0.056
0.064
0.069
0.119
0.134
0.138
0.181

p-value
0.407
0.355
0.122
0.056
0.166
0.114
0.052
0.074
0.066
0.187
0.071
0.092
0.413
0.198
0.150
0.054
0.194
0.246
0.064
0.084
0.056
0.221
0.068
0.264
0.350
0.641
0.574
0.242
0.068
0.156
0.251
0.187
0.078
0.233
0.420
0.671
0.552
0.497
0.464
0.205
0.153
0.141
0.053

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113

r
0.116
0.034
0.022
0.014
0.018
0.047
0.170
0.165
0.103
0.174
0.156
0.104
0.111
0.123
0.150
0.168
0.148
0.157
0.144
0.064
0.070
0.082
0.130
0.128
0.166
0.179
0.121
0.110
0.115
0.162
0.169
0.076
0.068
0.036
0.044
0.109
0.113
0.045
0.055
0.062
0.104
0.097
0.077

p-value
0.217
0.718
0.816
0.882
0.849
0.618
0.069
0.078
0.273
0.063
0.096
0.269
0.237
0.190
0.110
0.073
0.114
0.094
0.125
0.497
0.457
0.384
0.166
0.173
0.076
0.056
0.198
0.242
0.221
0.084
0.071
0.420
0.470
0.702
0.641
0.246
0.229
0.632
0.559
0.510
0.269
0.302
0.413

Measure 1

WAIS-IV DSF

WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS

Measure 2
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
WMS-IV SSp

df
113
113
113
113
113
113
113
113

* Result significant at p < 0.05
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r
0.060
0.116
0.110
0.114
0.066
0.177
0.042
0.068

p-value
0.524
0.217
0.242
0.225
0.483
0.058
0.656
0.470

Appendix 1.3. Difference Model Mood and Neuropsychological Test Correlations
Measure 1
English Proficiency Rating

Measure 2
PANAS Difference
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
PANAS Difference
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110

r
0.006
0.025
0.332
0.373
-0.105
0.110
0.083
0.115
0.103
0.164
0.053
0.046
0.032
0.079
0.100
0.096
0.033
0.054
0.076
0.028
0.014
0.009
0.022
0.038
0.032
0.020
-0.106
0.045
0.086
-0.066
0.174
0.671
0.119
0.108
0.293
0.160
0.373
0.097
0.089
0.126
0.319
0.077

p-value
0.950
0.794
0.012*
0.009*
0.271
0.248
0.384
0.227
0.280
0.084
0.579
0.630
0.738
0.408
0.294
0.314
0.730
0.572
0.426
0.769
0.884
0.925
0.818
0.691
0.738
0.834
0.266
0.638
0.367
0.498
0.067
0.001*
0.211
0.257
0.024*
0.092
0.004*
0.309
0.351
0.186
0.011*
0.420

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
BDI-II
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animal Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Word
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
NAART IQ
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110

r
0.103
0.084
0.470
0.072
0.096
0.088
0.109
0.119
0.133
0.026
0.031
0.017
-0.046
-0.071
-0.039
-0.062
-0.090
-0.055
-0.262
0.023
0.029
-0.105
-0.092
0.043
0.017
0.008
-0.010
0.003
-0.029
-0.046
0.022
-0.006
0.027
0.167
0.071
0.154
0.177
0.120
0.109
0.169
0.039
0.043
0.035

p-value
0.280
0.379
0.001*
0.451
0.314
0.356
0.253
0.211
0.162
0.786
0.746
0.859
0.630
0.457
0.683
0.516
0.345
0.564
0.018*
0.810
0.761
0.271
0.335
0.653
0.859
0.933
0.917
0.975
0.761
0.630
0.818
0.950
0.777
0.784
0.457
0.105
0.062
0.208
0.253
0.075
0.683
0.653
0.714

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
ANT Total
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
ANT Latency
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110

r
0.049
0.023
0.016
0.028
0.038
0.026
0.041
0.009
0.067
0.081
0.112
0.102
0.130
0.015
0.087
0.076
0.068
0.099
0.113
0.062
0.090
0.041
0.029
0.035
0.066
0.051
0.022
0.029
0.074
0.020
0.083
0.049
0.057
0.068
0.092
0.083
0.023
0.016
0.029
-0.377
0.042
0.033
0.134

p-value
0.608
0.810
0.867
0.769
0.691
0.785
0.668
0.925
0.483
0.396
0.240
0.285
0.172
0.875
0.362
0.426
0.476
0.299
0.236
0.516
0.345
0.668
0.761
0.714
0.489
0.593
0.818
0.761
0.438
0.834
0.384
0.608
0.551
0.476
0.335
0.384
0.810
0.867
0.761
0.004*
0.660
0.730
0.159

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
FAS
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
Animals Total
Animals Number Neighborhoods
Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110

r
0.152
0.106
0.119
0.160
0.151
0.159
0.102
0.172
0.088
0.032
0.054
0.071
0.096
0.159
0.104
0.139
0.170
0.080
0.163
0.038
0.043
0.082
0.097
0.036
0.051
0.073
0.108
0.065
0.030
0.021
0.025
0.019
0.078
0.177
0.162
0.180
0.067
0.168
0.045
0.029
0.175
0.349
0.034

p-value
0.110
0.266
0.211
0.092
0.112
0.094
0.285
0.069
0.356
0.738
0.572
0.457
0.314
0.094
0.275
0.144
0.073
0.402
0.086
0.691
0.653
0.390
0.309
0.706
0.593
0.444
0.257
0.496
0.754
0.826
0.794
0.842
0.414
0.062
0.088
0.056
0.483
0.077
0.638
0.761
0.065
0.010*
0.722

Measure 1

Measure 2
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
Animals No. Neighborhoods Animals Neighborhood Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
Animals Nei. Exemplars
Animals Neighborhood Run Size
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110

r
0.061
0.048
0.500
0.059
0.076
0.082
0.060
0.047
0.091
0.109
0.127
0.116
0.130
0.011
0.026
0.118
0.133
0.013
0.035
0.020
0.114
0.027
0.058
0.036
0.059
0.049
0.077
0.173
0.154
0.168
0.071
0.058
0.102
0.123
0.044
0.055
0.038
0.109
0.061
0.073
0.113
0.088
0.052
0.120

p-value
0.523
0.615
0.001*
0.537
0.426
0.390
0.530
0.623
0.340
0.253
0.182
0.223
0.172
0.908
0.786
0.215
0.162
0.892
0.714
0.834
0.231
0.777
0.544
0.706
0.537
0.608
0.420
0.068
0.105
0.077
0.457
0.544
0.285
0.196
0.645
0.564
0.691
0.253
0.523
0.444
0.236
0.356
0.586
0.208

Measure 1
Animals Nei. Run Size

Measure 2
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
DRM Total
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
DRM Critical Lures
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110

r
0.438
0.161
0.021
0.029
0.093
0.105
0.036
0.055
0.070
0.160
0.028
0.080
0.044
0.050
0.067
0.075
0.045
0.010
0.024
0.036
0.064
0.018
0.027
0.051
0.049
0.009
0.073
0.059
0.042
0.060
0.090
0.106
0.121
0.181
0.458
0.137
0.140
0.129
0.426
0.115
0.108
0.077
0.083
0.098

p-value
0.001*
0.899
0.826
0.761
0.329
0.271
0.706
0.565
0.463
0.092
0.769
0.402
0.645
0.601
0.483
0.432
0.638
0.917
0.802
0.706
0.503
0.851
0.777
0.593
0.608
0.925
0.444
0.537
0.660
0.530
0.345
0.266
0.204
0.056
0.001*
0.150
0.141
0.175
0.001*
0.227
0.257
0.420
0.384
0.304

Measure 1

Measure 2
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Color Naming
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Word Reading
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Color-Word
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Switching
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110

r
0.111
0.184
0.161
0.143
0.170
0.155
0.117
0.095
0.172
0.080
0.053
0.049
0.041
0.094
0.102
0.110
0.169
0.173
0.162
0.135
0.179
0.087
0.050
0.039
0.047
0.099
0.183
0.100
0.126
0.139
0.176
0.086
0.076
0.040
0.061
0.070
0.079
0.113
0.101
0.092
0.179
0.163
0.077
0.025

p-value
0.244
0.052
0.090
0.133
0.073
0.103
0.219
0.319
0.070
0.402
0.579
0.608
0.668
0.324
0.285
0.248
0.075
0.068
0.088
0.156
0.059
0.362
0.601
0.683
0.623
0.299
0.053
0.294
0.186
0.143
0.063
0.367
0.426
0.675
0.523
0.463
0.408
0.236
0.289
0.335
0.059
0.086
0.420
0.794

Measure 1

Measure 2
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Scanning
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Number Seq.
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Letter Seq.
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Number-Letter
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
D-KEFS Speed
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
WAIS-IV DS Total
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
WAIS-IV DSF
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS
* Result significant at p < 0.05
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df
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110

r
0.045
0.069
0.084
0.171
0.164
0.093
0.181
0.065
0.030
0.048
0.060
0.088
0.175
0.103
0.168
0.099
0.066
0.053
0.087
0.115
0.106
0.173
0.080
0.073
0.061
0.090
0.122
0.093
0.056
0.033
0.049
0.067
0.071
0.020
0.031
0.018
0.012
0.047
0.146
0.152
0.139
0.106
0.155
0.142

p-value
0.638
0.470
0.379
0.071
0.084
0.329
0.056
0.496
0.754
0.615
0.530
0.356
0.065
0.280
0.077
0.299
0.489
0.579
0.362
0.227
0.267
0.068
0.402
0.444
0.523
0.345
0.200
0.329
0.558
0.730
0.608
0.483
0.457
0.834
0.746
0.851
0.900
0.623
0.125
0.110
0.144
0.266
0.103
0.135

Measure 1
WAIS-IV DSB
WAIS-IV DSS

Measure 2
WMS-IV SSp
WAIS-IV DSS
WMS-IV SSp
WMS-IV SSp

df
110
110
110
110

* Result significant at p < 0.05
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r
0.082
0.181
0.100
0.119

p-value
0.390
0.056
0.294
0.211
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